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ABSTRACT 
"y4 civilization can be judged by the way a society treats its minorities'". 
Mahatma Gandhi 
It is a curious fact that the world of today is made up of small number of states 
and a large number of minority groups. Like many countries India is also a multi-
ethnic society but her diversity is unmatched in the world in term of her uniqueness 
and extent. Uniqueness of Indian diversity lies i.n the fact that there is no majority 
community. In a sense it is a land of minorities. Majority community is also divided 
in small groups based on religion, culture, language and region. It is for this reason 
that at times even majority community suffers • from same unsafety with which 
minorities suffer and starts talking of one religion, one language and one culture. 
Certainly when majority becomes worried minorities become uneasy. 
Ethnicity is a by-product of a historical process. Minorities may come into being 
either as a result of victory and subjugation, break-up of a multi-national empire or 
the process of amalgamation or political, social and economic inequalities, integration 
of ethnic groups, and immigration. Minority environment in India is the combination 
of these factors. Minority groups are not eternal entities but changing dynamic social 
units that may come out and disappear over time according to historical 
circumstances. 
The problem of minority is the puzzling question to face for modem 
democracies. The problem is of universal phenomenon. The nature of the problem of 
minorities is not every where the same. There can be no question of minorities except 
in a democracy. Unless there is a democracy the problem would not arise in that form 
at all. In democracy recognition is given to equal rights and duties for all, without 
regard to their religion, race, caste or language. Minorities are not allowed to have 
their separate identities in totalitarian state, as tliere everything exists for the state. In 
totalitarian state minorities dissolve their identity in the identity of the state. 
The Framers of the Indian Constitution were alive to the intricate character of the 
problem. They believed that sound and healthy consciousness would increase if the 
minorities are guaranteed liberty, equality, fraternity and justice. They made every 
effort to incorporate a number of constitutional measures in the form of guaranteed 
rights, safeguards and protective rights. All this was done mainly in the broader 
interest of national integration and to inculcate confidence among the minorities so 
that they may be put on an equal footing with majority. The minorities should feel 
that they are partners and co-rulers in the country. Minority rights are more in the 
interest of majority and the democratic institutions of the country. 
It is interesting to note that until the decision of partition had not became 
imminent, the member of the Constituent Assembly had placed before them the tasks 
of securing agreement on a constitutional arrangement which could on the one hand, 
reassure the minorities that their interest and their distinctive characteristics would be 
secured in the future political set-up and, on the other hand, ensuring for themselves 
that extremist demands of minorities were not to be conceded beyond a certain point. 
But the statement of June 3, 1947, providing for the partition of the country into two 
separate sovereign nations had the effect of changing the whole complexions of 
minority problem. The decision of partition and the great upheaval that was brought 
with it had the inevitable effect of materially alternating the situation both 
psychologically as well as strategically. Congress was no more in need of being 
extremely conciliatory, and was no more under extreme necessity to bring about 
"consensus'. The problem of safeguards for minorities that had come to the forefront 
as a communal problem thus boiled down to lose its colour. The occurrence of events 
outside and the consequent change of attitudes inside the Assembly were the factors 
that greatly helped the Assembly in weeding out progressively the communal element 
from the minority problem. 
Safeguards of minorities provided in the constitution are of two kinds: negative 
and positive. The matter in which the state is forbidden to tal<e an action goes against 
the interests of any minority may be called as negative safeguards. These safeguards 
are guaranteed by the fundamental rights. The positive safeguards curtained to a large 
extent under part xvi of the constitution under Special Provisions Relating to certain 
classes are guaranteed safety security and opportunities for the development of 
general particular interests of minorities. 
A wide range of minority rights are covered by the constitutional provisions 
relating to the fundamental rights. Articles 14, 15, 16 and 2992) seek to protect them 
from hostile and discriminatory state action. Articles 25 to 28 guarantee non-
discrimination in the exercise of the right to the freedom of religion. And Article 30 
guarantees religious and linguistic minorities the most important right- the right to 
establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. By granting 
autonomy in culture and educational spheres, it was hoped that minorities would 
preserve their way of life and contribute in their own way to the prosperity and 
development of the countiy and towards its political unity. Directive Principles of 
State Policy are also relevant for the minority rights. Article 46 requires the state to 
take special care in promoting the educational and economic interests of the weaker 
sections of the people. Article 38 requires the state to promote the welfare of the 
people by securing a social order. 
The constitutional Provisions to the minorities prove beyond doubt that the 
framers of the constitution of India have dealt with the problem in its historical 
perspective thoroughly. The Constitution provided political, social, economic and 
other safeguards to minorities to fulfill their legitimate desires and to satisfy their 
respective inspiration. 
In the Constitution of India cultural and educational rights of minorities are the 
balancing approach to grow prosperous life and status for minorities. To bring about 
equalities, special rights have been designed in the Constitution for the minorities by 
ensuring the preservation of the minority institutions and by guaranteeing autonomy 
in the matter of the administration of these institutions. These special rights given to 
minorities are intended to bring about exact balance. The majority in a system of adult 
franchise hardly needs any protection. It can look after itself and protect its interests. 
Majority can brought any measure without any difficulty on the statute book because 
the majority can get that done by giving such a mandate to the elected representatives. 
It is only the minorities who need protection and that is why to ensure equality by the 
Constitution of Indian in favour of the minorities. 
The establishment and administration of educational institutions and cultural 
centers are undoubtedly effective means of preservation of culture and linguistic 
characteristic of minorities. Therefore, special care seems to have been taken by the 
framers to put substance in the right to establish and administer educational 
institutions including institutions for imparting general education through the 
language of administering minority. It is not limited to the institutions established 
after the commencement of the Constitution, but extends also to the administration 
and running of the old established institution. 
Education has always been considered as a means of safeguard and advancing the 
culture and language of a group. The minorities have always felt strongly about their 
distinct educational institutions. In historical perspective education has been the 
responsibility of the community such as religious, ethnic and caste groups who have 
been creating educational activities for their community members. In the olden days 
Madarsas, Pathshalas or Gurukulas etc. were set up with the charity received by the 
religious institutions. The community action was needed for education during the 
British period when the contribution of Government was limited to the elite. Thus the 
emergence of 'Voluntary Educational Services' was the outcome of the defeat of the 
British Government to consider the promotion of education entirely as the state's 
responsibility because it did not show free of cost education as a necessity for every 
Indian. In pre-independence era private colleges established by different communities 
and groups have formed better traditions and Christian mission schools have even 
excelled in fulfilling the goals of education. 
In the Indian context the concept of national development goes far beyond the 
economic growth, it is concerned equally with the growth of a self-confident 
individual with a strong commitment to democratic values with the creation of a 
nation united in purpose out of people speaking different languages professing 
different religions and rooted in a variety of cultures. Education plays a critical role in 
breaking the poverty and underdevelopment. 
The main aim of the present research work is to study and evaluate the rights of 
minorities to establish and administer educational institutions in India as safeguarded 
under Article 30 of the Indian constitution and approach of the judiciary while 
interpreting these rights. The present study contains 5 chapters beside introductory 
and concluding remarks. 
Chapter 1 tells a story of the events that ultimately led to the adoption by the 
Constituent Assembly of the rights protecting minorities. In this section an attempt is 
made to investigate as to how the problem of Constitutional protection for minorities 
begun and how it finished up. It narrates the all important events that ultimately led to 
the adoption by the Constituent Assembly of the rights secured to minorities. The 
main aim behind this is to provide a perspective for a better understanding of the real 
spirit behind the adoption of the educational safeguards for the minority educational 
institutions. It notes that in the beginning the problem of the protection of minorities 
was basically seen as a political problem having more focus on the demand for more 
political safeguards and reservation in jobs etc. But the partition of the country 
completely changed the whole outlook of the Constituent Assembly and finally 
minorities had to satisfy themselves with certain guarantees in the areas of education, 
culture and language. 
The very first question that arises in the interpretation of educational rights of 
minorities is to decide the meaning of the term minority because in order to bring a 
case under Article 30 of the Indian Constitution, a community has first to establish its 
character as linguistic or religious minority. Chapter 2 attempts to find out the 
meaning of the very word 'minority'. It highlights the fact that how difficult has 
always been the task of defining the term 'minority' which is at the core for securing 
certain rights for the minorities. It points out that there is no valid and definite 
yardstick to define the term 'minority' as such. The question of defining 'minority' 
has always been a hotly contested issue in international and domestic levels. The 
adoption of the United Nations Declaration on Minorities could be made possible 
only after a decision to let the term be undefined. The Indian Constitution uses the 
term minority/minorities in four Articles, namely, Articles 29(1), 30, 350A, and 
35OB. However, what is amazing is that the Constitution nowhere defines the term 
'minority', nor does it identify the minority groups or prescribe a definite test for 
identifying the same. Thus it has been left for the courts to ascertain whether a group 
claiming protection is one identifiable by the characteristics of religion or language 
and is numerically non-dominant. The courts now, however, come out with various 
kinds of rulings, not answering the problem in a uniform way. Consequently the term 
'minority' under Article 30 is still not clear in its meaning and import. 
In Chapter 3 an attempt is made to answer the question that when and what kind 
of proof the courts require from a minority claiming to have established the institution 
in question. The name of the institution, the persons involved in the establishment, the 
source of fund, the subjection of an institution to legal provisions, expression of the 
intention, nature of the claim as to whether it was a mere clock or presentation and the 
real motive was business adventure have, singly or in combination with each other, 
served as positive index proving the claim of establishment. The Courts have used 
such a wide discretion in placing emphasis on the factors for determining the 
adequacy of the proof, they have, consequently, failed to achieve uniformity in 
approach. The absence of any fixed formulae and the consequent use of wide 
discretion have led the courts to arrive at conclusion which are not always rational. 
Particular emphasis is placed upon Azeez Basha case to find out whether the 
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assumptions on which the Supreme Court proceeded to decide the case were 
historically, factually and logically correct. Chapter 3 also seeks to know whether the 
object of establishment should be to confine the benefits of the institution to the 
members of the minority alone or to keep the institution open to all religious or 
linguistic groups. It further explore whether the protection of Article 30 is confined to 
only such minority educational institutions established with the object of preserving 
language script or culture or extends to those institutions offering general secular 
education. 
The right of minorities to administer educational institutions has many facets like 
appointment of teachers, admission of the student, choice determination of language 
of the educational institution etc. The object of Chapter 4 is to put a focus on the 
power of the minority to administer educational institution of their choice. An attempt 
is made here to find out how far minorities are free to decide for their institutions the 
medium of instruction. The Supreme Court has recognized that implicit in the Article 
30 is the right of the minorities to impart instruction to their children in their own 
language. It is true that the State can provide for imparting education in a particular 
language but it must not stifle the language, script or culture of any section of the 
citizens as such course would be trespass on the rights of those citizens who have a 
distinct language or script and which they have a right to conserve through 
educational institutions of their own. 
The admission policy is a matter which is considered very much within the realm 
of the administration of a minority educational institution. Chapter 4 ascertains the 
scope of the right of minority institutions in matters of admission of students. The 
right of minority institutions to select students could be regulated but it must be 
reasonable. It should be conducive to the welfare of the minority and must not be 
annihilative of their minority character. The question as to what extent the State can 
interfere in the matter of admission in minority institutions has also been addressed in 
this Chapter and points out that the Courts have failed to lay any definite guidelines in 
this regard. 
Chapter 4 also enquires about the power of the minority institutions in the matter 
of selection of their staff and to further seeks to find out as to what kind of conditions 
can be imposed by the State in this regard. The right to choose the principal and to 
have the teaching conducted by teachers appointed by the management after an 
overall assessment of their outlook and philosophy is perhaps the most important 
facet of the right to administer an educational institution. The Courts have generally 
observed that so long as the persons chosen have the qualifications prescribed by the 
University, the choice must be left to the management. 
The aim of chapter 5 is to find out as to what extent the State can exercise its 
regulatory power vis-a-vis minority educational institutions. The attempt has also 
been made to find out as to whether the courts have been successful in laying down 
any viable method for determining the constitutionality of a regulatory measure. The 
decisions on the scope and applicability of Art.30 seem to have long settled that as no 
right can be absolute, Art.30, being no exception, cannot have its operation as an 
unbridled license, and can have its effectiveness only within specified limits. The 
judiciary has consistently recognized that reasonable restrictions can be imposed. But 
only such regulations are permissible which do not restrict the right of administration 
of the minority community but facilitate and ensure better and more effective exercise 
of that right for the benefit of the institutions. 
Chapter 5 also discusses about the vital issues of recognition and affiliation as 
without them the right to establish and administer educational institutions would 
remain an empty proposition. It seeks to find out the answer for the question whether 
recognition or affiliation can be claimed as a matter of right. Further attempt is made 
to know that what kind of regulatory conditions can be attached to the grant of 
affiliation and recognition. Though there is no express right to recognition or 
affiliation under Article 30 it cannot be denied or withheld arbitrarily by the State and 
only such conditions can be attached to the affiliation or recognition that do not 
render the operation of Article 30 illusory. Chapter 4 also examines issues relating to 
disciplinary control over staff and fees regulation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When India became independent after its partition on religious ground, religious 
minorities became very apprehensive of their identity. Therefore, one of the biggest 
challenges before the framers of our Constitution was to assuage their apprehensions 
and to maintain the unity of India without compromising its rich diversity. This object 
was very beautifully achieved by declaring India a secular State and conferring 
constitutional safeguards on its minorities, both religious and linguistic. Minority 
rights were made cornerstone of the constitution of independent India. It is gratifying 
to note that at a time when even international communality was grappling with the 
problem of recognition of minority rights in international law in the post 2"^* World 
War, the Indian constitution not only provided safeguards to minorities against 
discrimination and ensured equality of treatment it also granted special rights to them 
as well. All this was done mainly in the broader interest of national integration and to 
inculcate confidence among the minorities so that they may be put on an equal footing 
with the majority and should enjoy all opportunities to participate in the democratic 
functions of the country. The framers of the Indian constitution wanted to lay down 
the foundation of a strong and vibrant democratic country with secular outlook and 
minority safeguards. 
The constitution of India provides ample safeguards to minorities to suit their 
specific needs, to fulfill their legitimate desires, and to satisfy their respective 
aspirations. Articles 15, 16, and 29 enjoin that the State shall not discriminate against 
any citizens on grounds of religion, race, caste, place of birth or any of them. 
Similarly Articles 25 to 28 guarantee non-discrimination in the exercise of the right to 
the freedom of religion. And Article 30 guarantees religious and linguistic minorities 
to most important right- the right to establish and administer educational institutions 
of their choice. The reason for giving fiandamental right status to the educational 
rights of the minorities was to make it immune from the ordinary State interference 
though the State can impose reasonable restrictions on the exercise of this right. The 
present study is a modest attempt to examine the nature and scope of the Article 30 in 
the light of judicial pronouncements. 
Education has always been considered as a means of preserving and advancing the 
culture and language of a group. Education is recognized as an important input both 
for the growth of the society as well as for the individual. The education generates in 
an individual a critical outlook on social and political realities and sharpness the 
ability to self-examination, self-monitoring and self-criticism. The minorities have 
always felt strongly about it. Furthermore the religious, ethnic and caste groups have 
always been organizing educational activities for their members. They have shown 
interest in educational uplift of their members. In India the need for more active 
engagement of communities in the field of education was felt more during the British 
period as the contribution of the then government was limited and had no mass 
appeal. It is against this background emerged the tradition of establishing private 
educational institutions by different communities and groups in India. The Christian 
minority community took more serious interest in setting up of educational 
institutions in India followed by Muslims and other minorities. 
The Honorable Supreme Court of India by their judicial dictum tried to interpret 
the 'letter and spirit' of the constitutional provisions regarding the minorities right to 
education keeping in view the recent socio-economic jurisprudential orientation and 
the new trend of unaided minority educational institution. To satisfy the new trend of 
the liberalization, privatization and globalization intelligent judiciary in TMA Pai 
Foundation ' case has oven-uled the view of the Unni Krishnan that is the 
nationalization of education and surrendering the total process of selection to the state 
but TMA Pai foundation allowed to educational institutions to generate reasonable 
surplus to meet cost of expansion and augmentation of facilities which would not 
amount to profiting. In the case of Islamic Academy', the ratio of Pai Foundation^ 
that autonomy of unaided non-minority institutions is an important facet of their right 
under article 19(1) (g) and in case of minority under Article 19(l)(g) read with Article 
30 of the constitution has been ignored. 
The main aim of the present research work is to study and evaluate the rights of 
minorities to establish and administer educational institutions in India as safeguarded 
under Article 30 of the Indian constitution and approach of the judiciary while 
interpreting these rights. The present study contains 5 chapters beside introductory 
and concluding remarks. 
Chapter 1 narrates the events that ultimately led to the adoption by the Constituent 
Assembly of the rights protecting minorities. In this section an attempt is made to 
investigate as to how the problem of Constitutional protection for minorities begun 
and how it finished up. It narrates the all important events that ultimately led to the 
adoption by the Constituent Assembly of the rights secured to minorities. The main 
aim behind this is to provide a perspective for a better understanding of the real spirit 
behind the adoption of the educational safeguards for the minority educational 
institutions. It notes that in the beginning the problem of the protection of minorities 
was basically seen as a political problem having more focus on the demand for more 
political safeguards and reservation in jobs etc. But the partition of the country 
completely changed the whole outlook of the Constituent Assembly and finally 
minorities had to satisfy themselves with certain guarantees in the areas of education, 
culture and language. 
The very first question that arises in the interpretation of educational rights of 
minorities is to decide the meaning of the term minority because in order to bring a 
case under Article 30 of the Indian Constitution, a community lias first to establish its 
character as linguistic or religious minority. Chapter 2 attempts to find out the 
meaning of the very word 'minority'. It highlights the fact that how difficuh has 
always been the task of defining the term "minority' which is at the core for securing 
certain rights for the minorities. It points out that there is no valid and definite 
yardstick to define the term 'minority' as such. The question of defining 'minority' 
has always been a hotly contested issue in international and domestic levels. The 
adoption of the United Nations Declaration on Minorities could be made possible 
only after a decision to let the term be undefined. The Indian Constitudon uses the 
term minority/minorifies in four Articles, namely. Articles 29(1), 30, 350A, and 
35OB. However, what is amazing is that the Constitufion nowhere defines the term 
"minority', nor does it identify the minority groups or prescribe a definite test for 
identifying the same. Thus it has been left for the courts to ascertain whether a group 
claiming protection is one identifiable by the characteristics of religion or language 
and is numerically non-dominant. The courts now, however, come out with various 
kinds of rulings, not answering the problem in a uniform way. Consequently the term 
"minority' under Article 30 is sfiU not clear in its meaning and import. 
In Chapter 3 an attempt is made to answer the question that when and what kind 
of proof the courts require from a minority claiming to have established the institution 
in question. The name of the institution, the persons involved in the establishment, the 
source of fund, the subjecfion of an institufion to legal provisions, expression of the 
intention, nature of the claim as to whether it was a mere clock or presentation and the 
real motive was business adventure have, singly or in combination with each other, 
served as positive index proving the claim of establishment. The Courts have used 
such a wide discretion in placing emphasis on the factors for determining the 
adequacy of the proof, they have, consequently, failed to achieve uniformity in 
approach. The absence of any fixed formulae and the consequent use of wide 
discretion have led the courts to arrive at conclusion which are not always rational. 
Particular emphasis is placed upon Azeez Basha^ case to find out whether the 
assumptions on which the Supreme Court proceeded to decide the case were 
historically, factually and logically correct. Chapter 3 also seeks to know whether the 
object of establishment should be to confine the benefits of the institution to the 
members of the minority alone or to keep the institution open to all religious or 
linguistic groups. It further explore whether the protection of Article 30 is confined to 
only such minority educational institutions established with the object of preserving 
language script or culture or extends to those institutions offering general secular 
education. 
The right of minorities to administer educational institutions has many facets like 
appointment of teachers, admission of the student, choice determination of language 
of the educational institution etc. The object of Chapter 4 is to put a focus on the 
power of the minority to administer educational institution of their choice. An attempt 
is made here to find out how far minorities are free to decide for their institutions the 
medium of instruction. The Supreme Court has recognized that implicit in the Article 
30 is the right of the minorities to impart instruction to their children in their own 
language. It is true that the State can provide for imparting education in a particular 
language but it must not stifle the language, script or culture of any section of the 
citizens as such course would be trespass on the rights of those citizens who have a 
distinct language or script and which they have a right to conserve through 
educational institutions of their own. 
The admission policy is a matter which is considered very much within the realm 
of the administrafion of a minority educational institution. Chapter 4 ascertains the 
scope of the right of minority institutions in matters of admission of students. The 
right of minority institutions to select students could be regulated but it must be 
reasonable. It should be conducive to the welfare of the minority and must not be 
annihilative of their minority cliaracter. The question as to what extent the State can 
interfere in the matter of admission in minority institutions has also been addressed in 
this Chapter and points out that the Courts have failed to lay any definite guidelines in 
this regard. 
Chapter 4 also enquires about the power of the minority institutions in the matter 
of selection of their staff and to further seeks to find out as to what kind of conditions 
can be imposed by the State in this regard. The right to choose the principal and to 
have the teaching conducted by teachers appointed by the management after an 
overall assessment of their outlook and philosophy is perhaps the most important 
facet of the right to administer an educational institution. The Courts have generally 
observed that so long as the persons chosen have the qualifications prescribed by the 
University, the choice must be left to the management. 
The aim of chapter 5 is to find out as to what extent the State can exercise its 
regulatory power vis-a-vis minority educational institutions. The attempt has also 
been made to find out as to whether the courts have been successful in laying down 
any viable method for determining the constitutionality of a regulatory measure. The 
decisions on the scope and applicability of Art.30 seem to have long settled that as no 
right can be absolute, Art.30, being no exception, cannot have its operation as an 
unbridled license, and can have its effectiveness only within specified limits. The 
judiciary has consistently recognized that reasonable restrictions can be imposed. But 
only such regulations are permissible which do not restrict the right of administration 
of the minority community but facilitate and ensure better and more effective exercise 
of that right for the benefit of the insfitutions. 
Chapter 5 also discusses about the vital issues of recognition and affiliation as 
without them the right to establish and administer educational institutions would 
remain an empty proposition. It seeks to find out the answer for the question whether 
recognition or affiliation can be claimed as a matter of right. Further attempt is made 
to know that what kind of regulatory conditions can be attached to the grant of 
affiliation and recognition. Though there is no express right to recognition or 
affiliation under Article 30 it cannot be denied or withheld arbitrarily by the State and 
only such conditions can be attached to the affiliation or recognition that do not 
render the operation of Article 30 illusory. It also examines issues relating to 
disciplinary control over staff and fees regulation. 
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CHAPTER -1 
FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION AND MINORITY RIGHTS 
The Constituent Assembly created by the will of the Indian people. It came in 
the last scene of the last act, with the help of the British. Constituent Assembly 
drafted a constitution for India in the years from December 1946 to December 
1949. In the Assembly Indians were for the first time in a century and a half 
responsible for their own governance. They were at last free to mould their own 
destiny, to shape their long-proclaimed aims and aspirations, and to establish the 
national institutions that would facilitate the fulfillment of these aims. These tasks 
the members approached with remarkable idealism and strength of purpose born 
of the struggle for independence. Constituent Assembly members intended to light 
the way to make a new India. 
The Constitution was to nourish the achievement of many aims. Transcendent 
among them was that of social revolution. Through this revolution would be 
fulfilled the basic needs of the common man and it was hoped, this revolution 
would bring about fundamental changes in the structure of Indian cultural and 
traditional society. Assembly members believed of the infusion of powerful 
energy to adopt parliamentary government and direct elections, many aspects of 
Executive, Legislative, Judicial provisions. Fundamental Rights and Directive 
Principles of the Constitution. The practical provisions were largely a product of 
the Assembly members experience in government and of the exigencies of the 
times. The members of the Constituent Assembly did not work in a vacuum. Not 
only did they act as the nation's parliament from August 1947 until January 1950, 
but many of them were also the leaders of the Union and Provincial Governments. 
The Constituent Assembly was able to draft a constitution that was both a 
declaration of social intent and an intricate administrative blueprint because of the 
extraordinary sense of unity among the members. The members disagreed hardly 
at all about the ends they sought and only slightly about the means for achieving 
them, although several issues did produce deep dissension. The atmosphere of the 
Assembly, generally speaking, was one of trust in the leadership and a sense of 
compromise among the members. The Assembly's hope, which it frequently 
achieved, was to reach decisions by consensus. And there can be little doubt that 
the lengthy and frank discussion of all the provisions of the future constitutions by 
the Assembly followed by sincere attempts to compromise and to reach consensus, 
have been the principal reason for the strength of the Constitution. ' 
1.1 The Origins of the Constituent Assembly 
By the end of the 2"^  World War, India was ready for a Constituent Assembly 
and her leaders were demanding one.^  Gandhi had changed his skeptical attitude of 
1934 and had proclaimed himself more and more "enamoured" of an Assembly.^ 
Most important, Britain, in the person of Sir Stafford Cripps, had accepted the idea 
that an elected body of Indians should frame the Indian Constitution. The 
proposals that Cripps put forward on his mission to India in 1942 were not 
accepted for a variety of reasons but Cripps made it clear that Indians would write 
their own constitution." 
On 14* September, 1939, the following resolution was passed by the 
Congress: "The committee wishes to declare again that recognition of India's 
independence and the right of her people to frame their constitution through a 
Constituent Assembly is essential. This Assembly can frame a constitution in 
which the rights of accepted minorities would be protected to their satisfaction 
and in the event of some matters relating to minority rights not being mutually 
agreed to they can be referred to arbitration. The Constituent Assembly should be 
elected on the basis of adult suffrage, the existing separate electorates being 
retained for such minorities as desires them. The number of these members in the 
Assembly should reflect their strength." ^ (Emphasis added) 
The substance of the demand for a Constituent Assembly was accepted by the 
British Government in the August offer of 1940. The Cripps Proposal of 1942 
went a step further and laid down the principles according to which the 
Constituent Assembly was to be set up^. 
This state of affairs continued till the end of the Second World War in 1945. 
When the Labor Party came to power in England in 1945, it decided to send the 
famous Cabinet Mission which visited India in March 1946. The joint statement 
issued by the Cabinet Mission and Lord Wavell on 16"^  May, 1946, gave a clear 
picture of the constitution-making machinery which was to be set up by the 
British Government to frame a constitution for Indians. It has already been pointed 
out that the legislative Assemblies of the provinces were to elect the members of 
the Constituent Assembly on the basis of one representative for one million of the 
population.'' 
The Mission made its plan public on 16^*^  May, 1946. By the end of June, after 
infinitely detailed negotiations, both the League and the Congress had accepted it, 
but both had publicly and privately record their reservations. Jinnah accepted the 
Cabinet Mission Plan "because the foundation of Pakistan is inherent in 
compulsory grouping and because it (the League) hopes it will ultimately resuh in 
independent Pakistan" ^ . The Congress accepted the plan subject to its own 
interpretations of certain provisions being accepted by the British and the League.^ 
The Constituent Assembly elected under the terms of one portion of the 
Cabinet Mission Plan'^. The members of three communal categories in the 
legislatures Muslim, Sikh, and general (Hindu and all other communities), would 
elect separately, according to their percentage of the province's population, their 
proportion of the provincial delegation. The Princely States, according to the 
Mission Plan, were to have ninety three representatives in the Assembly, but the 
method of selecting them was left: to consultation between the Assembly and the 
States' rulers. The negotiations between the Constituent Assembly States 
Committee and representatives of the Princes resulted in an agreement that 
provided at least 50 per cent of the States' representatives being elected to the 
Assembly; the rulers could nominate members up to 50 per cent, but it was hoped 
that the greater proportion would be elected." 
The cabinet Mission had failed. It failed because the Congress and the League 
had almost certainly become too estranged for reconciliation, which in any case 
was out of the question so long as the British were a third party to whom each side 
could appeal against the other. Yet if the three members of the Cabinet Mission 
could not hold together Muslim and non-Muslim India '^  (Indian Muslim 
Community had a population of about 100 millions, of which approximately 65 
million became Pakistanis), something that only Indians, if they, could have 
accomplished, a portion of the Mission's efforts lived on in the Indian Constituent 
Assembly. 
In August 1946 India was heading towards independence and the problem was 
how to bring the Congress and the League together in the Constituent Assembly 
and obtain their cooperation in forming the Interim Government envisaged in the 
Cabinet Mission Plan. The Congress went ahead with its plans for the Assembly, 
appointing an experts committee to draft fundamental rights and to arrange the 
early sessions.''' And the Congress, at the League Viceroy's invitation formed the 
Interim Government. The League continued to ignore the Assembly. It referred to 
join the Interim Government, but later changed its mind and joined with the stated 
purpose of wrecking it.'"* 
Nehru and other Assembly leaders continued to hope throughout December 
1946 that the League would instruct its members to join the Assembly, and outside 
that body the Congress changed or differed policies to this end. Partition was in 
the air at the end of 19th April when the Assembly met for the third time. For this 
reason it postponed debate on preliminary federal prevision. Throughout May 
1947, however. Assembly Committee continued to work, as they had during the 
previous six months, within the framework of the Cabinet Mission Plan.'^ The 
Constituent Assembly was still marking time. 
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On June 3, 1947 Lord Mountbatten, Viceroy since March, announced that on 
15* August England would recognize the existence of two independent states on 
the sub-continent, India and Pakistan.'^ India and more than half of her Muslims 
under Jinnah were to go separate ways. The Indian Independence Act passed by 
the British Parliament came into effect in 15* August, 1947, giving legally to the 
Constituent Assembly the status it had assumed since its inception. The Cabinet 
Mission Plan became outmoded and the Constituent Assembly settled down to 
draft free India's Constitution.'^ 
The Congress overwhelming majority in the Constituent Assembly resulted 
from the December 1945, provincial legislature elections and from partition. 
Under the scheme of indirect election in the Cabinet Mission plan, the Constituent 
Assembly reflected the complexion of the provincial legislature. Hence in the July 
1946, election to the Assembly, League members own all but seven of the seats 
reserved for Muslims.'^ Although the outcome of the Assembly elections in July 
1946 had made the Congress master of the Assembly, party policy ensured that 
Congress members their represented the country. This was a result of the in 
written and in questioned belief that the Congress should be both socially and 
ideologically diverse and of a deliberate policy that represent in the Assembly. 
As a result of Congress policy, the minority communhies were fully 
represented in the Constituent Assembly, usually by members of their own 
choosing. The Indian Christians had seven representations in the Assembly, the 
Anglo-Indians three, the Parses three, and so on. After partition, when the 
composition of the Assembly except for the representation of the Princely States, 
had become settled the minorities had 88 of the 235 seats allotted to the provinces, 
or 37 percent of the provincial membership.'^ 
1.2 Origin of the Minority Problem 
The problem of protection of minority interests has essentially been a 
communal problem,^" emerging as it did in the few decades before independence 
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out of almost a non-existent issue and developing into one which pervaded the 
entire political and social scene and ultimately served as the prime factor in 
dividing the sub-continent into two independent nations. The reasons, however, 
which helped push the problem into the forefront of national poHtics ultimately 
seeking solution through the constructional method, were such on which opinions 
differed widely from each other^'. To many, the problem was entirety a British 
creation born of the introduction of separate communal electorates under the 
Minto-Morley reforms of 1909, the system being a part of the policy of 'divide 
and rule' which the British had profitably followed since long.^ ^ To others, the 
British could not have divided and ruled unless the ruled were ready to be 
divided '^^  and that the emergence of the problem was a necessary consequence of 
the differences in religion, culture, history, tradition and political and economic 
interests of the different communities, more particularly of Hindus and Muslim.'^ '* 
In the previous century, despite occasional communal outbursts and occasional 
manifestations of a strained relationship, the two largest communities of India, 
Hindu and Muslim, had lived fairly peacefully. They were the subjects of a 
colonial power and hardly anything political to quarrel about. It was only in the 
present century that the political element came to have its way into their 
relations.^^ As soon as the independence movement supported by the fervor of 
nationalism, because strong enough to win from the British at least the promise of 
self-government and as soon any prospect of even a limited transfer of powers 
became visible on the country's political scene the two communities, as also the 
other political identities became increasingly conscious of their political position 
in future India.^ ^ 
Establishment of self-government involved the development of representative 
institutions gradually developing into a full-fledged parliamentary system on the 
British model. Introduction of any system of representation based upon direct 
election and majority rule meant a government by individuals responsible to the 
elected representatives of the majority. In the Indian conditions, where political 
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action was almost bound to be an expression of religious or ethnic group 
consciousness, the rule of the majority meant hardly anything else than the rule of 
the Hindu majority. In this political system, new and uncertain, the minorities 
being smaller in number were destined to remain in a position of disadvantage, 
perhaps perpetually. The principal moving forces, thus, behind the question of 
constitutional safeguards for minorities were fear and insecurity, intensified, 
indeed, by political and economic competition.'^ 
1.3 Safeguards for Minorities: Extra Constitutional Developments 
Whatever the reasons underlying the origin, ever since the problem of 
minorities had assumed colour, the Congress had held the view that the only 
solution to the problem of minorities, which would be compatible with the ideal of 
nationalism, was to incorporate in the constitution a detailed list of fundamental 
rights, applicable to any particular religion. The emergence of the nationalist 
movement and the birth of the Indian National Congress in 1885 were the direct 
result of the discriminatory treatment meted out to Indians in their own country. 
The desire to have some basic rights for all the Indians was in fact the desire of all 
the Indians represented by the Indian National Congress. In the earlier stages of 
the nationalist movement the Congress had demanded for the people the same 
rights and privileges that their British masters had enjoyed in India and were 
available to them in their own country. It was a demand to bring to an end the 
discrimination inherent in the colonial regime.^ ^ 
The demand for guarantee of fundamental rights had first appeared in the 
Constitution of India Bill, framed by the Indian National Congress^^ and was 
thereafter expressed in several resolutions passed by the Congress, particularly 
between 1917 and 1919.^ ^^  By the mid-twenties, the Congress and its leaders had 
become increasingly conscious of their Indianness and, consequently, their 
demands for civil rights were no more directed solely at establishing the rights of 
Indians. Mrs. Besant's Commonwealth of India Bill, 1925, stressed the need for 
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equality before the law, individual liberty, freedom of conscience, free expression 
of opinion, free assembly, right of free education, free profession and practice of 
religion, and for some other rights. The Nehru Committee Report of 1928 was a 
step further in that it recommended for being included in the proposed constitution 
not only a list of guaranteed fundamental rights but also it laid great emphasis on 
the safeguards for minorities, which included the right to freedom of conscience 
and free profession and practice of religion, elementary education for members of 
minorities, reservation of seats for Muslims where they were in minorhy and for 
non-Muslim in NWFP. 
The appointment of the Simon Commission by the British Government in 
November, 1927 impelled the Congress to draft a Constitution for future political 
set-up. For this, it passed what is known as the Madras Resolution, 1927, which 
provided for setting up a Committee to draft a constitution on the basis for a 
"declaration of rights". The Committee under the chairmanship of Motilal Nehru, 
came into being in May, 1928, and submitted what is known as the Nehru Report. 
The Karachi Resolution, 1931 was another major step in the development of 
constitutional rights for the Indian people and was somewhat unique for its 
emphasis on states positive obligations towards betterment of social and economic 
conditions of the people and removal of inequality and discrimination inherent in 
the society. 
Sapru Report, 1945 ,^' which was the last major document of the pre-
Constituent Assembly period, incorporated a number of fundamental rights 
including liberties of the individual; equality of rights of citizenship of all 
nationals irrespective of birth, religion, colour, caste or creed; full religious 
toleration, including non-interference in religious beliefs, practices and 
institutions; protection to language and culture of all communities. It also 
incorporated, for being included in a future constitution, a number of suggestions 
to ensure and safeguard the interests of minorities, which included provision for 
appointment of minority commission both at the centre and in each of the 
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provinces, reservation of seats in the legislatures ten percent of the total seats to be 
allotted to some special interests and the rest to be distributed among Hindus, 
Scheduled Casts, Muslims, Sikh, Indian Christians, Anglo-Indians, and other 
Communities. The committee also made a recommendation, a definite 
improvement upon any earlier recommendations, for a composite executive at the 
Centre representing Hindus, Scheduled Castes, Muslims, Sikh, Indian Christians, 
Anglo-Indians, their representation being, as far as possible a reflection of their 
strength in the legislature. The Committee also recommended for India, to be at far 
with the representation given to the Hindus, provided the Muslim agreed to the 
substitution throughout of joint electorates with reservation of seats for separate 
communal electorates.^^ 
1.4 Safeguard for Minorities: Constitutional Channel 
At the beginning the debate on constitutional safeguards for minorities 
centered around the issue of the method of selection of Indian representative to the 
legislative institutions. Thought several minority groups were involved in the 
debates over this issue, the principal disputants were the Muslim League, claiming 
to be the sole spokesman for the Muslims of India, and the Indian National 
Congress, claiming to be the sole spokesman for the nationalist movement 
representing all the Indians of all creeds and communities. The British were the 
third party to the dispute. The attempts to resolve the dispute and to secure 
communal accord resulted in the gradual introduction of a series of safeguards in 
the constitutional system. 
The first in the series were Minto-Morley Reforms of 1909^^  by which the 
Muslim were given separate electorate, while retaining their right to vote also in 
the general electorate. Thereafter, the question of separate electorates was 
recognized by the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919.^ "^  The question became 
one of the most contentious issues at the Round Table Conference.^ ^ Here not only 
the Muslims but also the representatives of other minority communities pressed 
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for this form of protection. Unable to reach an agreed solution, the British 
Government felt itself compelled to give what is known as the Communal Award ^  
in 1932 which was afterwards incorporated in the Government of India Act, 1935. 
This not only but extended the system to include Sikhs, Anglo-Indians, Indian 
Christians, Untouchables (Scheduled Caste) and even to Europeans and other 
classes of people needing protection. ^^  
Besides separate electorates and provision for additional seats for minorities in 
the legislatures in excess of the number they would ordinarily merit on a direct 
population basis, known as 'weightage', the British also adopted the policy of 
reservation of posts in the public services for the minorities.''^ For the purpose of 
redressing the inequalities as between the various communities the adopted from 
1925, a policy of reserving a certain percentage of direct appointments to public 
services the main object of this policy was to secure increased representation for 
Muslims. This policy was placed in 1934 on a formal basis as 25 percent of the 
total seats to be filled by direct recruitment of Indians were to be earmarked for 
Muslims and about 8 percent of such seats were to be reserved for other 
minorities. Some special quotas were also fixed for Anglo-Indians in certain 
categories of subordinate services.'''^  
In the last decade before independence, the communal question was 
inseparately linked to the proposal for the creation of a constitution making body 
which in turn depended upon a decision on the question whether India was going 
to be the sole successor of the British Government or the demand for an 
independent State of Pakistan was to be conceded. During this decade, as the 
prospects of British withdrawal from the Indian scene grew, the differences 
between the Congress and the League became more pronounced and 
uncompromising,'"^ and with this the problem of communal minority assumed 
formidable proportions. The Congress took its stand on independence, almost 
immediate and unconditional, the League on self-determination. Under the 
exigencies of the War, the British Government moved a considerable distance 
towards a settlement. One step was the August Offer (Statement made by Lord 
Linlithgow on 8 August, 1940/ which recognized that the framing of the new 
constitution would be primarily the responsibility of the Indians themselves and 
that the body framing the constitution would be represented by the "principal 
elements in India's national life", which means the different communities in India. 
The Congress did not accept the offer as it did not meet its immediate demand for 
a national government. ''^ The Muslim League welcomed the assurance that no new 
constitution would be adopted without the consent of the minorities but 
simultaneously its demand for a separate State. The Cripps Mission Proposals, 
''•'which granted the right of secession to provinces and Indian States, were another 
step to protect the interests of religious and racial minorities, but were 
unacceptable to Congress on the ground of being against the concept of Indian 
unity, and to Muslim League on the ground that they failed to incorporate a 
provision for a separate Constituent Assembly. 
After the failure of the Cripps Proposals, the Cabinet Mission which came to 
India is the spring of 1946 issued a statement known as the statement of May 16, 
which contained its recommendations on three matters'''' - the demand for 
partition, the basic form of the constitution, and the machinery for constitution 
making. While rejecting the demand for partition, it proposed for a weak centre 
with considerable provincial autonomy with a view to "very real Muslim 
apprehensions that their culture and political and social life might become 
submerged in a purely unitary India, in which the Hindu with their greatly superior 
numbers must be a dominating element. The weak centre was thus a concession to 
communal apprehensions. The statement also provided further safeguards for 
minorities suggesting for a provision to be made in the new constitution that any 
question raising a major communal issue in the legislature should require for its 
decision by a majority of the representatives, present and voting, of each of the 
two major communities as well as majority of all the members present and voting. 
It also provided for inclusion in the Constitution a bill of rights, as partial answer 
to the question of minority rights, the specific nature of which was a matter for the 
Constituent Assembly to decide. The Cabinet Mission also made it clear that the 
secession of sovereignty to the Indian people on the basis of Constitution framed 
by the Constituent Assembly would be conditional on adequate provision being 
made for the protection of minorities. The Mission suggested for a Constituent 
Assembly''^ and proposed the setting up by the Constituent Assembly, in a 
preliminary meeting, of an advisory committee on the rights of citizens, minorities 
and tribal and excluded areas 
1.5 Minorities' Questions in the Constituent Assembly Debates 
The demand for a Constituent Assembly elected on the basis of universal adult 
franchise had been reiterated in Congress resolution since 1934. The Muslim 
League and the Scheduled Casts Federation had been less enthusiastic about such 
a body, holding that it would entrench Congress dominance over the transfer of 
power from colonial rule. From the 1940s onwards, the colonial state had been 
increasingly receptive to the idea. 
Elections were held to the Constituent Assembly in July 1946, in accordance 
with the Cabinet Mission Plan of May 16, 1946. The plan had stipulated that "the 
cession of sovereignty to the Indian people on the basis of a constitution framed by 
the Assembly would be conditional on adequate provisions being made for the 
protection of minorities"'*^. Member of three communities- Muslim, Sikhs and 
general (Muslim and all other) elected their representatives separately by the 
'single transferable vote' system of proportional representation. The Congress and 
the Muslim League won overwhelming proportions of general and Muslim places 
respectively, with the Congress majority in the Assembly rising to 82 percent after 
the partition of the country''^  
The Constituent Assembly began its proceeding as scheduled on December 9, 
1946, with the Muslim League boycotting its sessions. In the Assembly 
deliberations, the minorities question was regarded as encompassing the claims of 
three kinds of communities: religious minorities, backward castes and tribals, for 
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all of whole safeguards in different forms had been instituted by the British and by 
princely states during the colonial period. The representatives of most of the 
groups claiming special provisions in some form emphasized that the group was a 
minority of some kind. The employment of the term minority did not, however, 
denote the numerical status of the group so much as the claim that the groups 
suffered from some disadvantages in respect the rest which entitled it to special 
treatment from the state. In minority claims, a given group's numerical status was 
invoked most frequently to denote numerical strength (rather than numerical 
disadvantage) which made the group a force to reckon with and gave it better title 
to safeguards than smaller groups.''^  
Representatives of each group sought to establish that their group was more 
eligible for safeguards or deserving of greater representation than any other - on 
grounds, for instance, that it was numerically superior, more backward than others, 
more distinct from the majority in its cultural practices and so on. Representatives 
of each group claiming minority status also frequently referred to the safeguards 
they had enjoyed under the colonial system and the assurance that the Congress 
had given their community. 
Minority status was claimed for most of the backward castes during the 
debates, but cultural distinctness from the majority community did no usually 
figure in the claims rather, the claims emphasized that the backward classes were 
culturally a part of the Hindu community, or at least that they were different from 
the religious minorities. It was stressed that each of these classes was a 'political 
minority'"* ,^ that the term 'minority' in each such case connoted not numerical 
disadvantage but entitlement to special treatment on account of social and 
economic backwardness.^''Not all representatives of the scheduled castes claimed 
minority status and political safeguards for their larger community. 
Minority safeguards were sometimes reluctantly admitted as temporary, 
transitional measures, necessary until backward sections of the population were 
brought up to the level of the rest or until groups accustomed to privileges under 
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the colonial system had adjusted to the new order. While arguments, from national 
unity, secularism, democracy and justice are analytically distinguishable these 
grounds were used together and interdependently, with mutually reinforcing 
normative force, in the arguments against minority safeguards.^' 
Speeches in the Constituent Assembly employed several variants of arguments 
from national unity, secularism, democracy and equality in opposition to minority 
safeguards. Such safeguards were regarded as instruments of the colonial 'divide 
and rule' policy, deliberately fashioned by the duplicitous colonial rulers to 
misguide the minorities, to create strife between different sections of the nation, to 
deny Indian nationhood and to delay the transfer of power once it became 
inevitable.^^ 
The dominant opinion in the house also regarded minority safeguards as 
undesirable since they compromised the nationalist ideal of secularism. In terms of 
the state's stance towards religion, most arguments in the Constituent Assembly 
emphasized that secularism did not imply state antagonism to religion. A secular 
state was not a state that denied the importance of religion faith or sought to 
inculcate skepticism about religious belief among its citizens. Rather, secularism 
was most commonly construed as implying that the state would not identify with, 
or give preference to, particular religion." 
Secularism has a somewhat different inflection in its Nehruvian version. Here, 
religion and inscriptive affiliations in general were regarded as vestiges of pre-
modern era that modernization and development would make redundant. This 
view was opposed to minority safeguards not just on the ground that they would 
perpetuate communalism as a relic of a bygone era or an era that would soon 
pass.^ ^ Claims for minority safeguards were regarded as out of step with the times 
and as distractions from the more pressing issues of development and the basic 
needs of the common man. 
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During this period, liberal notions in nationalist opinion were mostly to be 
found in the ideal of citizenship based on equal individual rights. Minority 
safeguards were understandable from this standpoint because they accorded 
centrality to the community rather than to the individual citizens.^^ The opposition 
to minority safeguards on liberal grounds in the period was cast in the language of 
justice, equality, and fair play. 
In the debates about minority safeguards, the language of liberal-secular 
nationalism was inflected by norms drawn from traditional political idioms. The 
most salient instance was the conception of the tolerance and the generosity of the 
hence and the majority community towards the minorities. This theme was 
reiterated both by Congressmen and by minority representatives particularly after 
the partition of the country in 1947. Explicitly or implicitly, it evoked filial norms: 
the majority community was cast in the role of the responsible, easy-going, 
benevolent and self-sacrificing elder brother, indulgent, protective and 
accommodating of even the excessive and unreasonable demands of his younger 
and weaker brother, the minorities." 
1.6 Nationalist Resolution of Minorities' Question 
The question of political safeguards for minorities in the Constituent Assembly 
was referred to the advisory committee on fundamental rights, minority, tribal and 
excluded areas whose creation had been mandated by the Cabinet Mission Plan. 
The committee's first report on minorities, discussed in the assembly in August 
1947, rejected some of the central components of the British system of safeguards 
such as separate electorates and weightage. It offered an alternative set of political 
safeguards. 
A system of joint electorates with representation for communities in proportion 
to population was proposed for 10 years. The instrument of instructions to the 
President and the Governor suggested the desirability of including members of 
important minority communities in cabinets as far as practicable.^ A general 
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declaration was adopted to the effect that "in the ail India and provincial services, 
the claims of all the minorities shall be kept in view in making appointments to 
these services consistently with the consideration of efficiency of 
administration".^^ Some special provisions of a temporary nature were also made 
for the Anglo-Indian community in the spheres of representation, education and 
the services. This report was regarded as representing the high watermark of 
Congress concessions to the minorities - made several months after the partition 
of the country, when the need for conciliating the minorities, particularly the 
Muslims, had greatly diminished. °^ Provision was made for special minority 
officers at central and provincial levels to report to the legislatures on the working 
of various safeguards of minorities. 
These decisions were incorporated under 'special provisions relating to 
minorities' in the draft constitution published in February 1948. But amendments 
were adopted to negate each of these articles during discussions of the draft in 
October 1949. The amendments effectively removed religious minorities from the 
purviews of these safeguards and restricted the scope of these articles mainly to 
the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. 
1.7 Political Representation 
Separate electorates, reserved quotas for communities in the legislatures in 
proportion to population and various forms of proportional representation were the 
chief mechanism proposed in the Constituent Assembly facilitating the 
representation of minorities in the legislatures. Muslim representatives were at the 
forefront of such demands although similar claims were put forwards by Sikhs and 
backwards advocacy of caste representatives. 
The most forceful political safeguards for religious minorities is to be found in 
the arguments for separate electorate made by some Muslim League members. 
The case for separate electorates was built around a contention over the concept of 
representation. Typically, it invoked the following arguments. Firstly, it was 
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asserted that minorities were a permanent feature of every human society and not 
mere creatures of colonial machinations. There were fundamental differences 
between communities which were inherent in the very nature of things. 
Secondly, it was argued that the very existence of distinct communities meant 
that these communities had to be represented in the legislature so that their needs 
could be taken into account in the framing of legislation. Representation in 
sectional terms was privileged area over individual representation as embodied in 
a system of territorial constituencies. The implicit assumption in such views was 
that an individual's political choices and affiliations derived from his membership 
of a religious community. The Muslim League's demands for separate electorates 
for Muslims stemmed from a notion of representation as a descriptive activity, 
distinct from conventional liberal-democratic notions of representation.^' 
Thirdly, representation would not be authentic and hence effective under the 
person representing a community was chosen by members of that community. It 
was not sufficient for minority representation that the representative be a member 
of a community. To be able authentically to represent the views and the interests 
of the community, she or he had to command the confidence of the community. 
Separate electorates were defended as being the best mechanism for securing this 
end^^ 
The house rejected the proposals for separate electorates. The most prominent 
argument against the proposal was based on considerations of nationhood and 
national unity. Separate electorates, it was asserted, were historically associated 
with a policy based on the premise that India was a conglomeration of distinct 
communities and not a nation. Further, it was felt that they has aggravated 
communal differences to the extent of causing the vivisection of the country and 
that their perpetuation would sabotage the creation of a national political 
community." 
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Separate electorates were also opposed on secular grounds, as they involved 
the introduction of religious considerations into the political sphere. It was also 
argued that separate electorates were vestiges of an undemocratic colonial system 
in which legislatures had been mere advisory bodies without policy-making 
powers and in which the function of representatives was to act advocates of their 
communities rather than to share in the governance of the country.^ "* 
Minority claims for special representation assumed forms other than those for 
separate electorates. At different stages of constitution making various forms of 
proportional representation were proposed by minority representatives, primarily 
in the context of the election of members to the lower house and the formation of 
the cabinet. During the initial stage, when religious minorities were included in 
provisions for quotas in legislatures, proportional representation was forwarded so 
that members of minority groups could have a greater voice in the election of their 
representatives and minority representation could thus be more authentic. 
Legislature quotas under joint electorates were regarded as ah illusory safeguard 
as they did not allow the members of the community to have a preponderant voice 
in the selection of representatives and hence did not ensure that the person elected 
was a 'true' or 'real' representative of the community. ^^  In the later stages of 
constitution-making proportional representation was proposed as mechanism that 
would facilitate the representation of minority opinion, and, as one of its 
consequences, enable some representatives belonging to minority communities to 
be elected. 
The arguments invoked in the case for proportional representation were 
substantially similar in their various incarnations during the career of the 
Constituent Assembly. Proportional representation was justified on democratic 
grounds. In the argument about the democratic merits of proportional 
representation, notion of political equality blended with notion of the 
representativeness of assemblies. If the electoral system made for a better 
realization of the individual's right to be represented, minority political opinion 
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would have a better chance of being represented in the legislatures. This was 
desirable, it was argued as it would enhance the representativeness and in turn the 
democratic character of assemblies^'' 
The various proposals for proportional representation put forward by minority 
representatives were rejected by the house. It was argued that they shared the 
flaws of communalism and separatism which beset separate electorates; that they 
were impracticable in an illiterate country; that they would promote government 
instability; that they would make parliamentary democracy based on collective 
responsibility unworkable ^ 
However, the fact that proportional representation increasingly replaced 
separate electorates as the favoured institutional mechanism for minority 
representation is significant. The representation of minorities through proportional 
representation was thus defended on the grounds that it would make for a more 
adequate realization of democratic principles and that, unlike separate electorates, 
it would not tend to undermine secularism or national unity. 
While separate electorates were a particular nationalist taboo, the grounds on 
which they were opposed were employed against every other proposal for special 
representation of minority groups. These included provisions for reservation of 
seats in the legislature for religious minorities, scheduled caste and scheduled 
tribes that had initially been accepted by the house. The provision has been 
admitted as exceptions to these norms, as measures of compromise whose 
existence was an aberration, a necessary evil in a period of transition. They were 
regarded as temporary measures for communities that needed assistance for a short 
period. ^^ 
In the house, no defense of political safeguards for religious minorities had 
been found. Not any attempt was made by the constitution-making to evolve an 
alternative legitimacy for political safeguards for the religious minorities in the 
edifice they were fashioning. Political safeguards were intended to facilitate the 
• 'J 
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eventual integration into the nation of communities that were not immediately in a 
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position to integrate. 
1.8 Reservations in Employment 
The debates on quotas in the services in the Constituent Assembly reveal a 
pattern similar to the debates on special representation provisions. The dominant 
opinion in the house regarded quotas in the services as undesirable in general, 
although necessary for the backward classes in the short run. By and large, other 
methods of ameliorating backwardness, such as channeling more economic and 
educational resources towards these groups were considered preferable to quotas 
in services. The general grounds position to group preference provisions for 
minorities were invoked against reservation in the public services for the 
backward classes. 
Quotas were regarded unfair because they allegedly conflicted with 
fundamental rights which guaranteed equality of opportunity and non-
discrimination in matters of state employment. They were also opposed for their 
supposedly deleterious effects on a desired social good efficiency of 
administration and good governance. Merit considerations were prominent in the 
latter form in this period . 
Reservation in government posts was regarded as undesirable not only for the 
country but also for the backward castes themselves. Here the most common 
arguments were that not only would quotas stigmatise the recipients induce 
feelings of inferiority among them and stifle initiatives for self-development but 
also that they would benefit only a few, already privileged sections within the 
group.^' It was also feared that such provisions would open the way for more and 
more groups claiming special treatment for an indefinite period. Thus it was urged 
that the constitution ought to clearly specify and limit groups on the category 
'backward' besides fixing the duration for which such provisions would apply.^ ^ 
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Nevertheless, unlike the case of the religious minorities, there were principled 
arguments within nationalist opinion in the Constituent Assembly in favour of 
quotas for the backward classes. Such provisions were justified on grounds of 
equality in both fairness and general welfare arguments. In the fairness type of 
arguments, it was opened that unless the entry of members of disadvantaged 
groups was facilitated by special measures, the constitutional provisions for 
equality of opportunity for all citizens would remain mere paper declarations. 
Thus, it was argued that such provisions were necessary in order to remove 
inequalities between groups and raise the backward sections that were dragging 
the nation to the level of the rest. It was also argued that unlike minority claims in 
general the claim for quotas for the backward classes was not a communal one." 
While the representatives of religious minorities did not participate 
significantly in early debates on quotas in the services, the restriction of provisions 
for quotas in the services to the backward classes in the later stages of 
constitution-making was rigorously opposed by some Sikh and Muslim 
representatives.^" It asserted that the religious minorities, or sections within these 
communities, were backward and that quotas were required to give effect to the 
principle of equality of opportunity for individuals when such individuals 
belonged to groups discriminated against in matters of recruitment to the public 
services. It was also argued that such provisions would assuage minority fears and 
thereby promote national integration. '^' 
1.9 Sub-Committee on Minorities 
The Advisory Committee met on February 27, 1947 under the Chairmanship of 
Sardar Patel and divided itself into four sub-committees-two of them being Sub-
Committee on Minorities and Sub-Committee on Fundamental Rights. The 
remaining two sub-committees were on tribal and excluded areas. It was in these 
two Sub-Communities that the problem of safeguards for minorities was gradually 
settled. 
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The Sub-Committee under the Chairmanship of H.C. Mookerji met the same 
day it was created, February 27, 1947. The Sub-Committee, finding its taslcs 
difficult, formulated a questionnaire and wanted to ascertain the views of the 
members." Memoranda were submitted on behalf of the Scheduled Castes, 
Scheduled Tribes, Sikhs, and Anglo-Indians demanding constitutional safeguards. 
No memorandum was presented on behalf of Muslim League as it was still not 
participating in the proceeding of the Assembly. 
The most detailed demands came from Dr. Ambedkar who submitted then on 
behalf of the Scheduled Castes. These included both political as well as social 
safeguards. Jagjiwan Ram suggested generous provision in the constitution for 
upliftment of the Scheduled Castes. He also suggested that the guarantee of 
religious and cultural freedom to racial and religious minorities should be 
permanent feature of the Constitution whereas provisions regarding Scheduled 
Castes could be eliminated when their condifion became satisfactory.^^ 
A memorandum on behalf of Sikhs was submitted by Harnam Singh and Ujjal 
Singh which included a demand for retaining the Punjab as the "homeland and 
holy land of the Sikhs"." On behalf of the Anglo-Indians, the demands included a 
guarantee as a fundamental right of facilities to receive education in English, 
liberal educational grants secured for Anglo-Indians and European Schools by the 
Government of India of India Act 1935 to be not only continued but also increased 
in relations to their requirement, and a provision for securing a preferential claim 
to a certain percentage of appointments in Railways, Customs, and Poasts and 
Telegraph Departments - a privilege they had enjoyed in the past. They also 
demanded reservation in the legislatures.^^ Some members of the Sub-Committee 
gave their own suggestions. Syama Prasad Mookerji^ ^ suggested for a Minority 
Commission in each province, and Jairamdas Daulatram^° suggested for a minority 
court to adjudicate on complaints by minorities of unfair treatment. Both of them 
suggested representation of minorities in various ministries. M. Ruthnaswamy also 
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suggested the provision by the state of schools for minority communities where 
their religion and culture would be taught. 
The Sub-Committee met on April 17, 18, and 19, 1947 to consider the widely 
divergent views. In these meetings the Sub-Committee also considered the interim 
proposals of the Fundamental Rights Sub-Committee in so far as those proposals 
had a bearing on minority rights. After considering what rights were conceded to 
minorities by way of fundamental rights, the Sub-Committee again met on July 21, 
1947, to consider the proposals which had been submitted before it. By this time 
the question of partition had been decided and the Muslim League was also 
represented in the Sub-Committee. The issues which the Sub-Committee 
formulated on the basis of the replies received to the questionnaire issued to the 
members covered the following:^' 
(i) Representation in legislatures, joint versus separate electorates and 
weightage; 
(ii) Reservation of seats in the Cabinet; 
(iii) Reservation in services; 
(iv) Administrative machinery to ensure protection of minority rights 
After a prolonged discussion on these issues the Sub-Committee arrived at 
certain decisions. The Sub-Committee could not make a detailed report due to 
shortage of time and its report submitted before the Advisory Committee on July 
27, 1947 contained merely a brief summary of the conclusion reached by it. The 
report contained the following decisions: 
(i) The demand for separate electorates and weightage should be rejected and 
the principles of joint electorates with seats reserved for the minorities on a 
population basis should be accepted; 
(ii) The demand for reservation of seats in the Cabinet should be rejected; 
(iii) The demand for reservation of posts in the public services on a population 
basis should be accepted; 
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(iv) Special officers should be appointed to look after the safeguards and interests 
of minorities.^^ 
1.10 The Advisory Committee Stage 
When the report of the Sub-Committee came up for consideration before the 
Advisory Committee in July, 1947 the committee endorsed almost all the 
conclusions reached by the Sub-Committee except with regards to Anglo-Indian 
for which it appointed a Sub-Committee to report on the position of this 
community in certain services and the existing educational facilities for them. The 
Advisory Committee accepted by very large majority the recommendation of the 
Sub-Committee on minorities that there should be no separate electorates for 
elections to the legislatures on the ground that these had in the past widened 
communal differences. The Advisory Committee recommended as general rule 
that seats for the different recognized minorities should be reserved in the different 
legislatures on the basis of their population. It also accepted the principle that no 
weightage should be given, but members of a minority community would be 
entitled to contest unreserved seats. It recommended that the Muslim and 
Scheduled Castes should get reserved seats in proportion to their population. The 
Committee accepted the recommendation of the Sub-Committee that there should 
be no statutory provision for reservation in Cabinet. It also disfavoured any 
specific provision for reservation of appointments in the public services and 
favoured a general provision that in appointments the claims of the minorities 
should be kept in view consistently with the efficiency of administration. As the 
community had in the past completely depended on its representation in certain 
categories of public services, the committee adopted the recommendation of the 
Sub-Committee that the reservation in the services should be continued. It also 
accepted the recommendation of the Minorities Sub-Committee that special 
educational grants which had been previously made available to Anglo-Indians 
School should be continued for a period of ten years. The Advisory Committee 
also recommended for the appointment of a special Minority Officer both at the 
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Centre and in the Units charged with the duty to ensure implementation of the 
guarantees and safeguards provided for the minorities in the constitution. The 
committee also accepted the recommendation for setting up of a statutory 
commission to investigate, inter alia, into the conditions of all socially and 
educationally backward classes and to recommend the steps to eliminate the 
hardships.^ ^ 
1.11 The Assembly Stage 
The report of the advisory committee was considered by the Constituent 
Assembly on August 27 and 28, 1947.^ '* The Assembly adopted all the 
recommendations of the Advisory Committee without any modification. The draft 
constitution prepared by the Constitutional Advisor in October, 1947 incorporated 
the decisions of the Constituent Assembly on the problems of minorities. 
When the drafting committee met on February 5 and 6, 1948, it formulated the 
various provisions into ten articles and placed them in Part XIV under the title 
"Special provisions relating to Minorities''.^^ This part of the Draft constitution 
was based on the decisions of the Constituent Assembly and the recommendations 
of the two Sub-Committees on tribal people. 
The report of the Sub-Committee was considered by the Advisory Committee 
on December 30, 1948 but consideration of the report was postponed. At this 
meeting a suggestion of a very fundamental character was made. Some of the 
members sought to submit resolutions seeking to do away with reservations for all 
minorities.^^ 
The Advisory Committee again met on May 11, 1949 and submitted its 
proposals to the Constituent Assembly. The Committee also placed before the 
Assembly the views expressed by some members at its meeting held on December 
30, 1948 for abolition of all kinds of reservations, ft observed that since it had 
made its recommendation on reservation of seats in 1947 the condition has 
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changed and it was no longer appropriate in the context of free India to reserve 
seats for any religious minority. Although the addition of separate electorates was 
a right step and would remove much of the poison from the body politic the 
reservation of seats if allowed would lead to a certain degree of separation as 
between the various communities and to that extent was contrary to the conception 
of secular democratic state. It reported that the resolution for abolition of 
reservation adopted in its meeting held on May 11, 1949 was passed with an 
overwhelming majority; explaining the decision to the Assembly on May, 25, 
1949, Patel said that the vast majority of minority communities, including 
Muslims had themselves realized the evil of such reservation in the part, and 
consequently the voting for the abolition of communal reservation was unanimous 
and only one member had voted against the proposal.^ ^ 
The Advisory Committee therefore recommended that reservation for 
Muslims, Sikhs, Christians or any other religions community should be abolished 
and should be provided only for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. When 
these recommendations were placed before the Assembly the majority of the 
speakers which included members of all the communities offered full support to 
the proposal to abolish reservations on religious ground. Jawaharlal Nehru was so 
much moved by the new change that he described the proposal as a "historic turn 
in ourdestiny".^^ 
1.12 Fundamental Rights and the Minorities 
Among the fundamental rights three were directly concerned with the problem 
of minorities: 
(a) Right to equality. 
(b) Right to freedom of religion, and 
(c) Cultural and educational rights 
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The first of these aimed at helping the minorities and backward sections or the 
population to move forward by legally placing then on the same footing as the rest 
of the population, the other two rights were intended to assure them that in matters 
of religion and culture they would be able to preserve their identity. 
(a) Right to Equality 
The right to equality before law contained three important provisions: 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, and caste etc., equality 
of opportunity in public services and abolition or untouchability. 
The prohibition of discrimination had been provided both in the Nehru 
Committee report and n the Congress Resolution of Rights (1933), when the 
Fundamental Rights Sub-Committee suggested such a clause in its Draft Report on 
April 3, 1947 it was welcomed by all though its actual drafting passed through 
several stages. Certain improvements were suggested by the Minority Sub-
Committee and then by the Advisory Committee a provision was added to 
safeguard the interest of 'women and children'. It was put forward by the 
Constituent Assembly for its consideration on April 29, 1947 and several 
amendments, most of which were of verbal nature, were moved by members. This 
draft Article was accepted by the Constituent Assembly on November 29, 1948 
with a few changes and was embodied in the Constitution as Article 15. In report 
of equality of opportunity in public services, the draft article was accepted by the 
Constituent Assembly and was embodied in the constitution as Article 16. There 
was a general agreement among the members to abolish untouchability. K.M. 
Paniker pointed out that it applied to all forms of untouchability. It was accepted 
by the Constituent Assembly and was incorporated as Article 17 of the 
constitution. 
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(b) Freedom of Religion 
Freedom of religion was accepted as fundamental right in the Nehru 
Committee Report and also in the Congress Resolution on Rights (1933). The 
framers of the Indian Constitution were unanimous in accepting this right; though 
there was a controversy regarding its nature and scope. Attempts were made at 
different stages of the Constitution making to arrive at a compromise between 
conflicting views, and therefore, concerned articles and clauses were drafted and 
re-drafted again and again. 
Thus, in their endeavour to establish a secular state in India the makers of the 
India constitution granted to all its citizens as well as to other members residing in 
the state freedom to profess, practice and propagate religion of their choice with 
the promise that it would not stand in the way of social reform by the state. They 
did not accept the Constitutional validity of personal laws based on religion. They 
expressly abolish religious instruction from schools maintained by the state and 
restricted its scope in case of aided schools. By these provisions they hoped that 
every religious minority would have autonomy in religious sphere and would be 
able not only to profess and practice religion of its choice but also to propagate it 
subject to public older, morality and health. 
(c) Cultural and Education Rights 
By not accepting the demands for separate electorates and reservation of seats 
on religions considerations, the Constituent Assembly thus sought do away with 
any protective principle which could further damage the cause of national unity. 
But it also sought to reassure the minorities that their special interests which they 
cherished as fundamental to their life were safe under the constitution. This 
assurance, more particularly, concerned with cultural and educational interests of 
minorities which the Assembly sought to protect as justifiable rights. 
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The original draft of the Fundamental Rights which was submitted along with 
the report of the 'Sub-Committee on Fundamental Rights' to the Constituent 
Assembly did not contain any provision corresponding to Article 30 (1) of the 
Constitution.^' K.M. Munshi, K.T. Shah and Harman Singh'° prepared a draft in 
which the rights now contained in Article 30 (1) of the constitution, along with 
other rights was proposed to be considered on "national minorities...based on 
religion".'' Sub-Committee on Minorities prepared an interim report which dealt 
from the point of view of minorities. The report recommended the following: 
(1) All citizens are entitled to use their mother tongue and the script thereof, and 
to adopt, study or use any other languages and script of their choice. 
(2) Minorities in every unit shall be adequately protected in respect of their 
languages and culture, and no government may enact any laws or regulations 
that may act oppressively or pre-judicially in this respect. 
(3) No minority whether of religion, community or language shall be deprived of 
rights or discriminated against in regard to the admission into state education 
institutions, nor shall any religious instruction be compulsorily imposed on 
them. 
(4) All minorities whether of religion, community or language shall be free in 
any unit to establish and administer education institutions of their choice and 
they shall be entitled to state aid in the same manner and measure as is given 
to similar state aided institutions. 
(5) Notwithstanding any custom, law, decree or usage, presumption in term of 
deduction, no Hindu on grounds of caste, birth or denomination shall be 
precluded from entering an educational institution dedicated or intended for 
the use of the Hindu community or any section thereof 
(6) No disqualification shall arise on account of sex in respect of public services 
or professions or admission to educational institutions saves and except that 
this cannot prevent the establishment of separate educational institutions for 
boys and girls. 
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This interim-report was sent to be considered by tlie Advisory Committee. The 
committee debated on the scope of the protection of the interest of minority and 
most of them with slight modification were accepted. Ultimately, the Advisory 
Committee made the following recommendations:^^ 
(i) Minority in every unit shall be protected in respect of their languages, script 
and culture and no laws or regulations may be enacted that may operate 
oppressively or prejudicially in this respect, 
(ii) No minority whether based on religion, community or language shall be 
discriminated against in regard to admission into state education institutions, 
nor shall any religious instruction be compulsorily imposed on them, 
(iii) (a) All minorities whether based on religion, community or languages shall be 
free in any unit to establish and administer educational institutions of their 
choice, 
(iv) (b) The state shall not while providing state aid to schools discriminate 
against schools under the management of minorities whether based on 
religion, community or language. 
The recommendations which provided safeguards for minorities came up 
before Constituent Assembly for acceptance. K.M. Munshi was of the view that 
sub-clause (2) "No minority based on religion, community or language shall be 
discriminated against in regard to admission into state educational institutions, nor 
shall any religious instruction be compulsorily imposed on them", should be sent 
back to the Advisory Committee for clarifying its scope in respect of state-aided 
institutions. Rest of the clause was adopted without any modification. 
At the time of modification the Advisory Committee deleted the words "not 
shall any religious instruction be compulsorily imposed on them", for the reason 
that this was already incorporated in clause (16) of the Draft Constitution, which is 
now Article 28 of the Constitution. At the time of discussion or the report, in the 
Constituent Assembly K.M. Munshi pointed out that, the scheduled castes in the 
strict sense of the term, were not a minority. 
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When the whole clause came to be considered by the Drafting Committee in 
its meeting, it made certain modifications of a fiindamental nature and drafted it as 
Article 23 with the general head of "Cultural and Educational Rights" in the 
following form:^ '* 
(1) Any section of the citizens residing in the territory of India or any part thereof 
having distinct language, script and culture of its own shall have the rights to 
conserve the same. 
(2) No minority whether based on religion, community or language shall be 
discriminated against in regard to the admission of any person belonging to 
such minority into any educational institution maintained by the state. 
(a) All minorities whether based on religion, community or language shall have 
the rights to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. 
(b) The State shall not in granting aid to educational institutions discriminate 
against any educational institution on the ground that it is under the 
management of a minority, whether based on "Religion, Community or 
Language". 
In the Draft Constitution the word minority was replaced by the words any 
section, from sub-clause (1) of, the recommendations. Due to such replacement a 
heated and prolonged controversy sparked on in the Assembly. Dr. Ambedkar in 
trying to set the controversy at rest explained the reason for substitution of the 
word 'Minority' by the words 'any section' as follows: 
"....The term Minority was used therein not in the technical sense of the word 
minority" as we have accustomed to use it for the purpose of certain political 
safeguards...The word is used not merely to indicate the minority in technical 
sense of the word. It is also used to cover minorities which are not minorities in 
the technical sense but which are nonetheless minorities in the cultural and 
linguistic sense. For instance, for the purposes of this Article 23, if a certain 
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number of people from Madras came and settled in Bombay for certain purpose, 
they would be, although not a minority in the technical sense, cultural minorities. 
Similarly if a certain number of Maharashtrians went from Maharashtra and 
settled in Bengal, although they may not be minorities in the technical sense, they 
would be cultural and linguistic minorities in Bengal. The article intends to give 
protection in the matter of culture, language and script not only to a minority 
technically but also to a minority in the wider sense of the terms as I have 
explained just now. That is the reason why we dropped the word "minority" 
because we felt that the word might be interpreted in the narrow sense of the term 
when the intention of this house... was to use the word "minority" in much wider 
sense, so as to give cultural protection to those who are technically not minorities 
but minorities nonetheless.^^ 
Thus it seems that the above exploration was designed to broaden the scope of 
earlier part of the draft Article 23 so as to include all such minorities who were 
technically not minorities but minorities nonetheless and left the later part of the 
draft Article 23 (1) (corresponding to the present Article 30) to remain confined 
which were minorities in the technical sense. 
The Drafting Committee incorporated two more amendments of the 
substantial nature. By one the "language, script and culture" in clause (1) were 
replaced by the words "language, script or culture". By other, it was sought to 
prohibit discrimination against any minority in the matter of admission by state-
aided institutions as well as state-owned institutions. 
After drafting the constitution, the draft Article 23 was presented for 
consideration before the Constituent Assembly. At this time a number of 
amendments were moved and Assembly witnessed a long debate on the question 
of sufficiency or adequacy or the scope of the rights, but after a prolonged debate 
only the amendments moved by B.R. Ambedkar himself and the two amendments 
moved by Thakurdas Bhargava and accepted by Ambedkar were adopted. All 
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other were rejected. With such amendments^''Article 23 of the Draft constitution 
was accepted by the Constituent Assembly. 
Subsequently, at the revision stage, the Drafting Committee divided Article 
23 into two separate Articles, i.e.. Article 29 and Article 30 which are as follows: 
Article 29 (1): Any section of citizens residing in the territory of Indian or any 
part thereof having a distinct language, script or culture or its own shall have the 
right to conserve the same. 
(2) No citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution 
maintained by the Stare or receiving did out of state funds on grounds only of 
religion, race, caste language or any of them. 
Article 30 (1): All minorities, whether based on religion or language, shall 
have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. 
(2) The State shall not in granting aid to educational institutions, discriminate 
against any educational institution on the ground that it is under the management 
of a minority, whether based on religion or language. 
Ultimately, the Constituent Assembly conceded certain rights relating to 
education, language and culture and they came to be incorporated as Articles 29 
and 30. Thus these two articles sought to recognize and protect a right of religious 
and linguistic minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of 
their choice. By granting autonomy in culture and educational spheres, it was 
hoped that minorities would preserve their way of life and contribute in their own 
way to the prosperity and development of the country and towards its political 
unity."^ ^ 
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1.13 The Change in the Assembly's Attitude 
A review of the two parallel developments of minority safeguards detailed out 
above shows that until the decision of partition had not became imminent, the 
member of the Constituent Assembly, a vast majority of whom represented the 
typical Congress ideology and attitude, had placed before them the tasks of 
securing agreement on a constitutional arrangement which could on the one hand, 
reassure the minorities that their interest and their distinctive characteristics would 
be secured in the future political set-up and, on the other hand, ensuring for 
themselves that extremist demands of minorities were not to be conceded beyond a 
certain point. Till that moment, the Congress had been extremely cautious in 
dealing with the question of protection of minority interest, lest a retrograde step 
might provide the Muslim League a pretext for refusing to join the Constituent 
Assembly and thus strengthening its argument which it had been using for half a 
century as a base for its political fight. 
But the statement of June 3, 1947, providing for the partition of the country 
into two separ£:;e sovereign nations had the effect of changing the whole 
complexions of minority problem. The decision of partition and the great upheaval 
that was broughx with it had the inevitable effect of materially alternating the 
situation both psychologically as well as strategically. Congress was no more in 
need of being extremely conciliatory, and was no more under extreme necessity to 
bring about 'consensus'. The 'remainder' of the Muslim League which had by 
none entered the Assembly was a different party, it not in its own eyes, at any rate 
in the eyes of others. 
A second major event that was much to affect the question of minority 
interests was the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi by a right-winger fanatic in 
January 1948. Both outside and inside the Assembly, the event created a feeling of 
revulsion towards the whole problem of religious minorities.^^ At the Constituent 
Assembly's meeting in April 1948, Nehru's forceful advocacy for the adoption of 
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a resolution declaring a ban on engaging by any communal organization in any 
activities othe than those essential for religious, social and educational needs of 
the community, his concern for the Draft Constitution containing "certain definite 
communal elements"'^, and his plea for minimum possible reservation were not 
only a reflection of the growing mood of the Congress as well as many sections of 
the Assembly members against the inclusion of political safeguards in the 
Constitution for religious minorities. 
Another event of some significance was the decision of the leaders of the 
Muslim League in early 1948 to disband the League and the refusal of some of the 
members of the party from provinces, such as Madras, to follow the decision. 
The Muslim League's break-up as a political party had the inevitable consequence 
of fragmenting the preciously united, though small, Muslim group within the 
Constituent Assembly. The further consequence was that Muslim members lost 
their position as a political force and were no longer able to speak with unanimity 
in any future deliberation on the question of minority safeguards. Also, a 
considerable number of Muslims were gradually won over to the nationalist point 
of view'°' and, barring a few who fought to the last, all the Muslim members 
themselves surrendered voluntarily their demands on reservation.'°^ 
The problem of safeguards for minorities that had come to the forefront as a 
communal problem thus boiled down to lose its colour. The occurrence of events 
outside and the consequ nt change of attitudes inside the Assembly were the 
factors that greatly helped the Assembly in weeding out progressively the 
communal element from the minority problem. 
What the A s^sembly ultimately secured for minorities must remain an event of 
great historical significance, for, apart from the above factors, the division of the 
country on the basis of religion and the declaration of an Islamic State in Pakistan 
were the immediate factors that supplied both argument and justification for denial 
of any kind of protective safeguards. At a time when religious fanaticism, 
reinforced by historical tradition and political rivalries, had rendered the country's 
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population thoroughly fragmented and agitated, the acceptance by the framers of 
the ideal of secularism to be a condition of political and social life of future India 
and acceptance with the same emphasis of the principle of protective provisions 
in such secular areas as education, language and culture, must remain a distinct 
and, indeed, a great achievement excelling many others in constitutionalism.'"^ 
The debates in the Constituent Assembly that began in 1946 and concluded 
with the final draft of the Indian Constitution in October 1949 were conducted 
resulting in the partition. This is what; we are told of the Constituent Assembly 
debates and led to the inclusion, non-inclusion, specification and non-specification 
of crucial issues relating to the political safeguards for minorities. 
Among the political safeguards included and then dropped was that of 
representation (not reservation) of all minorities in central administrative and 
provincial services, with the further stipulation of a special security officer at both 
the central and provincial levels to monitor and report on the status of minority 
presence in the services'"" .^ 
The whole debate in the Constituent Assembly on Article 23 of the Draft 
constitution which later assumed the shape of the present Article 29 and 30 
revolved round many issues. The whole problems as far as this part of constitution 
in concerned that engaged considerable time and efforts of the framers was to 
achieve a consensus in a constitutional arrangement between the numerically 
dominant majority considered as such on the national scene and the minorities 
referred to above a solution which could give the minorities a feeling of security 
against discrimination, and security against interference with those characteristic 
which had divided them apart from the majority. And, it is too obvious to be noted 
that at no stage was any section of this majority ever treated as 'minority'. 
If these assumptions as accepted as truly reflecting the intention of those who 
drafted and incorporated these prevision in the constitutional document with a 
wishful hope that they were rendering a constitutional solution to the problem of 
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Indian minorities, it may be argued that where a minority is the historical or 
national context and its claim is based on religion it must be defined and ascertain 
in term of the population of the whole country irrespective of its being in 
numerical majority in any particular state and where a group is not a majority 
considered as such in the national context, but is still definable as 'minority' under 
Ambedkar's stretched meaning of the term, it may be ascertained with reference to 
the population of the state concerned. The argument is correct, it is submitted, if 
the provision in the question are viewed against the historical prospective in 
which, they were adopted, and are construed to carry into effect the true spirit and 
intention of the constitution.'°^ 
Dr. Ambedkar wrote about the rights of oppressed people and minorities "It is 
no use for the Depressed Classed to have a declaration of equal rights. There can 
be no doubt that the Depressed Classes will have to face the whole force of 
orthodox society, if they try to exercise the equal rights of citizenship. The 
Depressed Classes therefore feel that if these declarations of rights are not to be 
mere pious pronouncements but are to be realities of everyday life, they should be 
protected by adequate pains and penalties from interference in the enjoyment of 
these declared rights".'°^ 
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CHAPTER - II 
THE CONCEPT OF MINORITY 
There is no valid and definite yardsticic to define the term 'minority' as such. 
Any item in lesser quantity will undoubtedly pinpoint the fact that the particular 
item is less in number or in quantum in comparison to the other items. But this fact 
does not entail in itself the extent to which the number or the quantum is less. The 
impact of all these aspects is greatly experienced in the arena of politics. In the 
absence of any fixed criterion regarding the number and the quantum, conflicts 
arise, which happen to become the very cause of the strife between the minority 
and the majority in due course. ' 
The term 'national minority' has been defined in the International 
Encyclopedia of Social Sciences. Here, this word is applicable for such group of 
the nationals who have been inhabitation in a particular place for a long time but 
another group of the nationals has snatched away the power from the formers' 
hand. Normally, it is so that the minority group is now out of power, though that 
group is still inhabitation in the same place. The governance and the economy of 
that place are being controlled by majority which always tends to protect its own 
interests. There, the majority decides the political existence of the minority. For 
example, the minority do not have the right to cast their vote for the candidates 
contesting for the seats of Parliament or Legislative Assembly. Though, they have 
been given the choice to send one or two of their representatives thereto.'^  
Such minority group did find an acceptable place on the basis of their language 
and their different race even among the people settled in the border areas. Prior to 
the First World War, minorities were used to be recognized on the basis of their 
worshipping method and the guarantee to protect them happened to be one of the 
provisions of all war treaties. During the Muslim rule in Ind'm Jaziya (special tax) 
was imposed on the non-Muslims. Likewise, till 1958 no Jew could become a 
member of the British House of Commons. In Pakistan and Islamic countries, a 
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non-Muslim can't become the President or the Prime Minister even today.^  
The term 'minority' defies exact definition because no matter enumeration is 
necessary but not sufficient for defining it. It is for this reason that the question of 
defining 'minority' has always been a hotly contested issue in international and 
domestic fora."* However, one can describe, if not define, the term minority. 
Minorities are groups of people who are united through race, religion, language or 
culture of which their members are conscious and which forms the basis of a 
common identity and distinguishes them from others on this basis. Such groups 
are generally called minorities when they are less numerous than the other groups 
or when they occupy a subordinate economic, political or special position in the 
state, or both.^  
According to anthropologists after family minorities as natural social 
groupings is an ancient phenomenon. Integration in group is generally not 
biologically or genetically determined. It is a social phenomenon. Glazer and 
Moynihan define minority as a "group of society characterized by a distinct sense 
of difference owing to culture and descent- forms of social life that are capable of 
renewing and transforming themselves."^ 
In soviet literature "ethnoses" is a social phenomena and covered groupings, 
large and small. They are however, different from social classes because ethnic 
groups are essentially, though not exclusively, concerned with cultural matters' 
symbols, values and issues of self-definition whereas interest groups are 
organizations which are merely concerned with a common demand. According to 
Marxist approach minority discrimination is a funcfion of class system. Hence, the 
rights of minorities are best protected through collective class rights rather than 
through so-called minority rights.^ 
The criteria used to define, identify and distinguish minorities may vary from 
case to case, but generally they have to do with language, religion, territory, 
history, social and political organization, shared myths and feeling of identity and 
belonging that Anderson calls 'imagined community.' ^ 
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Minorities may come into existence either as a result of conquest and 
subjugation or breakup of a multinational empire or process of amalgamation or 
integration of ethnic groups or immigration or political, social and economic 
inequalities or combination of these various factors. In India minority environment 
is a combination of these various factors. Minority groups are not eternal they are 
dynamic social units that may emerge, metamorphose and dissolve over a period 
of time according to changing historical circumstances.^ 
The term 'minority' is compound of the Latin word 'miner' and the suffix 'ity' 
meaning, inter-alia, "the smaller in a number of the two aggregates that together 
constitute a hole." According to Webster it means, "a group characterized by a 
sense of separate identity and awareness of status apart from a usually larger group 
of which it forms or is held to from a part."'° The Oxford English Dictionary 
defines minority as "the condition or fact of being smaller, inferior or 
subordinate", or as "a number which is less than half the whole number." The 
meaning and definitions just referred to contain a common criterion, namely, the 
statistical criterion. In 1736 the term was used in numerical sense to describe the 
relationship between larger and smaller groups/values. In 1788 the term was 
defined in political sense to denote the number of votes cast for a political party. 
Thus in its earlier usage the term was used both in qualitative or quantitative 
sense." 
The whole concept of "minority" may be based either on primordial or 
instrumental point of view. Primordial point of view refers to identity and security 
which a person acquires from his attachment to race, religion, region, language 
and culture. This perception of identity and security, though natural, but is rooted 
in non-rational foundations of personality. Instrumental perspective refers to the 
exploitation of the identity factors by the vested interests which are used as a 
bargaining process for achieving desired results. As Brass define it, "ethnicity is 
the study of the process by which elites and counter elites within ethnic groups 
select aspects of the groups' culture attach new values and meaning to them and 
use them as symbol to mobilize the group to defend its interest and to compete 
with other groups."'^ In most of the minority groups these two factors are 
54 
combined. Primordial factors are used to achieve cohesion in the groups and 
instrumental factors are used for bargaining purposes. For an aggregate of people 
mere sharing of common primordial perception is not enough in order to qualify 
for a minority group identity, there must also be an organization and mobilization 
in the group. Therefore, a minority group may be defined as a self-conscious 
mobilized group with its own feeling of identity, its own insular contacts, its own 
history and its separate institutions not shared with the rest of the community.'^ 
In a plural society mobilization within a minority group takes place generally 
under a perception of economic and social insecurity and in order to achieve a fair 
and equitable share in the scarce resources of the country the group mobilize itself 
using primordial markers. This leads to politicization of minority group. The 
degree of politicization is in direct proportion to the viability of social, economic 
and political system of the country. This makes any minority group both 
primordial and modern at the same time.''* Boundaries of a minority group are 
generally not fixed by space and time. Such boundaries change with a change in a 
purpose and need of mobilizafion. Groups often absorb, merge with other ethnic 
groups through a process of assimilation. Sometimes groups divide or sub-groups 
reject the wider entity and branch out on their own, through a process of 
differenfiation.'^ 
As menfioned earlier the concept of minorifies cannot be understood solely on 
the ground of enumeration alone. Three other features must also be taken into 
consideration. First, there must be certain identifiable ascribed special features 
which bind the group together and gives its members a sense of separate identity 
and it is also identified as such by the majority. Second, the group must feel that 
these special identity-constitufing features could shape the political and social 
order of the society in which it exist. Thus the groups must be politically relevant 
and must believe and desire that it can play a role in the determination of general 
policies and programmes. Third, there must be a perception of disadvantage on the 
basis of special constitutive features of the group. 
Besides preference and constitutive features objective and subjective criteria 
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may also be used to understand the concept of minority. Objectiye;id'^fieatiofli;^^'•^^v 
criteria of a minority group talce into consideration: / •* ' j ' ^ M 3 ^ K • 
(1) Group must be numerically less as compared to majority; 
(2) Determination must be based on population of that state; ^ . ^ ' imvr i^^^j^ 
(3) The group must have certain stable constitutive features like race, religion, 
language, or culture; 
(4) The group must be in a non-dominant position; 
(5) Members must be nationals of that country. 
Subjective identification criteria for identifying minority refer to the will of the 
members of the group to preserve their constitutive features in relation to other 
members of the society. 
The report of the Third Session of the Sub-Commission of the United Nations, 
in 1950, furnished the following definition: The term minority includes only those 
non-dominant groups in a population which possess and wish to preserve stable 
ethnic, religious, or linguistic traditions or characteristics markedly different fi-om 
those of the rest of the population.'^ 
Minority means a non-dominant group. This restricted meaning is afforded by 
the 'current usage which applies the term minority only to "a distinct ethnic 
group.... living within a state which is dominated by another nationality". Thus 
minority signifies a group living "in a defensive position", "although there are 
national minorities which actually constitute the ruling and privileged groups 
within a state".'^These non-dominant groups in a population are not mentioned in 
hs constitutions as the dominant groups. The members of the minority are not 
registered in the constitution of the country in which they live. In order not to be 
aliens; they must become citizens of this country. Further, to their citizenship they 
must add loyalty, complying with various laws and regulations, and contributing 
to the common welfare. The minority possesses constant-existing natural and 
cultural characteristics which are viewed by the majority "as the particular 
expression of its own individuality".'^ Moreover, the minority has the will to 
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preserve those characteristics or traditions of its own. This will constitute the 
subjective element to be combined with the aforesaid characteristics as the 
objective element. 
As a matter of fact, economic, political, or social conditions have often caused 
people to settle in a country other than their own. As time goes by, they often 
become its naturalized citizens. As loyal citizens, they obey its laws and 
regulations. Compared with the original inhabitants, they are only a minor unit. 
They are referred to as an ethnic minority or non-dominant group. Usually, they 
have diverse customs, folkways, mores, taboos, and so forth, of their own, and 
intend to abide by them. These patterns as well as ethnic, linguistic, and religious 
traditions make up their patrimony which they want to guard jealously. It is 
evident that a too small number of individuals are not worth forming a minority in 
the sociological sense, as a few trees do not make a forest. The minority must 
include an adequate number of persons sufficient by themselves to develop 
significantly their traditions and characteristics and preserve their inherited 
ancestral estate. In other respects, if the settlers are only aliens, the situation is 
entirely different. Likewise, if, being citizens, the minority members plot blowing 
up the country, they are not entitled to enjoy the rights and liberties.^" 
There are number of persons whom the concept of minority can cover. The 
writers attempting to define the term minority can be broadly divided into two 
categories. The first category brings to the factor of political allegiance. For 
example, Duparc says: "A minority is a group formed by certain nations of the 
State who differ from other nationals by offering a characteristic phenomenon: 
language or religion."^' Similarly, Brunet writes: "ft is a group of individuals, 
citizens of the State under the sovereignty of which they live, but differing from 
the majority of the population as to race, language, or religion." ^^  This category of 
definitions makes the concept of minority depend on two factors: to be citizen of 
the state and to be different from the majority by race, language, or religion. If we 
just view the greatness of the number covered by the concept of minority, then the 
writers of this group bring to the fore the fact of being "cifizen" of the state , in 
which these individuals live, as a necessary qualification. 
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The second category of writers extends the concept of minority not only to the 
"citizens" but to the inhabitants of the state as well. Balogh asserts that "as 
minorities must be considered such inhabitant who, by race, language, or religion, 
differs from the majority of the citizens."^^ Sereni adds: Minorities in the sense of 
the treaties comprehend all the inhabitants of the state who differ from the 
majority of the population by race, language, or religion, and not only the 
citizens.'^ '*According to these writers, we must include in the concept of minority 
not only the "ressortissants" of the state, as do the writers of the first category, but 
also all inhabitants in the territory of the obligatory state who differ from the 
majority of the population by race, language, or religion. The question of being 
"ressortissant" of the state does not count in the determination on the concept of 
minority, so that the country less and the foreigners can be minorities if they are 
the inhabitants of the state in question.^ ^ According to Sereni, this concept 
corresponds exactly to the aim pursued by the regime of the protection of 
minorities. The treaties of minorities have the goal, on the one hand, to guarantee 
the application of certain general principles of government adopted by the modern 
states, and, on the other hand, to exclude the oppression of minorities incorporated 
in the state, in guaranteeing them equality with the "ressortissants" of the majority. 
These are the two concepts of minorities, one broad and the other narrow. This 
question was the object of an examination on the part of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice at the time of a demand of consultative opinion relative to the 
acquisition of the Polish nationality. The court gave its opinion upon this question, 
according to which the factor 'person' must be interpreted in a broad sense in so 
far as the Polish treaty of minorities is concerned. Also, with regard to other 
treaties and declarations, the term minorities should be largely interpreted. The 
concept of minority must be such as to embrace not only the "Ressortissants" but 
also the inhabitants of the state who differ from the majority of the population of 
this state by race, language, or religion. 
Thus there is no agreed, universal definition of'minority'. The adoption of the 
United Nations Declaration on Minorities could be made possible only after a 
decision to let the term be undefined. A definition proposed by Francesco 
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Capotorti is understood to be the most widely cited definition of the term , 
wherein he defined minority as a group: "numerically inferior to the rest of the 
population of a State, in a non-dominant position, whose members - being nation 
of the State - possesses ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from 
those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of 
solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion, or 
language." ^^  
Almost same definition was submitted by Jules Deschenes, Sub Commission 
Member, to the Commission on Human Rights, which reads: "A group of citizens 
of a State, constituting a numerical minority and in non-dominant position in that 
State, endowed with ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics which differ from 
those of the majority of the population, having a sense of solidarity with one 
another, motivated, if only implicitly, by a collective will to survive and whose 
aim is to achieve equality with the majority in fact and in law."^^ 
2.1 Theoretical Formulations 
Commonly a minority is understood in numerical terms. It refers to a group of 
individuals smaller in member as against the numerically dominant group in a 
population. But theorists go further than confining their definition of 'minority' to 
merely numerical-ratio criterion.^ ^ 
Thus, while considering 'minority' as numerically smaller group as against the 
majority in a definite area, some place emphasis upon certain characteristic 
commonly possessed by the members constituting the minority and, to them, these 
characteristics serves objective factors of distinction. In this sense the term is used 
to cover "racial, religious or linguistic sections of the populafion within a State 
which differ in these respects from the majority of the population".^° Thus, 
according to these definitions, minority constitutes a collectivity which is united 
by certain common characteristics such as religion, language, race, culture or 
tradifions, or a combination of these factors, and is numerically non-dominant in a 
populafion. 
Others emphasize that the members constituting minority group have a feeling 
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of belonging to one common unit, a sense of blood relation or community which 
distinguishes them from those belonging to the majority of the inhabitants. They 
are "groups held together by ties of common descent, language or religious faith 
and feeling themselves different in these respects from the majority of the 
inhabitants of a given political entity"'". A 'consciousness' of the difference with 
the majority on the basis of certain common characteristic is, therefore, considered 
as a distinguishing mark, and as such a subjective elements. However, national 
consciousness alone, at least in some cases, may characterize minorities not 
otherwise distinguishable from the rest of the population by objective 
characteristics of language, race or culture, etc.^ ^ 
There are also those who define minority in term of relationship between the 
dominant group and the minority. To them, it is much more important "to 
understand the nature and the minority than it is to know the marks by the 
possession of which people are identified as members of either".'^ '^  
The definition which lay emphasis upon certain subjective factors such as 
'feeling' or 'consciousness' provide a test which is too vague and uncertain, and 
more psychological in nature than real. Every situation may not necessarily 
involve the assumption that a group in order to deserve the title of minority must 
be distinguishable from the majority by the presence of a feeling or consciousness 
of its being different from the majority. A group distinguishable from others by the 
possession of certain objective characteristic, such as language, may not have a 
feeling or consciousness of its distinct status and may yet be counted as minority. 
Moreover, ascertainment of any subjective factor would itself beg the existence of 
some objective characteristic which serve as the basis of distinction and the 
separation, and may in turn have served as the source of Teeling' or 
'consciousness'. Similarly, the writers who cite certain objective characteristic 
commonly possessed by the members constituting minority as the exclusive 
foundations of minority status fail to recognize that objective factors alone may 
not always be the determining mark of a minority. For, a group, not conscious of 
its distinct status or separate group identity, may soon be assimilated with the 
majority and thus may not be entitled to be called as minority. Those who regard 
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the factors of discrimination, prejudice and inferior treatment as the sole 
determinant of minority status and dismiss as irrelevant the numerical size of the 
group concerned need hardly be told that 'minority' is a relative term and must 
presuppose the existence of a numerical majority. Thus, for instance, the black 
population of South Africa or Rhodesia, though politically non-dominant and 
subjected to inferior treatment cannot be regarded as 'minority' as numerically it 
happens to be larger in size than the numerically smaller white population. Even 
the most acceptable of the definitions, the one given by the Human Rights 
Commission, is not beyond the reach of the argument. That definition appears to 
those confined to those non-dominant groups only which, apart from having 
certain objective characteristics which are distinctively their own, wish to preserve 
their separate identities and are not willing to be assimilated with the rest of the 
population. Based on the experienced of Europe where minorities like nafionalifies 
were largely minorities by will, anxious to preserve their distinctive character, and 
refusing to be assimilated with the rest of the population, the definition fails to 
include minorities which are not minorities by choice or will, but are minorities by 
force. The Negroes in the United States and the Scheduled Castes in India are 
examples in hand. They are not minorities by will, and are rather willing to 
assimilate with the majority but are forced to maintain their distinct status. 
Minority is seen, in this definition as a group apart, counter posed to the rest of the 
population, too much pre-occupied with itself and too much imbued with 
characteristic of separatism, inwardness and withdrawal - a picture to much 
overdrawn.^ "* 
2.2 Aims of Minority Groups 
Louis Wirth proposes a classification of minority groups in terms of their 
ultimate objectives.^^ A minority, according to him, may seek four aims: 
1. A minority may have pluralistic aims- and it may seek to preserve their own 
identity and culture upon a basis of tolerance of differences and equality of 
opportunity. This is a sort of'federal association'. 
2. A minority may have as its goal, assimilation and may seek ultimately to lose 
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its identity as a discrete group and to merge with the dominant group. This 
type is total integration in which the political state 'ought' to be culturally 
homogenous. The culture of the political dominant group must prevail in all 
contexts. Minority values and minority customs are seen as threat cohesive 
solidarity of society and must be eliminated. 
3. A minority may have secessionist aims, to achieve, political as well as cultural 
independence from the dominant group; 
4. Finally, the aims of minority may be militant - it may not be interested in mere 
toleration, assimilation or succession, but may set as its goal political 
domination over the majority and other minorities in the society.''^  
A minority's position involves exclusion or assignment to a lower status in one 
or more of four areas of life - economic, political, legal and social. That is, a 
minority will be assigned to lower-ranking occupations or to lower-compensated 
positions within each occupation, it will be prevented from exercising the full 
political privileges held by majority citizens; it will not be given equal status with 
the majority in the application of law or justice, or it will be partially or 
completely excluded from both the formal and the informal associations found 
among the majority. Not infrequently, the minority also voluntarily excluded itself 
partially or completely from participation in these areas of life, partly as a means 
of maintaining traditional cultural differences. Accompanying the objective 
subordination and segregation of the minorities are usually to be found some 
subjective attitudes of mutual hostility, although these may sometimes be publicly 
denied and camouflaged. Majority minority relations invariably involve some 
conflict, although this may take varied forms and operate on different levels.^ ^ 
Minority groups have performed almost every type of function in almost all 
types of social system. Minorities have played economic roles as specialist 
bankers, traders or craftsmen. More often they have been manual laborers, whether 
slave, serf or free. As revolutionary groups, they have acted as ideological leaders 
in political life: sometimes their function has been to told the political balance; 
more often they have been the subject of exploitation. Some, because they have 
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special skills, may be valued for their artistic contributions to social life and yet 
not be altogether socially acceptable to the rest of the society. Earlier it was noted 
that the role played by a minority group within a society varies with such factors 
as its size, its skill and its ideology, and also with the roles of the dominant and 
other groups in the society. The amount of wealth that the members of the group 
can accumulate and the political influence that they can exercise vary with the 
ways in which these factors arrange themselves. Factors such as these obviously 
work differently in different types of society, and even in the same type the 
balance is never likely to be identical in any two societies.•^ ^ 
2.3 Sociological Criterion 
Sociologists define the term 'minority' on the basis of certain characteristics 
which are commonly possessed by members constituting it. In this sense the term 
signifies such groups of people that are united by certain common features and 
which feel that they belong to one common unit. Such groups may be held 
together by ties of common descent, physical characteristics, traditions, customs, 
language or religious faith or a combination of these.^ ^ In any case, therefore, there 
is a sense of akinness (related by blood), a sense of community or unity prevalent 
in the group or groups that distinguish them from the majority of the inhabitants of 
the area where such minorities function. It is this sense of blood relation within the 
group coupled with the consciousness of a different with the majority which may 
serve as the basis for various polifical or other claims.''° So apart from the 
statistical or numerical size there may be cases where language or religion alone or 
power distribution whether social or political - may if found as the real basis to 
ascertain the minority status of a particular group of people. 
A more subtle definition is given by F.J. Brown and J.C. Roucek: Minorities 
are the individuals and groups that differ or are assumed to differ from their 
'dominant' social group. The differences, although varying in degree, are 
distinguishing characteristics not only on term of race, religion, nationality and 
state allegiance but also in the composite cultural patterns. However, such 
differences in and of themselves are not sufficient to make a group a minority 
without the accompanying attitude of'dominance' and 'subservience' consciously 
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accepted and tacitly assumed.'*' 
J.A. Laponce defines a minority somewhat with a different emphasis thus: 
"A minority is a group of people, who, because of a common racial, religious or 
national heritage which singles them out from the politically 'dominant' group, fear 
that they, may either be prevented from integrating themselves into the national 
community of their choice or be obliged to do so at the expense of their 
identity."^^ 
A classical defmhion of the term 'minority' is given by Professor L. Wirth. 
According to him, a minority is a group of people who, because of their physical 
or cultural characteristics, are singled out from others in the society in which they 
live for differential and unequal treatment and who, therefore, regard themselves 
as objects of collective discrimination. Further according to him, minority status 
carries with it an exclusion from full participation in the life of the society.''^  
There are two aspects of this definition which are worth noting. First, the 
minority group is marked out from the others in the society by virtue of hs specific 
racial or cultural characteristics. Such characteristics are of a permanent nature so 
that one's membership in a minority group is involuntary and, by and large, a 
person is born into such a group. The second important element in the definition of 
a minority group is that it being a minority group is derived from its subordinate 
relationship to some other dominant group. The dominant group, however, need 
not necessarily be the large one numerically, although in a democratic society in 
which numbers count in the acquisifion of power, the numerically large group may 
also become the dominant group. The actual minority-dominant relationship is 
determined by variables of social, economic and political power which are 
unequally distributed between the two types of groups.'*'* 
Some scholars like A.M. Rose and C.B. Rose have rejected any purely 
numerical definition and have given special emphasis to the factor of opposition. 
According to them, the mere fact of being generally hated and being hated because 
of religious, racial or national background is what defines a minority group."*^  This 
element of differential treatment, which is emphasized by Wirth and Rose, does 
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not find any favor with R.A. Schemer horn according to whom "minorities are 
sub-groups within a culture which are distinguished from the dominant group by 
reason of differences in physiognomy, language, custom or culture patterns 
(including any combination of these factors). Such sub-groups are regarded as 
inherently different and not belonging to the dominant group: for this reason they 
are consciously or unconsciously excluded from full participation in the life of the 
culture.'"*^ 
Thus, a mere glance over the above definitions will show that in spite of a 
difference of opinion among scholars it seems to be now settled that in the social 
sciences the term is not defined as a statistical concept of 'less than 50%'/^ 
Instead the test of 'dominant' and 'dominated' groups to describe 'majority' and 
'minority' respectively is adopted. So much stress is made on the concept of 
'dominant' and 'dominated' that one definition even goes to the extent of saying 
that there can be no minority, even if there are distinguishing characteristics in 
term of race, religion etc., unless there is an accompanying attitude of 'dominance' 
and 'subservience' consciously accepted or tacitly assumed. 
To conclude, it may be observed that no definition comes out to be 
comprehensive enough to cover all and varied situations, illustrates the difficulty 
experienced in assigning limits to the concept of 'minority'. The purpose of above 
referred definitions is not to evaluate the relative merits of the formulations 
explained above. These are recalled merely to illustrate that the term minority is 
not always regarded as a statistical concept, that there exists a sharp disagreement 
in opinions among the formulators and that each definition has its relevance only 
in a given context. 
2.4 Who is a Minority in India? 
In the Indian context, beginning from the Constituent Assembly debates, the 
term 'minority' was to have wider connotation. In the assembly's deliberations, the 
minorities question was regarded as encompassing the claims of three kinds of 
communities: religious minorities, backward castes and tribal.''^ The claims for 
special treatment by these groups were on the basis of some disadvantages 
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suffered by them with respect to the rest of the population rather than their 
numerical status.^° 
It was proposed by K.M Munshi, one of the members of the Drafting 
Committee, to have a narrow definition of the term 'minority' in order to exclude 
scheduled castes from its ambit. '^ Ultimately, the draft constitution excluded 
religious minorities from the provisions of reservation in various walks of public 
life. British India, however, had included provision of reservation for religious 
minorities since 1909. 
The very first question that arises in the interpretation of cultural and 
educational rights is to decide the meaning of the term minority because in order 
to bring a case under Article 29 and 30 of the Indian Constitution, a community 
has first to establish its character as linguistic, scriptural, cultural or religious 
minority. "All minorities whether based on religion or language, shall have the 
right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice". This is 
what clause (1) of Art. 30 in terms declare. The declaration vests in the courts a 
right to ascertain, as a preliminary step, if the group claiming the benefit of Art. 30 
(1) is a group entitled to be called as 'minority', and also imposes a duty upon the 
claimant-group to prove an evidence that the educational institution in respect of 
which claim to establishment or administration is advanced is established or 
administered by a 'minority' definable in terms of Art. 30(1). What it means to say 
is that in any conflict where Art. 30(1) is sought to be made the basis of a claim to 
establishment or administration of an educational institution, the claim must be 
supportable on proof that the insfitution in question was established by a minority 
distinguishable from others by the characteristics of either religion or language or 
both. "Religion" and "language" being the criteria indicated in Art. 30, a 
precondition for the latter's applicability, the Constitution itself tends to confine 
the task of the courts to the ascertainment whether the group claiming the 
protection is a group identifiable by the characteristics of religion or language and 
is also numerically non-dominant."''^  
The Indian Constitution uses the term minority/minorities only in four 
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Articles, namely, Articles 29(1), 30, 350A, and 350B. However, what is amazing 
is that the Constitution nowhere defines the term 'minority', nor does it identify 
the minority groups or prescribe a definite test for identifying the same. There 
may have been two reasons for this - the first, that the framers thought it proper to 
leave the issue open to be guided by the judiciary, from case to case, and the 
second, that the framers did not think it fit to enter into details as the matter had 
been discussed at such length before the Assembly that it was deemed as settled, 
who and what were minorities.^'They were not confronted with any theoretical 
problem of bringing the concept of minority within the confines of a definitional 
formulation. They were rendering a practical solution to a problem which was 
essentially political and had remained in the forefront of India's political scene for 
several decades before independence. While Art. 23 of the Draft Constitufion, 
corresponding to the present Article 30, was being debated,^" doubts were indeed 
expressed in the Constituent Assembly over the advisability of leaving vague 
justifiable rights to undefined minorities. The Assembly chose to avoid any further 
elaboration and left it to the wisdom of the courts to supply this omission.^ ^ 
Thus it has been left for the courts to ascertain whether a group claiming 
protection is one identifiable by the characteristics of religion or language and is 
numerically non-dominant. The courts now, however, come out with various 
kinds of rulings, not answering the problem in a uniform way. Consequently the 
term 'minority' under Article 30 is still not clear in its meaning and import. It is, 
therefore, necessary to refer to the work of scholars in social sciences, judicial 
decisions and other relevant sources to understand what the term really stands for. 
This bring us to the formidable question as to what tests can be employed to 
distinguish a 'minority' from the 'majority'.^^ 
The Nafional Commission for Minorities Act, 1992 avoids defining the term 
minority. According to the Act, "minority" means a community notified as such 
by the Central Government." The Government of India has notified five 
communities, namely, Muslim, Sikhs, Christians, Buddhists and Zoroastrians as 
Minorities at the national level. As per census of 2001 the share of minority 
communities in the national population is as follows: Muslims - 13.4%, Christians 
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- 2.3%, Sikhs - 1.9%, Buddhists - 0.8% and Jains - 0.4%, 58 
The judicial opinion seems to have correctly appreciated that the benefit of 
Art. 30(1) is confined to only two types of minorities - religious and linguistic. It 
is this appreciation which led the Delhi High Court to affirm that "the only or the 
principal basis of a minority must be their adherence to one of the many religions . 
. . and that the other features of the minority are subordinate to the main feature, 
namely its separateness because of the religion".^^ By analogy a similar 
interpretation can be put to the words "based on language" also. That being so it 
can be said that for the purpose of Art. 30, a minority means a non-dominant 
collectivity distinguishable from the majority of the population by the objective 
factors of religion or language or a combination of both. 
2.5 The Judicial Response 
The question of what is a minority was posed in case of Ramani Kanta Bose 
V. Gauhati Municipality.^^ The Supreme Court found when a Bill is passed by a 
State Legislature, which extends to the whole of the State, the term "minority" 
with reference to Articla 30 (1) must be determined by reference to the entire 
population of the State. 
The question who is a minority was posed, again, in the Kerala Education 
Bilf^ case. The Supreme Court opined that while it was easy to say that a minority 
community meant a community which was numerically less than 50 per cent. The 
important question was, 50 per cent of what? Should it be of the entire population 
of India, or of a state, or a part thereof? It is possible that a community may be 
concentrated in a part of a state, so that it is in majority there through it may be in 
minority in the context of the whole of the state population. If a part of the state is 
to be taken, then the question is where to draw the line and what is the unit to be 
taken into consideration? Whether it should be a district, a sub division, a taluk, a 
town or a municipality or its wards? However, in the context of an Act of 
Legislature, which extends to the whole of the state, the Court held that minority 
must be determined by reference to the entire state, and any community, linguistic 
or religious, which is numerically more than fifty percent of the entire state 
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population would be regarded as a minority for purposes of article 30(1). 
The unanimous pronouncement of the Supreme Court in D.A. V. College-
Jullunder v. State ofPunjab,^^ took in view the State of Punjab for determination 
of the issue whether Arya Samajists were a minority. The court held that Hindus in 
Punjab constitute a religious minority. Therefore, Arya Samajist in Punjab also 
constitutes a religious minority having their own distinct script. The Supreme 
Court said that the term minority must be determined in relation to the particular 
legislation which is sought to be impugned. Consequently, if it is a State law, then 
the minorities will be determined in relation to the population of the State. In this 
case the court categorically rejected the contention that the minority should be 
determined by reference to the entire population of India. It is, however, not clear 
from the judgments as to what would be the criteria if the question of defining the 
minority arises in relation to an impugned central law. Will it, then, be determined 
by reference to the entire population of India. 
This view has again been reiterated by the Supreme Court in the Guru Nanak 
University case. In this case, the Court rejected the contentions raised by the state 
of Punjab that a religious linguistic minority should be a minority in relation to the 
entire population of India. Invoking the ruling in the Kerala education Bill case, 
the Court held that the minority has to be determined, in relation to a state law, 
only with respect to the population of the state.^ '* There is, however, one snag in 
this formulation. It is possible that the population in a state may be so fragmented 
in linguistic, religious or cultural groups that no group may constitute 50 per cent 
of the state population, and thus all groups may fall under the protection of articles 
29 and 30 without there being a single majority community against which 
minorities needs to claim protection. 
Again, in Mother Provincial v. State of Kerala!'^ the Kerala High Court left 
the question open whether a minority within the meaning of article 30 "means a 
minority in the whole of India (which would mean that every linguisfic group 
would be a minority even in its own linguistic state), or a minority in a particular 
state, or a minority in the area to which an unplugged statute applies". The Court 
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definitely ruled out the last idea for, in that case, the legislature can defeat the 
article by omitting the operation of the statute to areas where particular religious 
or linguistic groups are in a majority. For a state Legislature, the relevant area 
should be area over which the jurisdiction of the legislature extends. 
In S.K.Patro v. State of Bihar,^^ the Supreme Court has held that a minority 
claiming privilege under article 30 should be a minority of persons residing in 
India. Foreigners not residing in India do not fall within article 30. Residents in 
India and forming the "well defined religious or linguistic minority" fall under the 
protection of article 30. Further, while rights under article 29 can be claimed only 
by Indian citizens, article 30 does not expressly refer to citizenship as a 
qualification for the members of the minorities. The facts that funds have been 
obtained from outside India for setting up and developing a school is no ground 
for denying to it protection under article 30.^ ^ 
It has been argued that the proposition laid down by the court to determine 
'minority' has many defects. The population of the state may be so fragmented in 
linguistic, religious or cultural groups that no group may constitute 50 per cent of 
the state population, and thus all groups may fall under the protection of Articles 
29 and 30 without there being a single majority community against which 
minorities may claim protection. Again, it might be that certain communities 
which may be in majority in a particular state, like the Sikhs in Punjab or Muslims 
in Jammu and Kashmir, or Christians in Nagaland, may be in minority in relation 
to the entire population of India. Can they be in majority from one point of view 
and in minority from the other? The problem becomes clear in the following 
instance: there are a number of educational institutions set up by the Christian 
minority, spread all over the country; applying the test formulated by the Supreme 
Court, the educational institutions situated in Nagaland would not be entitled to 
the protection of the Articles 29(1) and 30(1) but the same would have the 
protection as minority in the state of Punjab.^ ^ 
In the minds of the vast majority of man the word 'minority' has an 
arithmetical connotation. But the term 'minority' does not necessarily connote 
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numbers. In fact, to understand the term 'minority' only in terms of numbers, as a 
smaller part of a whole or less than 50 per cent of the total population, is wrong. 
Apart from common use, in a political and constitutional context 'minority' is not 
a numerical concept but means a "non-dominant" group in a state whether 
'cultural, religious or linguistic'. In the arithmetical sense of the term there could 
be, for instance, a minority of smokers as vegetarians, but no one thinks of them 
when one speaks of minority protection. In fact, there can be no minority, even if 
there are distinguishing characteristics, in term of culture religion etc. unless there 
is an accompanying attitude of dominance and subservience, consciously accepted 
or tacitly assumed. Thus in a society where groups coexist in peace and mutual 
harmony, devoid of any urge to dominate or sub serve each other, minority 
provisions have no place.™ 
So understood the term 'majority' and 'minority' are meant to describe 
"dominant and dominated" or "non-dominant" groups, respectively. A minority 
and dominated group is any group in society that remains at the bottom of the 
stratification system and is subjected to discriminatory practices by the majority 
and dominated group because of difference in culture, race, religion or sex. 
Specifically, minority groups "are categories of people that possess imperfect 
access to positions of equal power and to the corollary categories of prestige and 
privilege in the society.^' Such imperfect access is ensured by the power of the 
dominant group- a power that the subordinate group lacks. 
Thus a numerical minority by capturing political and economic power in a 
state may become the majority or dominant group. This group belonging to a 
particular culture or religion may, by use of political and economic power, 
propagate and conserve its group interests at the cost of the interest of the other 
group or groups in the state, in spite of the fact that the latter group or groups 
constitute the numerical majority individually or in aggregate in the state. Such 
possibilities in a state give rise to provisions for the minorities in a state. The 
restriction of the term 'minority' in its arithmetical connotation only undermines 
the effect of such protective provisions.^ ^ 
71 
Similarly, the main objective of articles 29 and 30 is that minorities based on 
culture, language, script or religion should not be compelled by circumstances to 
give up their language, script or culture. If a particular community is a minority on 
the national level but a majority in a particular state, such a community will on its 
own be able to conserve its language, script or culture as there would be no threat 
from within the State. The very basis of minority - protection is that the political 
underdogs must be protected against interference of the majority in their cultural 
and linguistic development. If there is no such threat, there is no need for such 
protection." 
Pointing out the significance of Articles 30(2), Justice Krishna Iyer has 
expressed an identical view, when he says, 
"The democratic [and secular] spirit of this provision is that the majority shall 
not use financial coercion on religious minorities through withholding the state 
aid. If such a community chooses to impart secular education, it must be subject to 
state regulation as other communities are." 
By now it should be obvious that the determination of the minority on the 
basis of less than 50 per cent of population is not viable. The constitution policy is 
to provide safeguards to real minorities against exploitation by the majority, and 
this idea has to be kept in mind in determining a minority. As rightly observed by 
K. Subbarao: "The minorities who deserve state protection are not the millions of 
people belonging to this religion or that religion or this linguistic group or that 
linguistic group, but. . . unhappy small casts and sects who belong to all religious 
or linguistic groups spread in different parts of the state"" 
The expression 'minority' is a relative term and its meaning should depend 
upon the territorial limits of its operation and the objectives of the particular 
legislation. The deliberations at the Constituent Assembly reveal that the problem 
of defining the term arose there, and the Assembly was unable to formulate any 
definition of 'minority'. It is, however, clear that the protection of Article 30 
applies only to those religious and linguistic minorities which had claimed 
political rights separated from the majority community prior to the Constitution 
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such as the Sikhs, Muslims, Jains, Anglo-Indians and Christians/^In addition. 
Article 30(1) does not confer on foreigners residing outside India the right to set 
up educational institutions of their choice. Persons setting up educational 
institutions must be resident in India and they must form a well established 
religious and linguistic minority." 
In the particular circumstances of India, the words 'majorities' and 
'minorities' may not mean exactly what they ordinarily do in other countries. In 
India, there are both powerful minorities and weak majorities in different parts of 
the country. There are contradictions in the assessment of majorities and 
minorities. Numerical majority is often equated with dominance, and the influence 
and authority that even small minorities wield in society and administration is 
frequently ignored. History, too, supports this view. In Madras, for instance, the 
Brahmins, are a dominant community though they number only three percent of 
the population and recently it was the 97 per cent non-Brahmin group who had to 
be helped through legislation. A similar situation existed in Maharashtra sometime 
back.'^ 
Justice Ruma Pal has taken divergent view on this count. In her opinion, the 
question whether a group is a minority or not must be determined in relation to the 
source and the territorial application of the particular legislation against which the 
protection is sought.^ ^ Her whole reasoning may be abstracted as follows: 
The term 'minority' literally means 'numerically less' in relation to the 
country as a whole or the state, or some other political or geographical boundary.^° 
Thus construed, the protection under Article 30 is sought against any measure, 
legislative or otherwise, which infringes the right granted under this article.^' 
Hitherto, the cases that have come for judicial intervention on this count involved 
impugning the state action, and, therefore, it was quite natural to hold the state 
boundary as the unit for determining minority status.^ ^ She cogently argues:^ ^ 
Merely because persons having a distinct language, script or culture are 
residing within the political and geographical limits of a State within which they 
may be in a majority, would not take them out of the phrase, 'section of citizens 
73 
residing in the territory of India'. 
All this implies is that 'minority' character need not be construed solely with 
reference to a state boundary. In an appropriate case, it may even bear a reference 
to the whole of India if it involved the consideration of a central statute. 
2.6 Kinds of Minorities 
The relevant Articles relating to cultural and educational rights are Articles 29 
and 30. Article 29(1) provides that "any Section of citizens residing in the territory 
of India or any part thereof, having a distinct language, script or culture of its own 
shall have the right to conserve the same." Article 30(1) says that "all minorities, 
whether based on religion or language, shall have the right to establish and 
administer educational institutions of their choice." It is clear from the language of 
the above two Articles that three categories of minorities has been recognized 
under the Constitution, these minorities are based on language, religion and 
culture. 
Minorities based on language or religion is understandable and can be defined 
but it is very difficult to define the word 'culture'. Culture is not a static 
phenomenon but it is a progressive and developing fact. Culture of a country or a 
community is much wider, larger and deeper, than its script or language. Culture is 
not a single item, either or area, language or script. It is vast ocean, including all 
the entirety of the heritage of the past of any community in the material as well as 
spiritual domain. It includes the arts, the learning, the science, the religion or 
belief and much else besides.^ ^ Culture has been defined as a collective name for 
the material, social, religious and artistic achievements of human groups, 
including customs, traditions and behaviour patterns. 
Since the word 'culture' has a very wide meaning and includes so many 
things, so if we examine minorities based on culture, there would be no end to it. 
Dr. S. Radha Krishnan remarked in this regard that "India is a symphony where 
there is, as in orchestra different instrument, each with its particular sonority, each 
with its special sound.^ ^ So it is a vague and unsafe criterion to categories 
minorities on pattern of culture. The judgments of the Supreme Court disclose that 
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there are only two types of minorities which have been given protection under the 
Constitution of India; these are linguistic and religious minorities. An eminent 
sociologist, Dr. G.S. Ghurye, also supports this view: for the Constitution of India, 
minorities based on culture, race nationality are nonexistent and they being based 
only on language and religion and by implication of both in combination. ^^  
2.6.1 Linguistic Minorities 
Humayun Kabir rightly remarked in his book, 'Minorities in a Democracy' 
that "Language groups are there, and it is no use trying to deny them. They will be 
there. Any attempt to suppress a language will. Infect, create a violent revulsion 
and may be a cause for fisslparous tendencies."^^ 
The framers of the Constitution were aware that this issue of language is a 
delicate matter. Rajendra Prasad, the first President of India, and President of the 
Constituent Assembly during the discussion on language pointed out: 
"There Is no other Item in the whole constitution of the country which will be 
required to be implemented from day to day, from hour to hour, I might even say, 
from minute to minute, in actual practice. . . Therefore, when any member rises to 
speak on this language question, I would request him most earnestly to remember 
that he should not let fall in a single word or expression which might hurt or cause 
offence. Whatever has to be said should be said in moderate language so that it 
might appeal to reason and there should be no appeal to feelings or passion in a 
matter like this."^^ 
To explain the term 'linguistic minorities' the Commissioner for Linguistic 
Minorities states: "Linguistic minorities are minorities residing in the territory of 
India or in any part thereof, having a distinct language or script of their own." 
The defmition of the term 'linguistic minorities' came up for discussion 
before the Supreme Court and High Courts in some cases. For example, in D.A. V. 
College, Jullunder v. State of Punjab^" P. Jaganmohan Reddy, J., speaking for the 
Supreme Court observed: 
"A linguistic minority for the purpose of Article 30(1) is one which must at 
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least have a separate spoken language. It is not necessary that language should also 
have a distinct script, there are in this country, some languages which have no 
script of their own, but nevertheless those sections of the people who speak that 
language will be a linguistic minority entitled to the protection of Article 30(1)."^' 
In Jugal Kishore Kedia v. State of Assam^^ an interesting question arose 
whether the linguistic minority has to be determined only on the basis of the 
language spoken by the minority or in respect of any other language? Saikia, C.J., 
speaking for the Court, observed: 
"A linguistic minority for the purpose of Article 30(1) is to be determined 
with reference to the language spoken by the community and not reference to any 
other language which the community wants its children to study." 
There are three basic problems faced by linguistic minority groups. First, the 
claim of the linguistic group that education is imparted to their children in their 
own mother tongues. Secondly, the use of minority language in the administration. 
Lastly, the problem of representation of the minorities in the State services. As 
regard the first problem, Article 350A was inserted by the Constitution (Seventh 
Amendment) Act, 1956, which provides, it shall be the endeavour of every state 
and every local authority within the State to provide adequate facilities for 
instruction in the mother-tongue at primary stage of education to children 
belonging to linguistic minority groups. Secondly, on the question of the use of 
minority language in the administration. Article 347 says that on a demand being 
made in that behalf, the President may, if he is satisfied that a substantial 
proportion of the population of a state desire the use of any language spoken by 
them to be recognized by that state, direct that such language shall also be 
officially recognized throughout that State or any part thereof, for such purposes 
as he may specify. Lastly, as regards the problem of representation of the 
minorities in the State services, a policy has been adopted that language should not 
be a bar for this purpose and besides the use of state language; the candidates may 
be given a choice for using English or Hindi as medium of examination.^ "* 
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2.6.2 Religious Minorities 
In India, the problem of religious minority is no less sensitive than that of the 
linguistic minority. The religious conceptions in this country are so vast that they 
cover every aspect of life, from birth to death.^ ^ There is nothing which is not 
religion. Not only in India but throughout the world, religion has played two 
distinct role in society. On the one side, it had the effect of unifying large sections 
of people who would otherwise have remained fragmented into petty tribes. On 
the other, it has also caused severe division between man and man, group and 
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group, nation and nation. 
The expression 'minorities based on religion' in Article 30(1) means, the 
principal basis of a minority must be their adherence to one of the many religions, 
and not a sect or a part of it and that the other features of the minority are 
subordinate to the main feature, its separateness because of its religion. For 
instance, Hinduism is a religion and Arye Samaj is only a sect of it. Islam is a 
religion and Shia or Sunnis are only sect of it. Christianity is a religion and 
Catholics or the Protestants are only a sect of it. V.S. Deshpande, J., in Arya Samaj 
Educational Trust, Delhi v. The Director Education, Delhi Administration 
observed: 
"No Section or class of Hindus was ever referred to as a minority. In Article 
30(1), therefore, the word 'minority' cannot apply to a class or a section of 
Hindus. However, some religious denominations have sought to have themselves 
judicially recognized as a separate religion, independent from Hinduism, so as to 
be entitled to be treated as minority for the purpose of the Constitutional 
protection secured under Article 30".^ ^ 
But the courts are not unanimous; they are rather shaky, in their approach 
while dealing with such claims. That bears testimony to the difficulties involved. 
In Dipendra Nath v. State of Bihar^'^ Brahmo-Samaj has been held a 
minority based on religion. In Janki Prasad v. State,^^° the claim of theosophical 
society has not been accepted. In M.C. Bandopadhyay v. State of West Bengal'^' 
Ramkrishnaities have been held as minority based on Fehgrb'fiT'by the Calcutta 
High Court but the Supreme Court has rightly reversed the decision of the High 
Court.'°^ 
Several attempts have been made by the Arya Samaj to have it judicially 
recognized as a separate religion independent from Hinduism. Although the 
Supreme Court had not decided whether Arya Samaj was a distinct religious 
minority for the purpose of Art. 31(1) or a religious denomination for the purpose 
of Art. 26(1) (a) because it had'°^ held that Arya Samaj was a religious minority 
having a distinct script of its own which entitled it to claim the protection under 
Art. 30(1). This observation somewhat creates the impression, thus bringing an 
element of uncertainty, that the Supreme Court was prepared to treat Arya Samajis 
a religious minority distinct from Hindus. On the one hand, the Delhi High Court 
in Arya Samaj Educational Trust'"'' case and Gandhi H.U.M. Vidyalaya v. 
Director of Education rejected the argument that Arya Samaj being a religious 
minority was entitled to protection of Art. 30(1). On the other hand, the Patna 
High Court, however, appears to have taken a different view of the position of 
Arya Samaj in Arya Pratinidhi Sabha v. The State of Bihar }^^ 
To conclude, we can say that the Courts should strictly confine the benefit of 
Art, 30(1) to the well defined religious minorities which existed at the time of the 
framing of the constitution. Religious denominations ought not to be allowed to 
prevail as religions and should not be confounded as separate religion. 
From the above discussion what seems evident is that the judiciary has 
liberally interpreted the expression 'religious minority' to the extent that hardly 
any religious sect or denomination, howsoever insignificant numerically and 
doctrinally, can be denied the right to establish and administer educational 
institutions of its own choice. 
In India, Hinduism is the religion of the majority, and Muslims, Christian, 
Sikhs, Parsees are major religious minorities. According to the Census of India 
(2001), the percentage of different important religious groups is as follows: 
Hindus 81.4%; Muslims 12.4%; Christians 2.3%; Sikhs 1.9%; Buddhists 0.8%; 
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Jains 0.4%; others 0.7%. Except Hindus all others are minorities in India. Now we 
shall study the position of these minority groups separately.'"''. 
2.6.2.1 Muslims 
Before the partition of the country the Muslim community in India stood in 
the ratio of one to four of the whole population. In 2001 it is 13.4% of the total 
population of the country. Next only to Indonesia and Bangladesh, it has the 
largest Muslim population in the world. And no one can deny that in the Indian 
Union they are more than a protected minority; they are a significant community. 
In almost every State and Union territory of India they are in considerable number. 
In certain areas their proportion is larger than even national average, e.g. in 
Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi Island 94.37%; Jammu and Kashmir 65.85%); 
and in Assam, West Bengal, Kerala, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar they are 24.03%), 
20.46%, 19.50% 15.48% and 13.48% respectively of their total population in the 
country. From this we observe that in India the Muslims are scattered throughout 
the length and breadth of the country. And in one Union territory and one State 
they are rather in majority."'^  
2.6.2.2 Christians 
The Christians constitute the third numerically important community in India. 
They are next only to the Muslims. They, forming only 2.3%, are in large numbers 
in the southern States of Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh. These three 
States together account for more than 60%) of the country's Christian population. 
The States and Union territories in which more than a fifth of the population is 
made up of Christians are Nagaland (66.76%)), Meghalaya (46.98%)), Goa, Daman 
and Diu (31.77%), Andaman and Nicobar Islands (26.35%), Manipur (26.03%) 
and Kerala (21.05%)).'°^ No doubt Christianity is a Western religion but the greater 
part of the community has been drawn from the lower strata of the Hindu 
community. And it is a fact that Christianity entered India before most of the 
Europeans had embraced this faith. St. Thomas came to India when many of the 
countries of Europe had not yet become Christian."° He was one of the 12 
Apostles of Christ, who brought Christianity to India around A.D. 52. 
79 
2.6.2.3 Sikhs 
Sikhism, as H.V. Hodson remarked, is a purified and protestant development 
of Hinduism.'" It is only 1.9% of the total population of the country and is in 
absolute majority only in Punjab; in all other States it is in minor fraction. Quite 
obviously the greatest concentration of the Sikhs, i.e. 78.62 per cent of the total 
Sikhs population of the country, is in Punjab. The other States accounting for at 
least one per cent of the total Sikh population are the adjoining Haryana (6.29%), 
Rajasthan (1.33%), Delhi (7.16%) and Jammu and Kashmir (2.29%)."^ 
It is a religious and linguistic minority of India. Punjabi in Gurumukhi script 
is the language of the community. The Sikhs' demand for a Punjabi Suba, which 
was primarily dressed up on the plea of the language, was conceded only in 1966 
as a result of a relentless struggle by the community. 
2.6.2.4 Parsis 
Yet another microscopic religious minority is Parsis. They are so called 
because they originally came from Persia in about eighth century to avoid their 
compulsory conversion to Islam. The first wave of Parsi immigrants landed on the 
west coast of India in A.D. 706 in what is now the State of Gujarat. They took to 
the local language Gujarati, which they speak to this day. But although the Parsis 
continued to follow the teaching of Zarathustra in matter of religion, they became 
acclimatized to Indian culture in their manner of living. It is a racial and religious 
minority."^ 
2.6.2.5 Anglo-Indians 
There is still another small but important minority of India called Anglo-
Indians. It is the only minority that possesses racial, religious and linguistic 
characteristics. What is an Anglo-Indian? The term 'Anglo-Indian' was officially 
adopted by the Government of India in 1911 it was used to describe persons of 
mixed descent. The Indian Constitution vides Art. 366(2) defines the Anglo-
Indians as a person whose father or any of whose other male progenitors in the 
male line is or was of European descent but who is domiciled within the territory 
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of India and is or was born within such territory of parents habitually resident 
therein and not established there for temporary purposes only. 
It is clear from the definition that the term Anglo-Indian cannot be used for 
anyone whose father is Indian and mother, a European such a person is known 
simply an Indian. The religion of the community is Christianity and the mother-
tongue is English. The community is concentrated mainly in big cities. 
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CHAPTER - III 
RIGHT TO ESTABLISH EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION 
The right of the minorities under Article 30 (1) to 'establish and administer 
educational institutions of their choice' guaranteed three main rights: 
1. The right to establish educational institutions; 
2. The right to administer educational institutions; and 
3. The right to determine the nature of their educational institutions at their own 
choice. 
In Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Third Edition, vol. 1, it is stated that the word 
'establish' occurs frequently in the Constitution of the United States and is used in 
different meanings such as, 
1. To settle firmly, to fix alterably, as to establish justice; 
2. To make or form, as to establish a uniform rule of naturalization; 
3. To found, to create, to regulate, at the Congress shall have power to establish 
post offices; 
4. To found, recognize, confirm or admit as, the congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion; 
5. To create, to ratify or conform, as, we the people, etc., do ordain and 
establish this Constitution. 
After quoting the above meanings of the word 'establish' in Azeez Basha v. 
Union of India,' the Supreme Court said: 
"Thus it cannot be said that the only meaning of the word 'establish' is to found 
in the sense in which an educational institution is founded and we shall have to see in 
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what sense the word has been used in our Constitution in this Article. In the Oxford 
English Dictionary, Third Edition, the word 'establish' has a number of meanings: 
ratify, confirm, settle, to found, to create. Here again founding is not the only 
meaning of the word 'establish' and it includes creation also. In the Webster's Third 
New International Dictionary the word establish has been given a number of 
meanings, namely, to found or base squarely, to make firm or it stable, to bring into 
existence, create or make, start, originate. It will be seen that here also founding is not 
the only meaning and the word also means to bring into existence." 
The Supreme Court, then, went on to add that for the purpose of Article 30 (1) 
the word 'establish' means 'to bring into existence' and so the right given by this 
Article to the minority is to bring into existence an educational institutions, and if 
they do so, to administer it. 
Article (30) gives protection only to those educational institutions which are 
established by the minorities. No other institutions can claim this right. To administer 
an educational institution, it is necessary that such institution should be established by 
these minority groups who claim protection. Whether an educational institution is 
established by them or not is subject matter of proof and of judicial reviews. As 
observed by the Supreme Court in S.P. Mittal v. Union of India ^- "The benefit of 
Article 30(1) can be claimed by the community only on proving that it is a religious 
or linguistic minority and that the institution was established by it." 
The Courts have tried to solve this problem on the basis of facts and 
circumstances of each case. In every dispute where the protection of Art.30 is sought 
to be made available, the court must be satisfied that the institution in respect of 
which the claim to protection is advanced was in fact established by the minority. The 
nature of proof or the quantum of evidence is, however, a matter for the court's 
discretion and satisfaction. Thus while an affidavit is sometimes accepted to be the 
proof of the fact of establishment, in some cases the court have gone into the long 
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history of the estabhshment and development of the institution concerned for the 
purpose of ascertaining whether the same was in fact established by the minority 
concerned.'^  
3.1 Presumption in favour of Establishment 
In some cases the courts have presumed that the institution in question had been 
established by a minority. They have accepted without any scrutiny the version of the 
claimant for the protection under Art. 30, and have made no attempt to go into the 
question of sufficiency or otherwise of the proof The court have found even a brief 
statement indicating the fact of establishment to be sufficient for a presumption that 
the institution in question had been established by the minority concerned.'* 
In case of State of Bombay v. Bombay Education Society,^ the Supreme Court 
noted that the Bombay Education Society, which was a joint stock Company 
incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1913, and which represented the 
Anglo- Indian community whose mother tongue was English, had established the 
school in question, the Barnes High School in Nasik District in Bombay in 1924, and 
since then had been running the same. The Patna High Court in Arya Pratinidhi 
Sabha v. State ofBiha/ relied on the affidavit by the Sabha in support of its petition. 
The affidavit stated that the Arya Pratinidhi Sabha which was an organization of 
persons professing the Arya Samaj faith, had established several schools including a 
school for boys and another for girls at Mithapur, and had collected funds from 
amongst the members of the Arya Samaj as well as from the general public. The 
schools also received grants-in-aid from the state Government and, as regards the 
buildings, grant-in-aid were also made by the Patna Administration Committee. The 
High Court did not make any enquiry about the correctness of the statement and the 
proceeded to determine the main issues in contention on the presumption that the 
schools in question were established by the Arya Pratinidhi Sabha. 
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The proof supplied by the petitioners in Methodist Boys Higher Secondary 
School V. Director of Public Instruction^ consisted of an affidavit which the Andhra 
High Court apparently noted with approval thus: The Methodirst Christians of 
Hyderabad or Telengana were a minority in the State of Andhra Pradesh. The 
Methodist Boys' Multipurpose Higher Secondary school was established by South 
Indian Annual Conference of 1921 for the spiritual and secular benefits of the 
Methodist Christians of Hyderabad Episcopal area. The School was established with 
the funds of the Methodist church at a cost of about 18 lakhs of rupees out of which 
about two lakhs were granted by the Government towards capital investment. The 
Court proceeded to decide the matters in issue on the obvious assumption that the 
school as contended by the petitioners was established by the minority belonging to 
the Methodist Christians in Hyderabad. Similarly, in Sidhrajbhai v. State of Bombay 
the Supreme Court appears to have accepted as true the fact that the petitioners 
professed Christian faith, belonged to the United Church of Northern India and were 
members of a society called Gujarat and Kathiawar Presbyterian Joint Board which 
maintained forty two primary schools and a training college for the benefit of the 
Christian community. On the presumption that the Training College was established 
by the Christian minority the Court held that an order requiring the College to reserve 
80% of the seats for Government nominees was violation of Art. 30. 
In Aldo Maria Patroni v. E.C. Kesavan^ the Kerala High Court found the brief 
history, submitted before it, of the St. Joseph's High School, Calicut, to be sufficient 
for a presumption that the school had been established in the late seventies or early 
eighties of the last century and had been catering to the educational needs of the 
Anglo-Indian community, but in 1936 had taken the steps towards Indianisation in 
view of bringing the benefits of Catholic education within the reach of Indian 
Catholic in the Diocese of Calicut. The Court found that "although the foundations of 
the school were somewhat lost in the remote past as to prevent us from affirming with 
much certainty its earliest recognizable outlines, nevertheless as for as can be 
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ascertained, it seems to be certain that it began at first as a Parish School. . .in about 
the year 1796. The School was superseded in 1861 by one conducted by the Christian 
Brothers". The Court further found that the school later on in 1883 passed into the 
hands of the Jesuit Fathers of the Calicut Mission and after a long time came to be 
managed by the Roman Catholic Diocese of Calicut, and thus concluded that the 
School was established by a linguistic minority. 
Similarly, the claim of the petitioners in G.D.F. College v. University ofAgra"^ 
that Gandhi Faize-Am College was established by the Muslim minority found implied 
acceptance with the Allahabad High Court as well as with the Supreme Court when 
the case came up in appeal before it." In the same way, the averment by petitioner 
that the C.N.L. Training School for men and women and B.L. Training College for 
Women were established by the Diocese of Madhya Kerala which was a part of the 
Church of South India, was accepted by the Kerala High Court in K.O. Verkey v. State 
of Kerala'^ without any investigation into the correctness or other-wise of the claim of 
establishment. In W .Proost v. State of Bihar'^ the Supreme Court observed without 
referring to any details in the averment that the St. Xavier's College at Ranchi was 
established by the Jesuits of Ranchi. In the D.A. V. College cases''* the Supreme Court 
made a presumption in favour of the D.A.V. College being established in the Punjab 
by Arya Samaj. Neither the Supreme Court in State of Kerala v. Mother Provincial 
'^ nor the Kerala High Court in Mother Provincial v. State of Kerala, '^ against whose 
judgment the Supreme court was called upon to decide appeals, went into question of 
proof of establishment of certain educational institutions whose principal weapon of 
attack was Art.30(l) both at the High Court stage as well as in appeal before the 
Supreme Court. The Kerala High Court in Benedict Mar Gregorios v. State of 
Kerela,'^ Mark Netto v. Govt. ofKeraW^ as well as in St. Mary's Church v. State of 
Kerala^^ merely noted a brief statement in the averment that the institutions 
concerned were established and being run by the minorities. 
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The Patna High Court in Muslim Anjuman-e-Taleem, Darbhganga v. Bihar 
University,^'^ and Mohd. Abu Saeed v. State of Bihar '^ and that of the Madras High 
Court in Director of S.E.T.N. Government v. Arogiasam , Thomas v. Deputy 
Inspector of Schools^^ and Charles Robs on v. State of Madras^'' where a brief 
statement submitted as proof of the estabHshment went unscrutinised. 
In these cases the opposite party had raised no objection as to the fact of 
establishment, and thus possibly arose no occasion for the courts to insist upon the 
proof of establishment. Though the proof of establishment consistently and 
emphatically held by the courts to be a condition precedent for the application and 
exercise of the rights under Ait.30, the attitude of the courts in the above cases seems 
to have been determined by the attitude of the opposite party which allowed whatever 
proof was submitted to go unquestioned. 
3.2 Proof of Establishment 
In the other category cases where the opposite parties to the cases have 
specifically challenged the claims to establishment which in turn have led the courts 
to weigh the merits of the claim in the light of the proof supplied. 
Thus as early as 1951 the Assam High Court in Ramani Kanta v. Gauhati 
University'^^ rejected the contention of the petitioner that Bholanath College at Dhubri 
in Assam was established by a minority on the ground that there was no statement in 
the petition to the effect that it was established as a minority institution. The mere 
statement in the affidavit that the College was "to all intents and purposes a minority 
college" was found by the High Court to be insufficient to justify the claim. The 
Court appeared to accept the objection made in the counter-affidavit filed by the 
respondent, the Gauhati University, that at the time of the establishment of the 
College it was not even mentioned that it was to be managed by any minority; on the 
contrary donations were asked for on the understanding that the College would be for 
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the benefit of all the communities irrespective of their language or religion and in fact 
were collected from non-Bengali communities which included Assamese, Marwaris, 
Tribals and others. The Court found that even the name of the College did not suggest 
that it was founded for the benefit of Bangalies, a linguistic minority in Assam. It 
further found that the constitution of the Governing Body, as stated in the petition 
itself, was such that two members of it were to represent the donors which included 
non-Bengalis also, three members were to be co-opted from amongst the guardians of 
the students and one member was to represent the Marwary community. Again, the 
petition failed to state that there was any provision in the constitution of the 
Bholanath College that it was a college established for any linguistic minority. The 
Court accordingly concluded that in the absence of sufficient proof the institution 
could not be regarded as the one established by a linguistic minority and without the 
fulfillment of the condition of establishment a right to administer the same could not 
be conceded. '^' 
The Patna High Court had to determine a similar issue in Dipendra Nath v. State 
of Bihar where the respondent questioned the claim of the Brahmo Samaj that the 
Samaj had established the Bankipur Balika Vidyalaya and being a religious minority 
had the right under Art.30(l) to administer the same. The main attack of the 
respondent, the State of Bihar, was that the Samaj never gave financial help to the 
Vidyalaya out of its funds and in support of this reliance was placed on an audit 
report. The petitioner, while conceding that though no contribution was made out of 
the Samaj fund, claimed that the Vidyalaya was established with subscriptions mostly 
raised by the members of the Samaj and were also collected from the general public. 
Chhoudhary J., speaking for the court, observed that the claim of the Samaj could not 
be negatived on the ground that the Samaj did not make any contribution to the school 
in question out of its own fund. It was found that the events starting from the 
inception of the school showed that it was established by the Samaj. The Court found 
that both the history of the Vidyalaya as well as the constitution adopted for the 
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Vidyalaya showed that it was estabhshed by and on behalf of the Samaj. It found that 
in about 1930 the Samaj conceived the idea of starting a Girl's School and formed a 
provisional committee for drawing up a scheme at a meeting of the Executive 
Committee of the Samaj in October 1930. The scheme was drawn and approved at the 
General Meeting of the Samaj in November, 1930. It was resolved that the school be 
named as the Bankipur Balika Vidyalaya; and a Managing Committee for the year 
1931 was also appointed. The Vidyalaya came into being in December 1930 as a 
primary school which later became a High School in 1944. The Court further found 
that the Samaj also adopted a constitution in 1944 which incorporated detailed 
provision for the governance of the school. These facts being based on records 
submitted by the petitioners the Court found no difficulty in accepting them to be 
sufficient proof of establishment. 
The Supreme Court in the Azeez Basha case^^ trace the history of the foundation 
of the Aligarh Muslim University and scrutinize at length the provisions of the 
Aligarh Muslim University Act, 1920, to ascertain if the University was in fact 
established by the Muslim minority. Contentions were raised on behalf of the 
petitioners that the Aligarh Muslim University was established by Muslim minority 
and, therefore, the Muslim had a right to administer it under Art.30(l). The challenge 
was mainly directed to certain amendments made in the Aligarh Muslim University 
Act, 1920, by the amending Act of 1965 and also of 1951.'^ ° The Supreme Court 
sought assistance both from the history of the establishment of the University as well 
as the provisions of the Act of 1920 for taming its conclusion that the University was 
not established by the Muslim but was the creation of the Act of 1920. 
It was to be seen from this that the two earlier societies, one of which was 
connected with the M.A.O. College and the other had been formed for collecting 
funds for the establishment to the University at Aligarh, were dissolved and their 
properties and right and also of the Muslim University Foundation Committee, which 
presumably collected funds for the proposed University were transferred and vested 
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in the University established by the 1920-Act. These provisions will show that the 
three previous bodies legally came to an end every thing that they were possessed of 
was vested in the University. 
Although the Court admitted that the nucleus of the Aligarh Muslim University 
was the Mohammadan Anglo-Oriental College which was till 1920 a teaching 
institution, it held that the conversion of that college into the University was not by 
the Muslim minority but it took place by virtue of the Act of 1920 which was passed 
by the then Central Legislature.^ ^ 
It was after the University Grants Commission Act, 1965, that no private 
individual could grant a degree in India and that the Muslim minority could 
established a university before the Constitution came into force, the degrees conferred 
by such a university were not bound to be recognized by the Government. And 
without recognition of degrees the establishment would have been meaningless. 
The Court of the University would consist only of Muslim could not be a 
persuasive force for the Court. It observed that the provision did not necessarily mean 
that the administration of the University was vested or intended to be vested in the 
Muslim minority. The important provisions show that the final power was in the hand 
of Governor-General-in-Council. 
The Supreme Court in the Azeez Basha case found the "proof to be an 
insufficient justification for the claim that the Aligarh Muslim University owed its 
establishment to the Muslim minority and as such it was entitled to administer the 
same by virtue of the right secured to every religious minority under Art.30(l).^'' 
As a result of representations from various Muslim Organizations, university 
teachers and students, and persistent demand both inside and outside Parliament for 
the restoration of basis characters of the university, the University Act, 1920 was 
amended in 1972 and again in 1981, making substantial changes in the 1920 Act. The 
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word 'establish' was omitted from the preamble of the Act so as to whittle down the 
effect of Azeez Basha case in relation to Aligarh Muslim University 35 
Two years after the Azeez Basha decision, the Supreme Court was again called 
upon to determine the sufficiency of the proof supplied in support of a claim to 
establishment of an institution which had come into existence more than 100 years 
ago. This time it was Church Missionary Society Higher Secondary School, 
Bhagalpur the question of whose acceptance as a minority institution was the main 
issue before the Supreme Court. The case was S.K. Patro vs. State of Bihar which 
was an appeal against a decision of Patna High Court in S.K. Patro vs. State of 
Bihar^\ As the manner in which the High Court dealt with the evidence adduced and 
the inference which it drew from that evidence for its judgment found disapproval 
with the Supreme Court, a reference to the judicial process adopted by the High Court 
may not be irrelevant here. The petitioners stated before the High Court that the 
Church Missionary Society Secondary School at Bhagalpur was established in 1854 
as a Primary School at Champanagar in Bihar. In 1887 it was raised to a High School. 
The property where the school was run was purchased by the Church Missionary 
Trust Association, a company registered and incorporated in England in 1885 from an 
Indian Proprietor. They further stated that the school had been controlled and 
managed by the Church Missionary Society of London through a Managing 
Committee which had Christian character. As per special arrangements with the 
Government, the key posts of the president and the secretary had always been in the 
hands of the Society. The Principal of the School had all along been a Christian and 
had acted as a representative of the Church and the school had been financed and 
maintained by the Church. It was further stated that in 1957 the Church Missionary 
Society, London, passed a resolution by which, while claiming to have founded and 
supported certain Christian schools situated in the Bhagalpur Diocese in the State of 
Bihar and claiming to have held the position of proprietor and founder of these 
schools, wished to hand over the responsibilities to the Church of India and to appoint 
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the Diocese, at whose head was the Bishop of Bhagalpur, to be the proprietor of these 
schools with full authority, though the Diocesan Trust Association or other 
appropriate domestic organization, to direct their policy and carry on all negotiations 
with Government. The petitioners further stated that from time to time the authorities 
of the Education Department on inspection of the school had noted in the Visitors 
Book that it was a Mission School, that regular scripture classes were held in the 
school and the lessons on the life and teaching of Jesus Christ were taught and 
examinations were held in the subject for all student as was apparent from the 
examination programs and the annual returns and the Church Missionary Gleaners of 
1905, 1911, 1914, that every morning Lord's Prayers were held from prescribed 
Church books, and that meeting of the Managing Committee of the school were 
always preceded and followed by prayers from the "Book of Common Prayer". They, 
therefore, asserted that the C.M.S. School being a Christian minority institution, the 
order issued by the Education Department on May 22, 1967 requiring the School to 
reconstitute the Managing Committee of the School was against Art.30(l) and as such 
was not binding. 
The High Court proceeded to negative the claim that the C.M.S. School was 
established by the Christian minority. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the 
judgment of the High Court observed that there was on record sufficient evidence 
about establishment in 1854 of the Lower Primary School at Bhagalpur. Although 
substantial assistance was obtained from the Church Missionary Society, London, but 
on that basis it could not be said that the school was not established by the local 
Christians with their own efforts and was not an institution established by a minority. 
It was unnecessary to go into the question whether all the persons who took part in 
establishing the School in 1854 were Indian citizens. It noted that prior to the 
commencement of the Constitution there was no settled concept of Indian citizenship 
and it could not be said that Christian Missionaries who had settled in India and the 
local Christians residents of Bhagalpur did not form a minority community. Noting 
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the difference in the phraseology used in Art.29 and 30 the Supreme Court 
emphasized that though Art.29 could be claimed only by Indian citizens, there was no 
such condition in Art^ O.'^ ^ 
In State of Kerala v. Manager Corporate Management of Schools of the Diocese 
of Palai^"^ a Division Bench of the High Court had held that these rules were 
inapplicable on minority educational institutions. The counter-affidavit denied the 
claim that the school was established by a minority. The sole ground of contest was 
that the application for sanction for the establishment was made by one K.P. Pathrose 
in his individual capacity in 1953-54 and the sanction for opening the school was 
granted only on that basis, and this fact could be testified from the register of 
applications for the year 1953-54 which contained the entries of application of K.P. 
Patrose. It was also said that to the knowledge of the education department no 
community had after the establishment of the school claimed any interest in the 
school. The High Court stated that for entitlements to the right under Art.30 it must be 
proved by satisfactory evidence that the institution concerned was established by 
minority. It observed that "the mere fact that the school was founded by a person 
belonging to a particular religious persuasion is not at all conclusive. The institution 
must be shown to be one established and administered by or on behalf of the 
particular minority community".'"' The Court found that the name given to the school 
was also of some significance because it had been named after a former Maharaja of 
Cochin, which showed that the school was intended for the general benefit of all the 
citizens. It also found lacking any evidence to show that the local Church or the 
Christian community was in any manner associated with the founding of the school or 
its day to day subsequent administration. Nor was it made out that any activity was 
carried on in the institution which was intended to promote the object of conserving 
the religion or culture of the particular minority. 
The Arya Pratinidhi Sabha ^' case presented a different story. In that case the 
petitioners asserted in the averment that the Musaddi Lai Arya Kanya Uchtar 
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Madhyamic Vidyalaya was established by the persons professing Arya Samaj faith 
who were a rehgious minority in the State of Bihar. It was said that the school was 
established in 1957 at Mokamah in a building constructed on a land belonging to the 
Arya Smaj. The object of the school was the propagation of Vedic literature and 
Dharma apart from modem education to girls of the locality on the lines and ideals of 
Swami Dayanand, the founder of Arya Samaj. It was further said that the school 
building was constructed with the funds collected by the persons professing the Arya 
Samaj faith as well as the contribution of the local people. These assertions were 
sought to be negative on behalf of the State of Bihar on an entirely different version in 
the counter-affidavit. It was said that in 1962 the education department sanctioned 
recurring and non-recurring grants for the establishment of a State subsidized Girls 
Higher Secondary School. In 1963 the Managing Committee of the proposed Musaddi 
Lai Arya Kanya Higher Secondary School passed a resolution to hand over the 
building of the school to the Government for establishing a State Subsidized Girls 
Secondary School on the condition that the school would be named as 'Musaddi Lai 
Arya Kanya State Subsidized Higher Secondary School". The Committee further 
resolved that except changing the name of Government could take all necessary 
action for the management of the School. Therefore the entire management of the 
School was handed over to the Government with a provision that the managing 
committee would be governed by the rules framed by the Government and the Arya 
Samaj will have no control over it. It was also contended that the School was 
established by the local people and that its properties did not belong to the Arya 
Samaj. It was also denied that the teaching was imparted in according with the Vedic 
culture and religion or that Havan or Vedic prayers were offered in the school. But the 
main contention of the respondents was that the school was not established in 1957 
but in 1961 and for which they relied on a letter written by the Secretary of the School 
to the Secretary, Board of Secondary Education, Bihar the material part of which was 
as follows: 
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". . The public of Mokamah felt extreme necessity for a High School for female 
education since long. Though there are three schools running in the different parts of 
the town where some of the people do not desire to get admitted their girls for 
education . . . meant for boys' education. Seeing the long felt desire of the public a 
proposed High School has been started at Mokamah for female education since the 
year 1961."^^ 
Relying on this letter and referring to the above contents the Patna High Court 
reached the following conclusion: 
"It is, therefore, evident that this school was started at Mokamah for female 
education in the year 1961 . . . It is not possible to accept that the school was 
established by the Samaj." ''^  
The Court also referred to the resolution of the Management Committee, by 
which the Management of the School had allowed the School to convert into a State 
Subsidized School on the condition that the name of the School would not be 
changed, for its conclusion that the managers of the School were mainly interested in 
naming the school and had decided to make the school a State Subsidized School 
which for all practical purposes was a constituent School of the Government. The 
Court emphasized that donations were raised from general public of the locality and 
amongst them the Arya Samaj was also one of the contributors. The contribution from 
others were also important factor which helped in arriving at the conclusion that the 
Arya Samaj had not established the School. Regarding one such donor the Court 
observed: 
"There is yet another important feature and circumstances indicative of the 
character of the School and that is the donation of Rs.5, 400, from the Notified Area 
Committee, Mokamah . . . In this view of the matter and on these facts it cannot be 
said that the Samaj . . . had established the School, although the Samaj like many 
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other donors may have been very enthusiastic element in the establishment of the 
institution.'"*'' 
In A.M. Patroni v. Asstt. Education Officer,'^^ the first question to be determined 
by the Kerela High Court was whether St. Peter's U.P. School, Tellicherry, was an 
institution established by the Roman Catholic. Certain facts about the establishment 
the institution were admitted by the respondents, namely, that the School was 
established in 1891, that the school was situated within the compound of St. Peter's 
Church, that it bore the name of the Patron of the Church. But the respondents took 
the stand that the School was neither established by the Catholic Diocese of Calicut 
nor was it being administrated by it. The petitioners stated that until 1923 the area 
where the School was situated was part of the Catholic Diocese of Mangalore. In 
1923 when this diocese was bifurcated into the Catholic Diocese of Mangalore and 
the Catholic Diocese of Calicut, the Church and the school established by Catholic 
Diocese of Calicut were passed on to the Catholic Diocese of Calicut. They said that 
the school accordingly belonged to the Roman Catholics now forming the Catholic 
Dioces of Calicut. The respondents' argument was that this school was established by 
the Basel German Mission under the name "Basel Garman Fisher Village School" 
which the High Court rejected on the basis of the evidence to the contrary contained 
in several documents supplied by the petitioners. Another point raised by the 
respondents was that the fact that the School was having successively a non-Christian 
as the Headmaster gave strength to the inference that the School was not established 
by the Christian community. They took recourse to the observations of the same 
Court in A.M: Patroni v. E.G. Kesavan""^ where the Court had emphasized the 
importance of the post of headmaster. But the High Court in the instant case rejected 
this argument also saying that in the earlier case this was only one of the circumstance 
relied on to show that the continuous holding of the post of the headmaster by 
Christians was a fact which strengthened the proof that the institution in question was 
established and administered by the Christians. It was an additional proof, but the 
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absence of that would not lead to the inference that the School was not established 
and administered by the Roman Catholics/'' The Court concluded: 
"For establishment, it is not necessary that the school must be constructed by the 
community. Even if the school previously run by some other organization is taken 
over or transferred to the Church and the Church recognizes and manages the school 
to cater to and in conformity with the ideals of the Roman Catholics it can be safely 
concluded that the school has been established by the Roman Catholics."''^ 
In A.M. Patroni v. E.C.Kesavan ^^  the Kerala High Court had gone a step further 
in accepting St. Joseph's Boys High School, Calicut as an institution established by 
the Catholic minority. The petitioners had stated before the Court that the School 
dated back to the late seventies and early eighties of the last century. The School was 
opened to cater to the educational needs of the Anglo-Indian community only, but in 
1936 decision had been taken to extend through the School the benefits of Catholic 
education to the Indian Catholic also in the Diocese of Calicut. The petitioners 
themselves admitted that the foundation of the School were somewhat lost in the 
remote past as to prevent them from affirming with such certainty its recognizable 
outlines. However, they claimed that as far as possible they could ascertain that the 
School at first began as a Parish School and was opened in about the year 1876. The 
School was superseded in 1861 by one conducted by the Christian Brothers. In 1833 
the management of the School passed into the hands of Jesuit Fathers of Calicut 
Mission. It became a High School in 1908 and continued to be governed by the Code 
of European School till 1948 when new pattern of Indian education was introduced. 
The High Court accepting the above facts to be true made the finding that for more 
than eighty years the management of the School had been in the hand of the Jesuit 
Fathers of Calicut Mission, and as such the School was a minority institution. 
In Parma Lai v. Magadh University ^^ also the main question that came up for 
determination by the Patna High Court was whether Rameshwardas Pannalal 
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Mahavidyalaya, Patna, was established by the Rajasthani Community who claim to be 
a distinct linguistic minority in Bihar. The petitioners stated that the residents of Patna 
city belonging to Rajasthani origin held a Priti Sammelan at the residence of 
petitioner No.l which discussed the need of a girl's college. Petitioner No.l was 
requested to take step for raising funds for the establishment of the proposed college 
for which a committee consisting of three persons including petitioner No.l and No.2 
was constituted. At another meeting petitioner No. 1 submitted a list of twenty three 
donors who had each contributed Rs.25000 each. After the affiliation of the college 
with the Magadh University a Governing Body was constituted which included two 
members nominated by the Magadh University as donor-members in the category of 
Rs.25000, an M.L.C. as legislature-member, one member as University 
representative, one member as Government representative, petitioner No. 1 in the 
category of donors of Rs. 1000. Later, an educationist was also included. The 
petitioners stated that they took keen interest in the establishment and administration 
of the college and never hesitated in conforming to the requirements of the Magadh 
University statutes and the Act. They also claimed that they had a fair representation 
on the Governing Body of the College and they adopted, for the administration of the 
college, rules applicable to the affiliated colleges without ever surrendering their right 
of administration. They said that their right was infringed when an order was issued in 
1974 appointing an ad hoc committee. The main question for decision before the 
Patna High Court whether this college was established by the linguistic minority. 
Several factors weighed with the Court in forming its opinion that the college was not 
established by a minority. It observed that in the writ application it was stated that the 
'citizen' of Patna city suffered for long for want of a good educational institution. 
That had reference.to 'citizens in general' and not a section i.e. the Rajasthanis or 
Marwaris. The idea was, therefore, to establish a college for girl's education 
generally. Again, the petitioners were not categorical, at the time of the fund was to 
be confined and kept within the Rajasthanis as it was raised by a general invitation to 
the public. It was decided to name the institution after the name of the father of 
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petitioner No. 1 and that "showed that the institution was named after an individual 
and not after a particular section or community. The intention was not manifest that it 
was being established for or after community". Moreover those who inaugurated the 
function of establishment of the college or those who presided over or gave vote of 
thanks were all non-Rajasthanis. The first Governing Body, constituted before the 
affiliation, included at least three non-Rajasthanis, included at least three Rajasthanis 
out of a total of eight members. This clearly showed that the concept of exclusiveness 
in the matter of administration was absent from the constitution of the first Governing 
Body itself Moreover, the Court observed that the application for affiliation 
mentioned nowhere that the college was exclusively meant to be administered by the 
Rajasthani community. It pointed out that after the affiliation a regular Governing 
Body was constituted in according with the statutes of the Magadh University and this 
body continued to administer the college during 1970 to 74. The court made the 
finding that what the petitioners were concerned with was a 'fair representation' on 
the Governing Body and that for all intents and purpose the college came to be 
governed by a Governing Body as was provided for any affiliated college in 
according with the Magadh University statutes, ft insisted that if the college had been 
established by the minority community as the petitioner claimed "the intention should 
have been expressed in the application for affiliation itself . . Having not done so and 
having accepted the rules and statutes of the Magadh University Governing the 
constitution of the Governing Body, the petitioners cannot now be allowed to turn 
round and say that the college was established by a minority community". The Court 
also emphasized that out of thirty one persons who had made donations for founding 
the college only three had come to file the writ application and they did not even say 
that they had come so in any representative capacity, and that it was difficult to know 
what was the intention of the whole body of thirty one persons who had made 
donations for the establishment of the college. The Court found itself unaware of the 
intention of the donors who had not joined hands with the petitioners in filing the writ 
petition. The Court took the view: 
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"In this case from the very beginning the member of the college decided to allow 
it to be governed by the Statutes of Magadh University and by a Governing Body 
composed of a cross-section of the people of Patna city. They decided not to manage 
and administer the college as a minority institution and on that basis obtained the 
benefits occurring under the Magadh University Act and its Statutes. The case being 
worse on facts than the one cited above, naturally, the protection under Article 30 of 
the Constitution cannot be available to the petitioners."^' 
In Deccan Model Education Society, Bangalore v. State of Karnataka and 
another, ^ ^ certified copy of the Memorandum of Association or the petitioner Society 
was made available to the Court. According to the certificate issued by the Registrar 
of Societies in Karnataka, Bangalore the object of the society was: 
1. To run educational institutions like Nursery, Primary and High School in 
Bangalore. 
2. To introduce, adopt and follow such plans as are conducive to the moral growth 
of Christian children of school going age in Bangalore. 
3. To carry on such other cultural activities for the benefit of the Christians in 
Bangalore to help the poor and jobless Christian ladies. 
In the list of Managing Committee members who were seven in number, it was 
seen that they were all Christians. Referring to the aforesaid facts, M.P. 
Chandrakanaraj, Urs, J. held that: 
"Therefore one has to come to the conclusion on the facts of this case that the 
petitioner is a minority institution and therefore entitled to assert its fundamental 
rights under Article 30(1) of the Constitution." 
To be recognized as a minority school there must be something related to the 
objects of Article 30(1) of the Constitution, as was held in A.P. Christians Medical 
Educational Society v. Government of Andhra Pradesh. In this case a society. 
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styling itself as the Andhra Pradesh Christian Medical Educational Society, was 
recognized on August 31, 1984. The first of the objectives mentioned in the 
memorandum of association of the society was to establish, manage and maintain 
educational and other institutions and impart education and training at all stage, 
primary secondary, collegiate, post graduate and doctoral as a Christian Minorities 
Educational Institution'. Another object was 'to promote, establish, manage and 
maintain Medical Colleges, Engineering colleges. Pharmacy colleges, Commerce, 
Literature, Arts, Sciences and Management colleges and colleges in other subjects 
and to promote allied activities for diffusion of useful knowledge and training. Other 
objects were also mentioned in the Memorandum of Association. 
The society approached Indian Council of Medical Education State Government 
and Osmania University for permission and affiliation. On the refusal of Andhra 
Pradesh Government and Osmania University and grant affiliation and permission to 
the Society to start a medical college, the society filed a writ petition in the High 
Court of Andhra Pradesh seeking a writ to quash the refusal of permission by the 
Government of Andhra Pradesh and to direct the Government to grant permission and 
the university to grant affiliation. The claim for the issue of the writ was based on the 
fundamental right guaranteed by Article 30(1) of the Constitution. The writ petition 
was dismissed by the High Court by a speaking order on the ground that there were 
no circumstances to justify compelling the Government to grant permission to the 
society to start a new medical college in view of the restriction placed by an expert 
body like a Medical Council of India that no further medical college should be 
started. The society had filled ban appeal by a special leave of the court under Article 
136 of the Constitution. 
It was contented by the society in the Supreme Court that any minority, even a 
single individual belonging to a minority, could found a minority institution and had 
the right so to do under the constitution and neither the Government nor the 
University could deny that society's right to establish a minority institution. They 
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may impose regulatory measures the interest of uniformity, efficiency and excellence 
of education. Justice O. Chinnappa Ready speaking for the Court said; 
"The object of Article 30(1) is not to allow bogies to be raised by pretenders but 
to give the minorities a sense of security and a feeling of confidence not merely by 
guaranteeing the right of profess, practice and propagate religion to religious 
minorities and the rights to conserve their language, script and culture to linguistic 
minorities, but also to enable all minorities, religious or linguistic to establish and 
administer educational institutions of their choice. These institutions must be 
educational institutions of minorities in truth and reality and not mere marks 
phantoms they may be institutions intended to give the children of the minorities the 
best general and professional education, to make them complete men women of the 
country and to enable them to go out in to the world fully prepared and equipped. 
They may be institutions where special provision is made to the advantage and for the 
advancement of the minority children. They may be institutions where the parents of 
the children of the minority community may expect that education in accordance with 
the basic tenets of their religion would be imparted by or under the guidance of 
teachers, learned and stripped in the faith. They may be institutions where the parents 
expect their children to grow in a pervasive atmosphere which is in harmony with 
their religion or is impetrative is that their must exist some real-positive index to 
enable the institution to be identified as an educational institution of the minorities." '^* 
Their Lordship also observed; 
"The right guaranteed by Article 30(1) gives the minority the full liberty to 
establish educational institutions of its own choice. If the minority community express 
its choice and opts to join the scheme of national educational policy, it must naturally 
abide by the terms of that policy unless the terms require the surrender of the right 
under Article 3.0(1)"'^  
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The question whether the petitioner trust registered in Tamil Nadu, could apply 
for permission to start an educational institution in another state for the benefit of 
minority communities came up before the Supreme Court in Vellore Educational 
Trust V. Andhra Pradesh^^. The respondent had refused permission to the Tamil 
minority's trust registered in Vellore, Tamil Nadu, to start an engineering college in 
Andhra on the ground that the government policy was not to grant permission to start 
new engineering colleges. The High Court did not interfere but the Supreme Court 
found that the respondent had, subsequent to the rejection of the trust's application, 
allowed the starting of two engineering colleges. The Court also found no substance 
in the respondent's plea that the trust was registered in Tamil Nadu. So, the Court set 
aside the application afresh under the law. 
In re Kerala Educational Bilf^, 1957 it was argued by the State of Kerala that 
the protection guaranteed by Claus (1) of Article 30 extends only to educational 
institutions established "after the commencement of the Constitution". Dealing with 
the contention, S.R. Das, C.J. held that, 
"We do not think that the protection and privilege of Article 30(1) extends only 
to the educational institutions established after the date our constitution came into 
operation or which may hereafter be established. On this hypothesis the educational 
institutions established by one or more members of any of these communities prior to 
the commencement of the Constitution would not be entitled to the benefits of Article 
30(1). The fallacy of this argument becomes discernible as soon as we direct our 
attention to Article 19(1) (g) which, clearly enough applies alike to a business, 
occupation or profession already started and carried on after the commencement of 
the Constitution. There is no reason why the benefit of Article 30 (1) should be 
limited only to educational institutions established after the commencement of the 
Constitution. The language employed in Article 30(1) is wide enough to cover both 
pre-constitution and post-constitution institutions. I must not be overlooked that 
Article 30(1) gives the minorities two rights, namely, to establish, and to administer. 
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educational institutions of their choice. The second right clearly covers pre-
constitution schools just as Article 26 cover the right to maintain pre-Constitution 
religious institutions." Justice Khanna observed: "Article 30(1) of the Constitution 
made no distinction between the minority institutions existing from before the 
Constitution or established thereafter and protected both."^^ 
In Arya Samaj Shillong v. State ofMeghalaya,^"^ the Guhati High Court has held 
that the Arya Samaj Hindi Kanya Vidyalaya School in Meghalaya is a minority 
institution and therefore the state has not power to change the constitution of the 
Managing Committee of the school. Arya Samaj in Meghalaya is both linguistic as 
well as religious minority. It has a distinct entity. Hence it was held that the 
notification directing the school to follow instructions the change of the constitution 
of Managing Committee was unconstitutional and invalid. 
In the case of T.M.A. Pai foundation v. State of Karnataka,^^ a question was 
raised, "Is there a fundamental right to set up educational institutions and if so, under 
which provision?" 
The answering of the court was: "With regard to the establishment of 
educational institutions, three articles of the constitution come into play; Article 19(1) 
(g) gives the right to ail the citizens to practice any profession or to carry on any 
occupation, trade or business; this right is subject to restrictions that may be placed 
under Article 19(6). Article 26 gives the right to every religious denomination to 
establish and maintain an institution for religious purposes which would include an 
educational institution. Article 19(1) (g) and Article 26, therefore, confer right on all 
citizen and religious denomination to establish and maintain educational institution. 
There was no serious dispute that the majority community as well as the linguistic and 
religious minority would have a under Article 19(1) (g) and 26 to establish 
educational institutions. In addition, Article 30(1), in no uncertain terms, gives the 
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right to the reUgious and hnguistic minorities to establish and administer educational 
institution of their choice." 
In the case of P. A Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra,^'' the question was raised, 
can there be an enquiry to identify the person or persons who have really establish the 
institution? With regard of this question, the Supreme Court has taken the proposition 
of Pai Foundation^ .^ What would happen if a minority belonging to a particular state 
establishes an educational institution in that state and administers it but for the benefit 
of members belonging to that minority domiciled in the neighboring State where the 
community is in majority? Would it not be a fraud on the constitution? In St 
Stephen's^^ Their Lordships had ruled that Article 30(1) is protective measure only 
for the benefit of religious and linguistic minorities and "no ill-fit or camouflaged 
institution should get away with the constitutional protection. ^ '' The question need not 
detained us for long it stands answered in no uncertain term in Pai Foundation. 
Emphasizing the need for preserving its minority character so as to enjoy the privilege 
of protection under Article 30(1), it is necessary that the objective of establishing the 
institution was not defeated".^ ^ 
In weighing the sufficiency or inadequacy of the proof of establishment, the 
following factors, singly or in combination with each other have, in the main, 
determined the attitude of the courts. The factors are; name of the institution, persons 
involved in the establishment, sources of funds, subjection to legal provisions, 
expression of intention. 
What particular factor has received what emphasis in the court's estimation 
appears to have depended upon the circumstance of each case, upon the nature of the 
facts in dispute and of course, upon the court's own discretion. But it is notable at the 
outset that in requiring proof of establishment a lavish use of discretion has resulted in 
opinions which not only fail to achieve other. The failure to evolve jurisprudence on 
such an important aspect of minority right as the kind and quantum of proof needed in 
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support of a claim to establishment explains the reason why the courts have failed, at 
any rate in some cases, to enforce the commitment of the constitution. 
3.3 Name of the institution 
The name of the institution may convey the intention of those who found or 
'establish' it, though by no means it may be stated as a general rule. What, however, 
may somewhat be generalized is the fact that where an institution is named after a 
particular community, it does convey the idea of the institution being established by 
or for that community. On the other hand, where an institution is not so named, or 
named after an individual, or an organization, or an entity, the same idea may or may 
not be inferable, and the attending circumstances would perhaps be the main 
determination in this situation. But the judicial opinion on this aspect is neither 
uniform nor do they seek to state a definite proposition, nor are beyond the reach of 
argument. 
Thus in the Ramani Kanta^^ case the petitioners failed in their claim that the 
Bholanath College in Assam was established by the Bengalis, one of the ground of 
rejection of the claim by the Assam High Court being that the name of the college 
did not convey the idea of its being founded "for the benefit of Bengalis" in Assam. 
The same factor became one of the ground for the Kerala High Court in the Rajershf^ 
case for refusing to accept the contention of the petitioners that Rajershi Memorial 
Basic Training School was established by the Christian minority in Kerala as in its 
view the School was named after a former Maharaja of Cochin which showed that 
that the School was established "for the general benefit of all the citizens", and as 
such was not entitled to claim the benefit of Art. 30. 
But the view that if an institution is named after an individual, it is a sure 
indication that the institution was established for the benefit of 'all the people' is 
neither supportable on other judicial authorities nor does it state a rational 
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proposition. For, if the name of the institution convey the intention of 'exclusiveness', 
the ease like the Azeez Basha^^ and the Arya Pratinidhi Sabha^^ would have been 
decided differently. In the former case the Supreme Court, in the presence of other 
circumstances on which it relied for its decision, did not gave even a casual attention 
to the name of the institution in question, Aligarh Muslim University, which 
otherwise seems to convey the intention that at the time of its establishment the main 
beneficiary contemplated was the 'Muslim' community. The Court did not find itself 
attracted by the word 'Muslim' as conveying the intention of those whose efforts had 
brought the institution into being. 
In the latter case, the Arya Pratinidhi Sabha case, the Patna High Court did pay 
no consideration to the name of the School- the Musaddi Lai Arya Kanya Vidyalaya-
while forming its opinion that allowing the school to be governed by the Government 
Rules and by accepting the help of the Government for making the school a State 
Subsidised School the managers of the School had decided to hand over the 
management to the Government and had thus displayed the impression that the school 
had not been established by or for the Arya Samajis in Bihar. The Court even found 
no substance in the resolution of the Managing Committee which, while allowing the 
school to have the status and benefit of a State Subsidised School, had insisted, as a 
condition precedent, on retaining the name of the school, and even went to the extent 
of using the same resolution against the petitioners saying that the petitioners were 
interested only in retaining the name of the institution and had deliberately allowed 
the same to be controlled by the Government. The name of the institution contained 
the name of an individual as well as the words 'Arya Kanya. The latter obviously 
referred to the girl-folk belonging to the Arya Samaj, and should have been taken by 
the Court as expressing the intention of the founders of the School. 
In fact both the 'denial' on the part of the courts in Azeez Basha and Arya 
Pratinidhi Sabha cases as well as the 'reliance' on the part of the courts in Rajershi, 
Ramani Kanta and Panna Lai cases leave room for criticism. For, if the name of an 
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institution incorporating the name of the community concerned is dismissed as an 
unreliable indication of the intention behind the establishment, a name lacking any 
such incorporation must also not to rely upon as indicative of a contrary intention. 
3.4 Persons involved in the establishment 
The right "to establish" under Art". 30(1) is regarded a collective right available to 
a collectivity entitled to be designated as "minority" is a non- issue, and there seems 
to be no disagreement among the judicial opinions. Where institutions have been 
established by individuals and the courts have, of necessity, had to address themselves 
to the question: In what capacity had the claimant/claimants established the institution 
in question-representative of individual? In the absence of any clear cut distinction 
between the two, the courts have used different scales, leading them some times to 
different and even logically unjustifiable conclusions. 
The Kerala High Court in the Rajershi case denied the protection of Art. 30 on 
the basis, as it stated, that the institution in question owed its establishment to an 
individual. The application for sanction for the establishment of the institution was 
made by one K.P. Pathrose in this individual capacity, that the sanction was granted 
only on the basis of (a fact testifiable from the register of applications maintained by 
the education department) and that to be knowledge of the education department no 
community had after the establishment of the institution claimed any interest in the 
institution. The Patna High Court in the Panna Lai case drew closer to this 
observation when it insisted that if the college in question had been established by the 
minority community, the Rajasthanis in Bihar, "the intention should have been 
expressed in the application, for affiliation itself'.^ "^  
But then they raise certain issues to which they disclose no clues. Some of the 
issues that the judgments raise may be stated thus: Should the application be made in 
the name of the community? Should several members jointly file an application? 
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Under what kind of authorization an individual may be regarded as acting in a 
'representative capacity'? If a philanthropic individual wishes to serve his community 
through an educational institution, is he bound to express such intention in the 
presence of other circumstances? If immediately after bringing into being an 
institution other members of the community take interest, contribute funds, and 
expand the institution, would such institution still not be regarded to have been 
established by a minority? 
Nor is any light thrown on such issues by the Patna High Court in Arya Pratinidhi 
Sabha case decided the same year as the Rajershi case. One of the grounds of 
rejection by the High Court of the claim that the Arya samaj had established the Arya 
Kanya Mahavidyalaya was a letter written by the Secretary of the School to the 
education department which had stated that the school had been established in 
difference to the "long felt desire of the public" to have an institution for female 
education. 
Three years after this decision, the same High Court in Panna Lai case followed 
exactly the same approach, as the Court had followed earlier, in turning down the 
petitioner's contention that the college in question was established by the Rajasthanis 
in Bihar, a linguistic minority. The Court took such factors into account as that the 
writ application had stated that the 'citizens' of Patna city had suffered for long for 
want of a good educational institution, and such frivolous factors as that those who 
had inaugurated the function of establishment of the college or those who had 
presided over or had passed vote of thanks were all non-Rajasthanis. "The petitioners 
cannot be allowed to turn round and say that the college was established by a minority 
community", implying that the petitioners had established the institution in their 
individual capacity.''' 
Supreme Court was in fact confirming a Full Bench decision of the Kerala High 
Court rendered the same year in Mother Provincial v. State of Kerala ^^  where the 
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High Court, referring to private Christian Colleges in some of the districts of Kerala, 
had to make a declaration that they are institutions established and administered by 
religious heads like Bishops or Heads of religious orders of the Roman Catholic and 
other Christian Churches for, and on behalf of the particular religious minority 
concerned. The persons who establish the institutions and who administer them are 
themselves members of a religious minority of this country and act only as 
representatives of that minority. 
This observation tends to create the impression that only the 'heads' can act in a 
'representative' capacity, through by accepting that 'membership' to a particular 
minority group gives the individual the status of a 'representative', the observation 
has the effect also of narrowing down the distinction between a 'representative' 
capacity and an 'individual' capacity. 
The Kerala High Court speak of the same thing: Right conceded to minority 
community belongs to and can be exercised by any member of the community or 
association or body of individuals. The following propositions thus seem to be well 
established: 
1. That the right to establish belong to minority but can be exercised by any member 
thereof; 
2. That an individual member of a minority can establish an institution for or on 
behalf of a minority; 
3. That an individual assumes the status of a representative of a minority by the fact 
of his membership to it; 
4. That participation of other members of the minority in the process of 
establishment is not essential for inferring a positive intention; 
5. That participation of outsiders in the process of establishment is an irrelevant 
consideration for inferring a negative intention. 
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3.5 Sources of Funds 
Collection of funds has sometimes received consideration by the courts while 
determining the fact of establishment. It has served as a factor helping the courts in 
their conclusions while weighing the evidence supplied or seel<;ing to infer the 
probable intention behind the establishment. Funds for the establishment of an 
institution may have been provided exclusively by the members of the minority or a 
part of the funds may have been collected from other sources also. The courts are not 
unanimous. Nor do those which provide answer in the affirmative display a 
uniformity of approach in placing emphasis upon the fact of collection of funds. 
The Supreme Court in the Azeez Basha case while declaring the Aligarh Muslim 
University an institution not established by the Muslim minority took care to note that 
donations for the establishment of the University were also collected from persons 
who were not the members of the Muslim minority. It ignored the more important fact 
that an initial sum of Rs.30 Lakhs was collected by the Muslim University Foundation 
Committee, formed by the Muslims, which acted under the guidance of the Muslim 
University Association, formed by the Muslims, with the object of establishing a 
Muslim University though some money was donated by non-Muslims as well. It 
nowhere is a condition under Art. 30(1) that all the sums required for the 
establishment of an institution must come exclusively from the minority concerned. If 
all the funds are collected by the members (or a member) of the minority from the 
members of the minority it does provide an additional evidence of the fact of 
establishment. But if the contributions by non-members are taken by the courts as 
evidence of a contrary intention it amounts to nothing else than reading into Art. 
30(1) a limitation which in fact must remain non-existent. 
The Supreme Court, however, soon had to depart from this narrow view of Art. 
30, which the Azeez Basha Court appeared inclined to take, and in the S.K.Patro^^ 
case emphasized that the fact that the funds were obtained from the United Kingdom 
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for assisting in setting up and developing what was known as the Church Missionary 
Society School was not a ground for denying the protection of Art. 30(1). If the 
character of minority institutions is not affected by the participation of other 
communities in the benefits which such institutions may bring, there can obviously be 
no objection if the other communities help establish such institutions by extending 
cooperation including assistance through contributions. 
In the Ramani Kanta case the Assam High Court made the finding that the 
donations for the Bholanath College were collected from non-Bengalis also which 
showed as additional evidence that the institution was not established exclusively by 
the Bengali minority. The Patna High Court in the second Dipendra Nath'^ case did 
just the opposite of it in refusing to accept the argument of the State of Bihar that the 
Brahmo Samaj claimed to have established the Bankipur Balika Vidhyalaya had 
never given any financial help to the school out of its fund, a fact conceded by the 
petitioner. The Patna Court emphasized that as the events starting from the inception 
of the school showed that it was established by the Samaj, the claim of the Samaj 
could not be negative on the ground that it made no contribution to the school in 
question out of its funds, and accepting as sufficient the claim of the Samaj that the 
school was established with subscriptions collected from the members of the Samaj as 
well as from the general public.^ ^ Collection of funds from the general public was so 
important for the same High Court in Panna Lai's case that it became a potential 
ground for the rejection of the claim of the petitioners that R.M. Mahila Vidhyalaya 
was established by the Rajasthani community in Bihar, where in fact several 
surrounding circumstances tended to favour the petitioner's claim to establishment. 
Thus the educational institutions, which were established by the funds collected 
from outside the country or at that time they were administered by such persons who 
were not Indian citizen, can also get the protection of Art.30(l). 
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3.6 Subjection to Legal Provisions 
What some of the decisions tend to convey is the interesting preposition that an 
institution may lose its character as a minority institution if by some external process 
or by some act or omission on the part of its managers the institution comes to be 
governed by legal provisions, thus giving rise to a presumption that the institution was 
not established with the unshaken intention of making it an exclusive minority 
institution. 
In the Arya Pratinidhi Sabha case decided in 1973 where the Patna High Court 
had adopted while determining the question whether Musaddi Lai Arya Kanya 
Vidhyalaya was established by the persons professing the Arya Samaj faith. Turning 
down of the claim of the petitioners by the Court was mainly conditioned by the fact 
that the petitioners had allowed the school to be treated as a State determined the 
constitution, functions and powers of the managing committee. In the Court's 
assessment these factors were sufficient enough to allow the conclusion that the 
school which was converted into a Government Subsidised School, could not be said 
to have been established by the Samaj and that being so naturally the protection under 
Art.30 was not available to the Arya Samaj. 
Back to 1968, Azeez Basha case presented somewhat an analogous situation. 
There also what appears to be the major ground of reliance by the Supreme Court for 
its decision was the subjection of the Mohammadan Anglo Oriental College to the 
provisions of the Act of 1920 while being converted into the Aligarh Muslim 
University. The Court also accepted the position that M.A.O. College was the 
nucleus of what came to be known as the Aligarh Muslim University. What, however, 
led the court to deny the protection of Art.30(l) were, along with some other 
considerations, certain provisions of the Act of 1920 which had the effect, in the 
court's view, of vesting the control and management of the affairs of the University 
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somewhere else than in the Muslim Minority. These were, in the main, Sections 3, 4, 
13, 14, 24, 30 and 32. 
These provisions, in the Court's opinion had not only the effect of transferring 
the powers and control over management from the M.A.O. College to the Aligarh 
Muslim University but had also the effect of vesting the ultimate control in the Lord 
Rector (which meant the Governor, the members of the Executive Council and some 
nominated members). The difference between the M.A.O. Colleges and the Aligarh 
Muslim University was the difference between and the institution which was unable 
to grant its own degrees and an institution which could do so. As the degrees would 
be of no use unless they were recognized by the Government and as the recognition 
depended upon the will of the Government and that this will was always expressed 
through some law, the M.A.O. Colleges could not have got its status changed to a 
University, entitled to grant its own degrees, unless through the intervention of some 
law. 
This was the kind of reasoning which came to the Court's help in informing its 
judgment that then Aligarh Muslim University owed its establishment to a law 
enacted by the British legislature and not to the Muslims who had established the 
Mohammadan Anglo-Oriental College. The M.A.O. College thus lost its character as 
a "minority' institution due mainly to its subjection to certain rules while its status 
was being raised to a university. 
Judicial opinions seem to favour the view that 'exclusiveness' in the matter of 
governing body is the essence of the right 'to administer under Art.30 (1). Thus 
except in Gandhi Faiz-e-am College Shajhanpur v. Agra UniversityP Where the 
Supreme Court by a majority opinion held as constitutional a provision requiring the 
minority to include on its managing Committee the principal and the senior most 
member of the teaching staff and in Punjab University v. Khalsa College^^ where a 
rule requiring a teacher representative to be on the Managing Committee giving rise 
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to a possibility of a non-Sikh being included in the Managing Committee, was not 
regarded by the Punjab and Hariyana High Court as violating Art.30(l), in all other 
cases the courts have disallowed any attempt from any external agency to force, 
through rules, the minority institutions to include outsiders on its governing body. St. 
Xavier College v. State of Gujarat,^'^ D.A. V. College Jullhunder v. State of Punjab^'', 
S.K. Patro v. State ofBiha/', State of Kerala v. Mother Provincial, ^^Hari manderji 
V. Magadh University^^ are the cases in point. 
Parma Lai and Arya Pratinidhi Sabha cases can then be regarded as laying down 
the rule that a minority will not have the protection of Art.30 (1) if by a deliberate act 
of its own it allow the management of the institutions to slip into the hands of others 
either subjecting the managing body to rules which require managing body to include 
'outsiders' or by allowing other to be included in the managing body with an intention 
to run the institution not as a 'minority institution'. 
But then it raises the question: what if a minority while intending to run the 
institution as a minority institution voluntarily includes on its managing body a 
member or two who do not belong to the minority? Even if some person or persons 
not belonging to the minority are inducted into the managing body by the minority 
either as a matter of gesture of goodwill towards other communities or because some 
outsiders had contributed heavily to help establish the institution- how does this fact 
have the effect of changing the character of the institution itself? If the minority has 
the right to establish an institution of its choice and under that choice it can establish 
the institution not only for the benefit of the minority but also for others^ "* and if for 
the purpose of establishment of the institution it can obtain funds from members of 
other communities,^ ^ why cannot it have the right to manage with others? It is true 
that the essence of the right to administer lies in the freedom to determine the 
composition of the managing body and that no rules can be allowed to affect that 
choice, but there is always a distinction between a managing body which is compelled 
to include outsiders and a managing body, the constitution of which is determined by 
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the minority. What if the minority exercises it's choice in a manner as to include some 
outsiders also with the intention, at the same time, to maintain the institution as a 
minority institution and for the purpose for which it was established? These are some 
of the questions for which the cases decided so far do not have a ready answer. 
Arya Pratinidhi Sabha, Panna Lai ana Azeez Basha cases also raise the 
important constitutional question; Can the fundamental right under Art. 30(1) be 
waived? On somewhat similar reasoning had proceeded the Supreme Court in the 
Azeez Basha case. After declaring 'to bring into existence' as the only sense in which 
the world 'establish' was used in Art.30(l) the court took upon the task of narrating 
the process by which the Aligarh Muslim University was brought into existence. It 
stated that as there was nothing to prevent the Muslims in 1920 to establish a 
University and as there was nothing to prevent the Government from not recognizing 
the degrees of such a University, the Muslims were under compulsion to come to the 
Government to bring into existence a University whose degrees would be recognized 
by the letter. And as the Government had to come to the legislature for a law under 
which such a University could be established and as the law, the Act of 1920, was the 
creation of the legislature the Aligarh Muslim University had to be recognized as 
brought into existence by none else than the legislature sitting in the year 1920. 
The question is whether the Muslims were competent to establish a University in 
1920. Seervai does not accept as correct the view of the Supreme Court, in the Azeez 
Basha case, sought to be based on St. David's College vs. Ministry of Educationf^ 
namely that the only distinguishing feature between a University and an ordinary 
institution was the power to grant degrees could not have been recognized, quoting a 
passage from the same case, St. David's, and relying on the statement of law in 
Halsbury, Seervai concludes that the essential feature of a University was its 
incorporation by the sovereign power, and express his opinion thus; The only manner 
in which a community could establish a University was by invoking the exercise of 
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sovereign power which might either take the form of a charter or on Act of the 
legislature, and this Muslims community did.^ ^ 
It is a well established fact, based on record, that the British Government had 
supported the establishment of the M.A.O. College and, knowingly well its 
denominational character, had all along assisted financially,^^ and had not only 
supported the idea of establishment of a Muslim University, it had done every thing 
possible in the direction.^ ^ The Governor- General's words which he uttered at the 
meeting of the Governor General's legislative council in which the bill was o finally 
passed into the Aligarh Muslim University Act 1920, speak well how the Government 
viewed the establishment of the University and with what intention it was established: 
"I should like to add my congratulations to the Muslim community on the 
passage of the Bill. I have come here especially this morning to preside in order that I 
might add my good wishes and congratulations to those which have already been 
uttered in this Council."^" 
But even if the Act of 1920 had the effect of converting a minority institution 
into a state institution, and that no right 'to establish and administer' existed as a 
•fundamental right' in the year 1920 when the Aligarh Muslim University Act was 
passed, the Act continued to be in force till after the commencement of the 
constitution which recognized such a right as a fundamental right vested in all 
minorities in this country. The correct course, therefore, for Court was to test the 
provisions of the Act of 1920 on the scale of Art.30 (1) and 13(1). If Art. 30(1) 
conferred upon all Indian minorities a right to establish and minister educational 
institutions of their choice. Art. 13 (1) declared unreservedly all laws exciting at the 
commencement of the constitution as unconstitutional if inconsistent with Any 
fundamental right. Was the Act of 1920 then inconsistent with the provision of the 
constitution incorporated in Art.30 (1)? 
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This remains an undeniable truth that the provision of the Act of 1920, including 
the provision under Section 23 by virtue of which University court had been enjoying 
the status of a 'supreme governing body', continued to exist uninterruptedly till the 
constitution came into force in 1950. The Aligarh Muslim University thus continued 
to be governed throughout the period of 30 years by a Supreme Governing body, the 
court, which was composed exclusively of Muslims and which at no stage had 
admitted to its membership any person other than a Muslim. It then requires no 
logical deduction to say that on the date of the commencement of the constitution in 
1950 the Aligarh Muslim University was being governed exclusively by Muslims. It 
was only in 1951 that the provision requiring that only the Muslims could be the 
members of the court was deleted by an amendment of the Act of 1920. 
Soon the question of waiver directly came up for consideration before the 
Supreme Court in Basheshar Nath v Commissioner of Income Tax ^' where SR Das 
C.J. Bhagwati, SK.Das, Kapoor and Subba Rao JJ. recorded their separate opinions. 
The two Questions that arose for decision were: (1) whether a settlement under S.8A 
of the Taxation of Income Tax Act, 1947 made after the Commencement of the 
Constitution, was constitutionally valid and (2) whether the petitioner could be said to 
have waived the fundamental right incorporated under Art 14. Das, CJ and Kapur J 
took the view that there could be no waiver of the fundamental right founded on Art. 
14, their opinion was that Art. 14 was founded on a sound public policy, its language 
was the language of command and it imposed an obligation on the state of which no 
person, by his act or conduct, could relieve it. They did not consider the question 
whether any other fundamental right could be waived as that question was not strictly 
necessary for the decision of the case in hand. Bhagwati and Subba Rao JJ. held that 
there could be no waiver not only of the fundamental right enshrined in Art. 14 but 
also of any other fundamental right guaranteed under the constitution. 
It was also held that Art. 13(2) was in terms a constitutional mandate to the state 
in respect of all the fundamental right and no citizen could by waiver of any one of 
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them relieve the state of the solemn obligation that lay on it. They referred to, with 
approval the opinion of Mahajan C.J. (who delivered the majority judgment) in 
Behram Khursheed v. State ofBombay^^ wherein he had said that fundamental rights 
were not put in the Constitution merely for individual benefit but had been 
incorporated as a matter of public policy and the doctrine of waiver had no 
application to them. 
Thus out of four Judges who continued the majority, two judges clearly held that 
no fundamental right could be waived. The tone and temper of the judgment of the 
other two judges, who wished to confine their opinion to Art. 14 only, as no question 
no wavier with regard to other rights was raised, clearly indicate that they inclined to 
held a similar view had the question been directly raised. 
In K.O. Verkey v. state of Kerala^^ the Kerala High Court through Mathew J. 
spoke more unequivocally on the inapplicability of the doctrine of waiver on 
fundamental rights: The fundamental right under Art.30 is that of a plurality of a 
persons as a unit, or if I may say so, of a community of persons necessarily 
fluctuating and waiver means the voluntary relinquishment of a known right. It may 
be difficult to infer a waiver from the conduct of the members of a fluctuating body. 
Can the present members of a minority community barter away the right under Art.30 
so as to blind the future members of it as a unit? In other words, can the conduct of 
the present generation affect the fundamental right of the community in the future? 
The fundamental right is of the living generation. The dead cannot waive the right of 
the living generation unless their succession. I doubt whether the future members of a 
minority community as a unit, derive the fundamental right under Art.30 from its 
dead members by succession or by inheritance.^ '* 
The observation made in the above cases, the judicial opinion on the 
applicability the doctrine of waiver in this country seems to be quite well established. 
In the Arya Pmtinidhi Sabha case a plea against the application of this doctrine was 
124 
specifically rejected by the Patna High Court. In Panna Lai's case though no plea for 
its application or rejection was made, the petitioners lost their claim to establishment 
mainly due to the subjection to the institution of Magadh University rules and thus 
had to waive their right to manage the institution. In the Azeez Basha case the 
application of the provisions of the Amending Act of 1951 had the effect of 
compelling the minority to waive the claim to management, though the Court 
assigned the different reasons for its rejection of the claim. If the decision of the 
question of waiver in the case referred to above are regarded as stating the correct 
law, the Arya Pratinidhi Sabha, Panna Lai and Azeez Basha cases must be regarded 
to have been decided on a wrong assumption of law. 
3.7 Expression of Intention 
The factors mentioned above have served only as aids, and in cases where the 
claim as to establishment of an educational institution is sought to be countered by the 
opposite party the real object of the courts has of necessity been to ascertain the true 
intention behind the establishment. For this, they have taken into account the 
circumstances in which an institution had come into being and also other factors the 
assistance of which could possibly help the courts reach the right conclusion. 
Disagreement among the judicial opinions is thus a natural consequence of 
absence of fixed principles and the presence of complex problems. The absence of 
any fixed formula has not only led to a wide divergence in opinions, the courts in 
their enthusiasm to find out the require intention have sometimes left behind the 
mandate of Art. 30 as well as the principles otherwise well established judicially and 
must govern such situation also. 
Thus the courts are hardly unanimous on the question: Whose intention should 
be the determining factor.^  Should it be of those who 'Found' was not the meaning 
acceptable to the Azeez Basha case as the correct substitute for the word 'establish' as 
125 
used in Art.30(l). In the Mother Provincial case pointedly declared that "the intention 
must be to found an institution for the benefit of a minority community".^ ^ 
Similarly, the same divergence in opinion is visible on the question: How the 
intention should be expressed? In most of the cases where the claim to establishment 
has been challenged it had made no difference for the courts whether it was 
specifically and clearly stated by the founders that the institution was established by a 
minority and was intended to be maintained as such. Hari Manderji v. Magadh 
University!^^ Patroni v. Asst. Education Officers^'', S.kPatro v. State ofBihar^^, State 
of Kerala v. Mother Provincial,^'^ Arya Pratinidhi Sabha v. State of Bihar^^^, and 
Dipendra Nath v. State ofBihar^^^ were decided on the assumption that the intention 
of the founders must not have been anything else than to establish a institution 
primarily for the benefit of the minority. The courts in these cases made no attempt to 
find out if the intention to establish was expressed by those who established the 
institution. Ramani Kanta, Azeez Basha, Arya Pratinidhi Sabha, Rajershi and Panna 
Lai seem to have been decided unfavourable because those who had founded their 
respective institutions had failed to express their intention in so many case. 
Unanimity is also not achieved on the question: What intention should be 
expressed? The Kerala High Court in Rajershi Memorial Basic Training School v. 
State ofKerala^^^ case sought to infer a negative intention from the fact that it was not 
made out that "any activity is carried on in the institution which is intended to 
promote the object of conserving the religion or culture of the particular minority' or 
that it was intended for the general benefit of all the citizens of locality". "^^ 
Nowhere the difference in opinion, mainly due to a misplaced emphasis, is more 
visible than on the question: Where the intention should be expressed? It is more 
visible in Azeez Basha case. 
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1. That in 1870 Sir Syed Ahmad Khan thought that the backwardness of the 
Muslim Community was due to their neglect of modem education; 
2. That Sir Syed Ahmad Khan conceived the idea of imparting liberal education to 
Muslim in literature and science. 
3. That with this object in view Sir Syed Ahmad Khan organized a Committee to 
devise ways and means for the educational regeneration of Muslims; 
4. That in 1872 the Mohammadan Anglo-Oriental College funds committee started 
collecting funds to realize the goal that Sir Syed Ahmad Khan realized. 
5. That in consequence of the activities of the committee a school was opened in 
1873. 
6. That in 1876 the school becomes a High School. 
7. That the school becomes the Mohammadan Anglo-Oriental College in 1877. 
8. That then M.A.O. College was a flourishing institution by the time Sir Syed 
Ahmad Khan died in 1898; 
9. That the idea of establishing a Muslim University gathered strength from year to 
year at the turn of the century; 
10. That by 1911 some funds were collected and a Muslim University Association 
was established for the purpose of establishing a teaching University at Aligarh; 
11. That the Muslim University Association collected large funds, including a sum 
of Rs.30 Lakhs which was collected for the University Fulfillment of a 
conduction by the Government of India; 
12. That the Mohammadan Anglo-Oriental College was made the basis of the 
Aligarh Muslim University; 
13. That all properties and funds belonging to the M.A.O. College were made over 
to the Aligarh Muslim University. 
These were the facts of history which the Court had accepted as true. 
If the history of the Muslims University, as set out, and also approved by the 
court as stating the correct state of affairs, reflects any intention on the part of the 
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Muslims, it was unmistakably an intention to establish a Muslim University. It then 
becomes difficult to appreciate the court's conclusion that the Act of 1920 did not 
intend to establish a Muslim institution unless it is also accepted that the 
establishment of the Aligarh Muslim University was the result of a misunderstanding 
between the Muslims and the then legislature- the former wanted to establish a 
Muslim institution and the latter wanted something else. 
The right question inviting the attention of the court was: what was the intention 
of the founders in converting the Mohammadan Anglo Oriental College into a 
Muslim University? Was not the answer readily available in the Court's own 
findings? 
1. That 'M.A.O. Colleges and the Muslim University Association and the 
Muslim University Foundation committee were established by the Muslim 
minority.'"'* 
2. That 'those who were in-charge of the M.A.O. College, the Muslim University 
Association and the Muslim University Foundation Committee were keen to 
bring into existence a University at Aligarh" 
3. That "the 1920 Act was passed as a result of the efforts of the Muslim minority. 
4. That the nucleus of the Aligarh Muslim University was the M.A.O. College. 
By this process, the result achieved was that the Aligarh Muslim University was 
declared by the court to have been "established" by the central legislature and not by 
those who had 'founded' the Mohammadan Anglo-Oriental College its nucleus."^^ 
3.8 Objects of Establishment 
The objects may either be limited to conservation of language, script or culture, 
for which a minority may established an educational institution under Art.30(l). The 
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object related to Art. 29 may be as varied as possibly they can be. The controversy as 
to which of the two propositions states the correct connotation of Art. 30(1) has 
engaged considerable judicial attention. The first proposition is based on a reading of 
the language of Art. 29(1) and 30(1) together, and also the subheading and the 
marginal notes under which the two articles are placed-conveying thus the impression 
that Art. 30(1) is complementary to Art.29 (1). The second proposition is based on the 
assumption that Art. 30(1) stands independently of 29(1) and that the words "of their 
choice" occurring in that article, if given their natural meaning, leave no room for 
limiting the scope of Art. 30(1) by any consideration on which Art.29 (1) is based. 
3.8.1The Relevance of Article 29 (1) 
The first occasion on which these prepositions were brought into consideration 
was a reference made by the President under Art. 143 for obtaining opinion of the 
Supreme Court on certain provisions of Kerala Education Bill, 1957. Describing the 
scope of Art.30 (1), S. R. Das C.J. In re Kerala Education Bill"'^, speaking for the 
Court, laid great stress upon the 'choice' available to minorities to determine for 
themselves the kind of institutions they want to establish, and observed: 
"What the article says and means is that the religious and the linguistic 
minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions of their choice. 
There is no limitation placed on the subjects to be taught in such educational 
institutions. As such minorities will ordinarily desire that their children should be 
brought up properly and efficiently and be eligible for higher university education and 
go out in the world fully equipped with such intellectual attainments as well make 
them fit , educational institutions of their choice will necessarily include 
institutions imparting general secular education also.""''' 
These observation hardly leave any doubt that the court found itself convinced 
that the objects for which minorities can establish educational institutions cannot be 
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limited to mere conservation of language, script or culture, a right made available to 
"any section of citizen" under Art.29(l). 
The observation become a ground of contention for the Attorney-General in W. 
Proost V. state of Bihar °^^  where he argued that as the protection to minorities in 
Art.29 (1) was only a right to conserve a distinct language, script or culture of its 
own, the St. Xavier's College at Ranchi did not qualify for the protection of Art.30 (1) 
because the college was not founded to conserve them. Relying on the Kerala 
Education Bill opinion, he argued that the observation of Das C.J. suggested that the 
Supreme Court was reading the two Articles together. Hidayatullah C.J. speaking for 
the Court rejected the plea and said: "In our opinion the width of Article 30(1) cannot 
be cut down by introducing in it considerations on which Article 29(1) is based".'°^ 
Distinguishing the two Articles, as to their respective scope, he observed: "The latter 
article is a general protection which is given to minorities to conserve their language, 
script or culture. The former is a special right to minorities to establish educational 
institutions of their choice. This choice is not limited to institutions seeking to 
conserve language, script or culture.""" 
This view found further conformation in St. Xaviers College v. State ofGujrat^^^ 
where a bench of nine Supreme Court judges was called upon to determine, inter alia, 
the inter-relationship of Art.30(l) and 29(1). Ray C.J. on behalf of himself and 
Palekar J., disapproved of any suggestion seeking to read the two articles together to 
mean that one article was concomitant to the other, and emphasized: "It will be wrong 
to read Article 30(1) as restricting the right of minorities to establish and administer 
educational institutions of their choice only to cases where such institutions are 
concerned with language, script or culture of the minorities.""^ Beg J. also took the 
view that: "Article 29 of the constitution does not, in any way, impose a limit on the 
kind or character of education which a minority may chose to impart through its 
institutions to the children of its own members or to those of others who may choose 
to send their children to its schools.""'^ 
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Thus all the judges who spoke on the relationship between Art.29(l) and 30(1) 
were in complete agreement on the point that the two articles address themselves to 
different groups of persons and guarantee different rights. 
In MM. All Khan v. Magadh University,^^^ to negative the petitioners' 
contention that Mirza Galib College, Gaya was a minority institution, one of the 
respondents took the plea that as the application filed by the college for obtaining 
affiliation had stated that several subjects like Hindi, English, Bengali, principle Hindi 
and Principle Bengali were to be taught, the college could not be regarded as an 
institution established with the exclusive object of conserving language, culture, and 
religion of that particular community. But the argument met with ready rejection by 
the Patna High Court which, relying upon the clear pronouncement of the Supreme 
Court in W. Proost v. state of Bihar,"^ held that the scope of Art. 30(1) could not be 
limited by what is the subject-matter of the right under Art.29 (1). 
The above decisions suggest is that "any section of citizens" referred to in Art. 
29(1) and religious and linguistic minorities referred to in Art.30 (1) is not identical 
groups of persons. Similarly, the right to conserve language, script or culture 
guaranteed in Art.29 (1) and the right to establish and administer educational 
institutions secured under Art. 30 (1) are not identical rights,"^ though, as 
Hidayatullah C.J. Had rightly pointed out in W. Proost case,"^ they may meet in a 
given case. 
What logically follows from the decisions reviewed is that a religious or 
linguistic minority may establish an educational institution with the sole-object of 
giving a general 'secular' education wholly unconnected with any thing like 
conservation of language, script or culture. The decisions reviewed above leave 
hardly any doubt that the language employed in Articles 29(1) and 30(1) makes these 
Articles different from each other as to their object and scope and that the language of 
one article cannot be read as limiting the scope of the other. A reading of the two 
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Articles shows that the right to conservation of language, script or culture is available 
to any 'section of citizens' which term includes a 'minority'. "^ 
The unmistakable conclusion that can be drawn out of this explanation is that 
the Constituent Assembly was very clear not only on the persons of inherence of the 
rights under Articles 29(1) and 30(1), but also that the objects and scope of two 
articles were different from each other. If the right of establishment and 
administration of educational institutions under Art.30 (1) is regarded as being limited 
to conservation of language, script or culture. Art. 30(1) would obviously become 
redundant as the right to the conservation of language, script or culture, under Art. 
29( 1) is itself wide enough to include with in its scope a right to establish educational 
institutions for carrying this object into effect. Jegdev Singh v. Pratap Singh^^^ is an 
example in hand where the Supreme Court has held that Art.29 (1) includes the right 
"to agitate for the protection of the language", and that make of promises by a 
candidate to work for conservation of the electorate's language does not amount to a 
corrupt practice in term of S. 123(3) of the representation of the people Act, 1951 
which makes an appeal by a candidate to vote or refrain from voting for a person on 
the ground of language a corrupt practice. 
The decisions reviewed also demonstrate an emphatic assertion, with the 
exception of course of the Azeez Basha case, that Art.30 (1) cannot be read to imply a 
condition that an institution, in order to be entitled to its benefits as a minority 
institution, must confine its own benefits to the member of the minority alone. Neither 
the scope of the word 'choice' occurring in Art.30 (1) admits of any such limitation, 
nor indeed can a minority close the doors of its institutions to non-minority students 
without bringing itself face to face with clause (2) of Art. 29 which prohibits aided 
institutions from denying admission on grounds of religion, race, caste, or 
language.'^° 
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All the case laws except Azeez Basha'^' shows that a person or persons 
belonging to minority community if established an educational institution definitely 
the administration power of the institution goes to the hand of the minority for the 
benefit of the minority community. The name of the institution, the persons involved 
in the establishment, the source of fund, the subjection of an institution to legal 
provisions, expression of the intention, nature of the claim as to whether it was a mere 
clock or presentation and the real motive was business adventure have, singly or in 
combination with each other, served as positive index proving the claim of 
establishment. '^ ^ The Courts have used such a wide discretion in placing emphasis on 
the factors for determining the adequacy of the proof, they have, consequently, failed 
to achieve uniformity in approach. 
The absence of any fixed formulae and the consequent use of wide discretion 
have led the courts to arrive at conclusion which are not always rational. Nowhere is 
this more eminently visible than in the Azeez Bsaha decision which, as has been 
brought out, was wrongly decided. It must also be said that the Azeez Basha decision 
is the lone example to cite where that catholicity which permeates through the whole 
lot of judicial decisions is quite conspicuously missing. The decision in that case 
exemplifies how a court of law can create history by denying a fact bom of known 
history. It shows how a court can deny constitutional protection to an educational 
institution which existed on this soil for no less a period than 95 years. 
The decision has not only uprooted the foundations of a historical fact it has also 
the effect of preventing minorities from securing a University for objects like 
preservafion of language or culture or promotion of special studies. There is no reason 
why the language of Art. 30(1), which allowed linguistic and religious, minorities to 
establish and administer educational institutions of their choice, be so read as to 
exclude the possibility of establishment of a University by a minority. In view of 
Sections 22 to 25 of the University Grants unless the Parliament or a State legislature 
enacts a law for establishment of a University, But, so long as the Azeez Basha 
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decision stands, once the legislature comes on the scene any institution incorporated 
as a 'University' would ceases to be a minority institution as then it would be 
regarded an as institution 'brought into existence' by law. 
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CHAPTER - IV 
RIGHT TO ADMINISTER EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
In one word right to administer means managing, maintaining, molding, 
organizing, planning after the affairs of the institution. In a very general sense 
right to administer of a minority educational institution indicates the power to 
appoint teaching and non- teaching staff, admissions of the students and deciding 
the medium of instruction etc. The fundamental freedom under Art.30 (1) is prima 
facie absolute in nature as it is not made subject to any reasonable restrictions. ' 
This means that all minorities, linguistic or religious, have by Art.30 (1) right to 
establish and administer educational institutions of their own choice and "any law 
or executive direction which seeks to infringe the substance of that right under 
Art.30 (1) would to that extent be void." ^ 
In Kerala Education Bill case', Justice S. R. Das explained the scope of 
administration as follows: 
"The right to administer cannot include the right to maladminister. The 
minority cannot surly ask for aid or recognition for an educational institution run 
by them in unhealthy surroundings without any competent teachers possessing any 
semblance of qualification and which does not maintain even a fair standard of 
teaching or which teaches matters subversive of the welfare of the scholars." 
The Supreme Court in St. Xavier's college v. State of Gujarat ^ considered 
that the right conferred by Article 30(1) is not an absolute right and is not free 
from regulation and that just as regulatory measures are necessary for maintaining 
the educational character and content of minority institutions. These are necessary 
also for ensuring orderly, efficient and sound administration of the school in the 
matter of maintaining discipline, health, morality etc. Chief justice Ray, speaking 
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for himself and Justice Palekar said: "Permissible regulatory measures are those 
which do not restrict the right of administration but facilitate it and ensure better 
and more affective exercise of the right for the benefit of the institutions and 
without displacing the management. If the administration has to be improved, it 
should be done through the agency or instrumentality of the existing management 
and not by displacing it. Restrictions on the right of administration imposed in the 
interest of the general public alone and not in the interest of and for the benefit of 
minority educational institutions concerned will affect the autonomy in 
administration."^ 
The approach is nothing but reiteration of the opinion of justice Shah in the 
Sidhraj Bhai case. It would be seen that the interest of a minority institution are 
well protected by Article 30(1) itself the right to administer educational 
institutions of their choice. The minorities are free to administer their institution in 
a manner so as to make it an effective vehicle for achieving their aims and 
objectives, e.g., to impart general and secular education as well as to conserve 
their language and religion. 
Thus the state may legitimately insist that reasonable restrictions be 
prescribed to ensure the excellence of the institution before giving aid or 
recognition. In the opinion of Justice S. R. Das there is also an indication of taking 
into account 'public interest' or 'national interest' as he upheld some of the 
impugned clauses as permissible regulations because these were "designed to give 
protection and security to the ill- paid teachers who are engaged in rendering 
service to the national and protect the backward classes."^ But in Sidhraj Bhai v. 
State ofGujaraf Shah J. stated that "The right [under Article 30(1)] is intended to 
be effective and is not intended to be whittled down by so called regulative 
measures conceived in the interest not of the minority educational institutions but 
of the public or nation as a whole. If every order which while maintaining the 
formal character of a minority institution destroys the power of administration is 
held justified because it is in the public or national interest, though not in its 
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interest as an educational institution, the right guaranteed by Article 30(1) will be 
but a 'teasing illusion', a promise of unreality."^ 
In State of Kerala v. Mother Provinciaf, Chief Justice HidayatuUah adopted a 
somewhat midway approach between the two earlier decisions in the Kerale 
Education Bill case and the Sidhraj Bhai case. He said: "... The standards of 
education are not a part of management as such. These standards concern the body 
politic and are dictated by consideration of advancement of his country and its 
people. Therefore, if universities establish the syllabi for examinations, they must 
be followed, subject however, to special subject whom the institutions may seek to 
teach, and to certain extent tile state may also regulate condition of employments 
of teachers and the health and hygiene of students. Such regulations do riot bear 
directly upon management as such, although they may indirectly affect it. Yet the 
right of the state of regulate education, educational standards and allied be allowed 
to fall below the standards and excellence expected of educational institutions or 
under the guide of exclusive right of management to decline to follow the general 
pattern. While the management must be left to them they may be compelled to 
keep in step with others". 
It is submitted that the above observations of Chief Justice HidayatuUah are 
rather vague generalization and fail to lay down any definite guidelines to 
determine the difference between permitted regulations for educational standards 
and the guarantee of freedom of control. His Lordship himself admits in the 
passage quoted above that the regulation 'may indirectly affect' the right. It would 
be wrong to suggest that the management of the minority institution is meant only 
to appoint teachers and disburse their salary. It is also the duty of the management 
to see that standards of education are maintained by their institution, whether it is 
in connection with the efficiency of the staff, teaching standards, or general health 
and hygiene of the teachers and the students relating to games, sports and other 
extra-curricular activities in the institution. 
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In that case, the impugned provisions dealt with the composition of the 
governing body for private colleges not under corporate management and of the 
managing council for private colleges. Sections 48 and 49 of the Kerala University 
Act, 1969 required the corporate managements to constitute a managing council, 
and required the other institutions not under corporate management to constitute a 
governing body. The governing body was to consist of eleven members out of 
which not more than six to be nominated by the corporate management. The 
Supreme Court held after the election of these two bodies the founders or the 
community could obviously have no hand in the administration of the institution. 
The Court found that the two bodies are vested with the complete administration 
of institutions and that they are not answerable to the founders in the matters of 
administration. The Court found these provisions so much objectionable that it 
outrightly rejected the argument of the State that even in the presence of these 
provisions the managing council and the governing body had the controlling voice 
in the management. The Court also rejected the other argument that the defect, if 
any, must be found in the statutes, ordinance, regulations, bye-laws and orders of 
the university and not in the provisions of the Act itself 
Hidayatullah C.J., speaking for the Court assigned the reasons for rejecting 
the arguments: "The Constitution contemplates the administration to be in the 
hands of the particular community. However desirable h might be to associate 
nominated members of the kind mentioned in Sections 48 and 49 with other 
members of the governing body or the managing council, it is obvious that their 
voice must play a considerable part in management. Situations might be conceived 
when they may have a preponderating voice. In any event the administration goes 
to a distinct corporate body which is in no way answerable to the...management." 
The Court held that by force of the two sections the minority community would 
lose the right to administer an institution which it had founded. 
The report of the Education Commission were also brought to the notice of 
the Court in which the Commission had made suggestions regarding the 
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conditions of service of teaching staff in tiie universities and the colleges and 
standards of teaching etc., and it was pointed out that what was done by the Kerala 
University Act, was to implement these suggestions. Chief Justice HidayatuUah 
recognizing the desirability of implementation of these suggestions and made the 
following observation: "We have no doubt that the provisions of the Act were 
made bonafide and is in the interest of the education but unfortunately they do 
affect the administration of these institutions and rob the founders of their right 
which the Constitution desires should be theirs. The provisions even if salutary 
cannot stand in the face of the constitutional guarantee..."'" 
In S. Azeez Basha v.Union of India'^ it was contented that, "... Even though 
the religious minority may not have established the education, it will have the right 
to administer it, if by some process it had been administering the same before the 
constitution came into force". K. N. Wanchoo. C .J. rejected the contention and 
held, "We are not prepared to accept this argument. The article in our opinion 
clearly shows that the minority will have the right to administer educational 
institutions of their choice provided they have established them, but not otherwise. 
The Article cannot be read to mean that even if the educational institution has been 
established by somebody else, any religious minority would have the right to 
administer it because, for some reason or other, it might have been administering it 
before the Constitution came into force. The words "establish and administer" in 
the Article must be read conjunctively and so read it gives the right to the minority 
to administer an educational institution provided it has been established by it."'^ 
The re Kerala Education Bill, 1957'^  case was also referred to in support of 
the argument that the minority can administer an educational institution even 
though it might not have established it. On a reading of that decision, the court 
came of the conclusion that even though the minority did not establish the 
institution it had the right to maintain it. But the Article 30(1) only conferred the 
rights on minority after the constitution came into force. It is in respect of the latter 
contention that the observation of the Supreme Court in re Kerala Education hill 
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case should be read. In support of this view they also referred to the case of 
Dargah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain All''' which while dealing with Article 
26 (a) and (b) of the constitution had held that even if it be assumed that a certain 
religious institution was established by a minority community it may lose the right 
to administer it in certain circumstances. They referred to the following 
observation of the Dargah Committee, Ajmer case: "If the right to administer the 
properties never vested in the denomination or had been validly surrendered by it 
or had otherwise been effectively and irretrievably lost to it, Article 26 cannot be 
successfully invoked." 
From the passage cited above, it is apparent that even the institutions 
established by a minority can be given up or the right to administer is relinquished 
or validity surrendered if so, the right to administer would be irretrievably lost. 
The facts leading to the passing of the Aligarh Muslim University Act and its 
establishment clearly indicate, said Wanchool, C. J., "That the minority 
community had validly surrendered its right to administer the institution which 
was in existence prior to the establishment of University and had also transferred 
its assets and liabilities and thereafter had no rights over them."'^ 
There is no limitation on the subject to be taught in such institution, and they 
are not debarred from giving general education as well in such institution. It is not 
necessary for the protection of Art.30 (1) that the majority of pupils belonging to 
the institution must belong to the religion of minority in question. Thus nature and 
purpose of the institution is entirely left to the discretion of the community.'^ This 
view was upheld by the Supreme Court in State of Bombay v. Bombay Education 
Society.''' Das C.J. observed: "There is no Limitation placed on the subjects to be 
taught in such educational institutions. As such minorities will ordinarily desire 
that their children should be brought up properly and efficiently and be eligible for 
higher university education and go out in the world fully equipped with such 
intellectual attainments as well make them fit for entering the public services, 
educational institutions of their choice will necessary include institutions 
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imparting general secular education also. In other words, the Article leaves it to 
their choice to establish such educational institution as well serve both purpose, 
mainly the purpose of conserving their religion, language or culture, and also the 
purpose of giving a through good general education to their children." 
The result of the above discussion is that the term 'administer' under Article 
30(1) means 'to manage the affairs of the educational institution' belonging to the 
minority and that this right of minority does not include the right to mal-
administer. It can also be stated that the right to administration includes right to 
have a fine choice to mould the institution to better serve interest of the minority 
community. The right has not been held to be absolute in nature and provisions 
made in the interest of minority educational institutions would be regarded as 
permissible regulation. However, the Courts are not clear as to the limits of 
control. 
4.1 Medium of Instruction 
All educational experts are uniformly of the opinion that pupils should begin 
their schooling through the medium of their mother tongue. There is great reason 
and justice behind this. If the tender minds of the children are subject to an alien 
medium the learning process becomes unnatural. It inflicts a cruel strain on the 
children which makes the entire transaction mechanical. Besides, the educational 
process becomes artificial and tortuous. The basic knowledge can easily be 
garnered through the mother tongue. Keeping this philosophy in mind, a 
conference of the state ministers of education passed a resolution recommending 
for introduction of mother tongue as the medium of instruction at the primary-
school stage and that where there were no fewer than forty students of a linguistic 
minority in a school, or ten students in a class, the state should provide facility for 
imparting instruction to these student by appointing a teacher in that school for 
that purpose.'^ 
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Article 29 (1) admits that the minorities have right to conserve their distinct 
language or script but it does not specify the means of conserving such right. 
Establishment of educational institution is, undoubtedly, one of the most effective 
means of conservation of language and script. Article 30(1) which provided 
minorities the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their 
'choice'. Their 'choice', therefore, must necessarily include a choice to determine 
the language of instruction in such institutions. 
The issue of medium of instruction becomes a political question after the 
Report of the State Reorganization Commission recommending the re-
organization of States on the basis of language and the change that followed. The 
question of medium of instruction arose in number of cases in the backdrop of the 
policy of states to promote the advancement of State's official language. The 
following are the two main questions under head: 
(1) Whether the states can validity legislate on medium of instruction under 
Entry 25 of List iii or is the Parliament alone competent to enact a law on this 
subject? 
(2) Whether and to what extent the minority educational institutions can be 
required to follow such regulations? 
Both these issues came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in a 
number of cases. 
In State of Bombay v. Bombay Education Society,^"^ the Supreme Court held: 
"Where ... A minority like the Anglo Indian community, which is based, inter-
alia, on religion and language has the fundamental right to conserve its language, 
script and culture under Art. 29 (1) and has the right to establish and administer 
educational institutions of their choice under Article 30 (1) surely them there must 
be implicit in such fundamental right, the right to impart instruction in their own 
institutions to children of their own community in their own language.. ."'^ ^ 
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In Usha Mehta v. State of Maharashtrc?\ a policy decision made by 
Maharashtra State Government whereby Marathi language was made compulsory 
throughout the schools in that State. As a result, the English Medium Schools run 
by Gujarati linguistic minorities were compelled to teach four languages (Hindi, 
English, Marathi and mother tongue Gujarati) as against the accepted 'three-
language formula'. Constitutional validity of the imposition of Marathi language 
as a compulsory study in schools run by linguistic minorities was the main matter 
for judgment in this case. 
Petitioners contested that the imposition of compulsory Marathi was in 
violation of the fundamental right of the linguistic minority to establish an 
educational institution of'their choice' under Article 30(1) of the Constitution, that 
the 'choice' is meant to achieve not only the purpose of conserving the minority's 
mother tongue, language etc. but also giving their children a good general 
education; that the minority, in furtherance of their fundamental right under 
Article 29(1) read with Article 30(1) of the Constitution has a choice to teach the 
other subjects (Maths, Science etc.) through such medium mother tongue, Hindi or 
English as commends to it and correspondingly a 'negative choice' not to teach 
such subjects in any such medium that does not commend to its perception of 
good general education. The petitioner argued that the imposition of regional 
language was violation of the minority right to conserve its own language, script 
and culture. 
The State of Maharashtra maintained that the imposition of Marathi language 
or asking the schools to follow particular syllabi is a matter of State policy. The 
considered policy decision of the State is based on the recommendations of the 
Education Commission, the National Education Policy, the expert opinion of 
several educationalists and the need to spread its regional language. The 
imposition of Marathi language is not against the fundamental rights of the 
citizens, on the contrary the larger welfare of student community has been kept as 
the paramount consideration that there is no bar to establish a non-Marathi 
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regional language medium school in Maharashtra but Marathi language has also to 
be taught in such schools. All the States have switched over to making their 
regional language as the compulsory language of study since 1968; that the 
education policies of 1968 and 1986 has been instrumental in the process of 
national integration and the students belonging to different linguistic minority 
groups will be better equipped to get themselves assimilated in the culture and life 
of people of Maharashtra. 
The Court in several cases elaborately considered the limit of minority rights 
under Article 30. The right under Article 30(1) is not so absolute as to prevent the 
Government from making any regulation whatsoever. It is difficult to accept the 
proposition advanced by the Petitioners that minority character would only be 
protected by learning Gujarati as a First or Second language. There is enough 
opportunity, in the impugned school syllabi, for students in English medium 
school run by Gujarati minority group to offer Gujarati language as a composite 
subject. Therefore, it cannot rule that the impugned policy will result in destroying 
the minority character of the Gujarati community in Maharashtra. For the 
foregoing reasons Court held that the impugned policy decisions is not violation 
of the linguistic minority rights guaranteed under Art.29 and 30 or any other 
provisions of the Constitution. Hence this petition stands dismissed. ^^  
The question of state power to prescribe medium of instruction also came up 
before the Gujarat High Court in Srikrishna v. Gujarat University^^ acting under 
1961 the Gujarat University acting under status 207, 208 and 209, purported to 
have been enacted under Sec. 4(27) and Sec. 38 (a) of the Gujarat University Act, 
1949 sought to impose Gujarati or Hindi as an exclusive medium of instruction for 
institutions affiliated to it. In effect the affiliated college was prohibited to use 
English as a medium of instruction. The court held that the Gujarat University was 
not competent to prohibit affiliated college from deciding to impart education in a 
language of its own choice. 
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Another example to impose a language on the minority institutions came up 
consideration in D.A.V. College v. State of Punjab?''' The D.A.V. College trust 
Society, an association of Arya Samajis which is linguistic minority in Punjab 
challenged the constitutional validity of S.4 (2) of the Punjabi University Act 1961 
and circulars issued there under dated 15.6.1970 prescribing Gurumukhi script as a 
sole medium of instruction and examination on the ground that it violated the 
previsions of Art.30 (1). Replying to the question that no minority had the right to 
tell the University to conduct its examinations in the language or script which the 
minority had adopted for its own institutions, Reddy J. Observed: 
"The state must ... harmonies its power to prescribe the medium of 
instruction with the rights of the religious or linguistic minority or any section of 
citizens to have the medium of instruction an script of their own choice by either 
providing also for instruction in the media of these minorities or if there are other 
University which allow such colleges to be affiliated where the medium of 
instruction is that which is adopted by the minority institutions, to allow them the 
choice to be affiliated to them."^^ 
In the case of English Medium Student Parents Association v. State of 
Karnataka?^ the court held the State can impose reasonable regulations on the 
institutions covering Article 30 for protecting the larger interest of the State and 
the nation. The 'choice' that could be exercised by the minority community or 
group is subject to such reasonable regulations imposed by the State. While 
imposing regulations, the State shall be cautious not to destroy the minority 
character of institutions. While imposing regulations, the State shall be constrains 
not to destroy the minority character of institutions. The regulation in this case 
imposed by the State of Maharashtara upon the linguistic minority right is to make 
Marathi language a compulsory course in school syllabi. Here the court was of 
view that the regulation imposed by the state was reasonable because a proper 
understanding of Marathi language is necessary for easy carrying out the day to 
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day affairs to the people living in the State of Maharashtra and also proper 
carrying out of the daily administration. 
All the discussion shows that the power of fixing the medium of instruction is 
in the hand of the minority institution and it is a part and parcel to their 'choice'. 
But in the case of English Medium student Parents Asim^' says that State can 
make reasonable regulation for the purpose of proper understanding of the day to 
day affair. 
Though Art 29 (1), which allows minorities to conserve their distinct 
language or script, does not specify the 'means' of conservations, it cannot be the 
disputable proposition that establishment of educational institutions is one of the 
most effective means of conservation of language and script. Art. 30(1) which, in 
terms allows minorities to establish and administer educational institutions leaves 
it to "their choice" to determine the kind or character of educational institutions. 
Their "choice", therefore, must necessarily include a choice to determine the 
language of instruction in such institutions. 
Though under Art. 29 minorities enjoy the right to adopt its own language as 
the medium of education, the language of Art. 30 (1) does not seem to be 
susceptible to such a limitation, and would appear to leave with the minority the 
choice to adopt its own distinct language. Minorities have a constitutional right to 
determine for their institutions, the medium of their own choice. 
The factual situations enabled the courts to delineate the scope of the right of 
minorities to determine the language of instruction and examination for their own 
institutions and the extant of the powers of the State to regulate medium of 
mstruction in educational institutions. In Sri Krishna v. Gujarat University , the 
factual context in which the litigation arose was that the Bombay legislature 
enacted the University Act in 1949 for establishing a teaching-cum-affiliating 
university. In 1961 the Gujarat University acting under statutes sought to impose 
Gujarati or Hindi as the exclusive medium of instruction for institutions affiliated 
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to it. These statutes were challenged in a petition before the Gujarat High Court by 
the father of Srikant who was a student of St. Xavier's college, Ahmedabad, 
affiliated to the Gujarat University. The college provided teaching in courses of 
study prescribed by the University for intermediate Arts Examination and for that 
purpose held simultaneously two classes, one having English as the medium, and 
the other in Gujarati. Srikant, after having passed the first year Arts class through 
the medium of Gujarati in 1961 sought admission to the class preparing for 
intermediate Arts Examination through the medium of English. The college 
expressed its inability to permit him to seek sanction from the University, which 
the later denied. He was, however, allowed to keep English as medium of 
instruction but not for examination, and thus was compelled to attend inter Arts 
class in which Gujarati was the medium of instruction. 
The Gujarat High Court expressed the view that the right to determine the 
medium of instruction was a necessary part of the rights secured to minorities 
under Arts.29 (1) and 30 (1). The court held that neither the State Legislature nor 
the Gujarat University had the competence under the Constitution to prohibit St. 
Xaviers College from deciding to instruct its pupils in a language of its own choice 
by directing it to adopt Gujarati or any other language or languages as medium of 
instruction in place of English which the college, being a Christian minority 
institution, had adopted as its medium of instruction. 
In St. Xavier 's College v. State of Gujarat,^'^ the observation, though made 
with regard to recognition and affiliation of minority institutions, are quite 
pertinent. Visualizing a situation in which there was a law in existence providing 
for recognition of affiliation, Reddl J. provided the answer in the following words: 
The only purpose that the fundamental right under Article 30 (1) would serve 
would in that case be that minorities may establish their institutions, lay down 
their own syllabi, provide instructions in the subjects of their choice, conduct 
examinations and award degrees or diplomas. Such institutions have right to seek 
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recognition to their degrees and diplomas ... Tlie State is bound to give 
recognition to their qualifications and to the institutions. 30 
Difficulties have arisen only where a state has sought to prescribe a language 
as the exclusive medium of instruction. With the reorganisation of the States on 
Hnguistic basis, the States have shown a tendency to prescribe the regional 
language as the sole medium for teaching, with the obvious object to promote 
regional language. In the Gujarat University case what the university had done 
was to make an attempt to leave the students taking admission to certain classes 
with no option but to receive instruction and write examination in the Gujarati 
language. In the D.A.V. College case also the university had sought to impose 
Punjabi as the exclusive medium for students taking admission to pre-University 
class. 
The decisions considered above show that no language can be prescribed as 
the sole medium of instruction and to determine for itself the language of 
instruction and examination. What this brings forth is the proposition that a 
minority has an 'absolute' right to determine the medium of its own choice. The 
proposition that seems be firmly established is that the right under Art.30 (1) like 
other rights are not absolute, and can be regulated. In Mother provincial v. state of 
KeraW the Supreme Court specifically held that 'Standards of Education' are not 
part of management (of minority institutions) and, as such can be regulated.^^This 
principle, courts have adopted as a matter of 'judicial policy' and have often had 
to reiterate to press the point.^ '^  
Therefore, the proposition that a minority has an absolute right to determine 
the medium of its choice would seem to form an exception to the general rule that 
standards of education can be regulated. Or, alternatively, it may be said, that the 
choice remains intact so long as its exercise does not adversely affect standards of 
education.'^ '' 
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In Hindi Hitrakshak Samiti v. Union of India, the question before the Supreme 
Court was whether non-holding of entrance examination (Pre-medicai test) in any 
particular language amounted to violation of clause (2) of Article 29? The three 
judge's bench consisting of Sabyasachi Mukharji C.J., K.N.Singh and 
M.M.Punchhi, J.J, answered the question in negative and held that: "It is difficult 
to accept that in not holding entrance examination in any particular language be it 
Hindi or regional language, amounts to denial of admission on the ground of 
language. Every educational institution has right to determine or set out its method 
of education and conditions of examination and studies provided these do not 
directly or indirectly have any casual connection with violation of the fundamental 
rights guaranteed by the Constitution. It may be that Hindi or other regional 
languages are more appropriate medium of imparting education to very many and 
it may be appropriate and proper to hold the examinations, entrance or otherwise, 
in any particular regional or Hindi language, or it may be that Hindi or other 
regional language because of development of that language, is not yet appropriate 
medium to transmute or test the knowledge or capacity that could be had in 
medical and dental disciplines. It is a matter of formulation of policy by the State 
or educational authorities in-charge of any particular situation."^^ 
In General Secretary Linguistic Minorities Protection v. Karnataka the 
Karnataka High Court was confronted with one delicate question. The petitioners 
challenged the validity of the respondent's order prescribing Kannada as the first 
language in Secondary Schools and a compulsory subject in non Kannada primary 
school and for pupils whose mother tongue was not Kannada. The order required 
the student in secondary schools to opt for the study of two other languages from 
the languages specified by it, one of which was Kannada. It thus, permitted 
students whose mother tongue was Kannada to offer Kannada as an optional 
language also, it provided for 15 grace marks in the paper on Kannada for 10 years 
students whose mother tongue was not Kannada. 
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The majority option of Rama Jois, J., with Balkrishna, J., dissenting, contains 
a wealth of well-documented material on the need for and the importance of 
imparting education to a child at the primary level in mother tongue. He said: 
"Development and language go hand in hand, one does not proceed or follow the 
other.... Educational development is central to economic, culture and political 
development."" 
Rama Jois, J., Further pointed out that the mandatory Art. 350A, which 
directed the state to provide adequate facilities for instruction in the mother tongue 
at the primary level, recognized the unanimous opinions of experts that children 
whose mother tongue was a language other than the official language were not 
similarly situated. So the impugned order in so far as it made study of Kannada by 
the linguistic minorities at the primary level compulsory was irrational and 
arbitrary and so violated of Article 14. The court'^ ^ said further that as the state was 
not entitled to decide. "As to the language in which the children should have their 
primary education" It was not constitutionally competent to say that the linguistic 
minority schools "must add to the general pattern of syllabus the regional/official 
language as an additional subject. So it found that the impugned order violated 
Articles 29 and 30 also. 
In regard to the validity of the order relating to the first language the court 
found that the Supreme Court had subordinated the state's police power to 
determine the medium of instruction to, inter alia, Article 29(1) and 30 and held 
that administrative and financial difficulfies permitting imparting of instruction in 
college in the language of a minority would not permit infringement of minority 
rights. It accordingly, held that the regulations making Kannada the sole first 
language violated Articles 14, 29 and 30. It clarified that the mulfilingual 
Karnataka State could make the study of Kannada compulsory from the senior 
primary class and as one of the three languages in the high school. Against the 
decision of the Karnataka High Court the state of Karnataka appealed to the 
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Supreme Court.^' Justice Mohan confirmed the well- considered judgment of the 
High Court. 
On the basis of cases discussed above it can be stated that while the choice of 
minority institution to determine medium of instruction is implicit in Art. 29(1) 
and 30(1) and had the status of a fundamental right, the State's power to regulate 
medium of instruction must not come into conflict with this right. The choice of 
minority institution to decide for itself the medium of instruction cannot be 
restricted on extraneous considerations, however laudable. It is also recognized 
that no language can be prescribed as the sole medium of instruction if that is not 
the language of the minority concerned. A university cannot compulsorily affiliate 
a minority institution and impose upon it a medium which is not its own. At the 
same time no minority can claim that the affiliating university should conduct 
teaching and examination in a language which the minority has a right to adopt. 
4.2 Admission in Minority Institutions 
The admission policy is a matter which is considered very much within the 
realm of the administration of a minority educational institution. The issue of 
admissions to the minority educational institutions has raised two main questions: 
firstly whether admissions in such institutions be considered as part of the right to 
administer conferred under article 30(1), and secondly whether state can regulate 
admissions in such institutions and if yes then to what extent? 
In St. Stephen's College v. University of Delhi'"' exempting Stephens College 
from the uniform admission procedure applicable to all affiliated and constituent 
colleges of the University of Delhi at the undergraduate level, the court held that 
admission of students is an important facet of administration. It can be regulated 
but only to the extent that the regulation is conducive to the welfare of the 
minority institution or for the betterment of those who resort to it. The court held 
that denial to St. Stephen's College the power to supplement its admission 
procedure by interview and to compel it to make admission exclusively on the 
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basis of marks obtained in the qualifying examination would be against the right 
of the minority educational institutions under Art. 30 (1). 
In the above case the Supreme Court clearly laid down the law regarding the 
admission to minority educational institutions. In the light of all the relevant 
principles and factors and in view of the importance which the constitution 
attaches to protective measures of minorities under Article 30(1), the court decided 
that there have to be two categories for annual admissions in a minority 
educational institution: 
(a) Category- 1, (50% seats) for candidate belonging to the minority community 
which has established and administers the institution. 
(b) Category- II, (remaining 50%) for all candidates to be filled purely on the 
basis of merit. 
According to the mandatory direction of the Supreme Court, in the 50%) 
Category - II admissions in a minority educational institution there can be no 
reservation or weightage for any class of admission-seekers, here the admission 
are to be based purely on merit. The decision ruled out any reservation for SC/ST 
candidates in Category- II. 
In T.M.A. Pai Foundation "" the Court observed that admission of students to 
unaided minority educational institution cannot be regulated by the concerned 
State or University, except for providing the qualifications and minimum 
conditions of eligibility in the interest of academic standards. The Court observed 
that "The right to admit students being an essential facet of the right to administer 
educational institution of their choice, as contemplated under Article 30 of the 
Constitution, the State government or the University may not be entitled to 
interfere with that right . . . A minority institution does not cease to be so, the 
moment aid is received by the institution. An aided minority educational 
institution would be entitled to have the right of admission of students of 
belonging to the minority group and at the same time, would be required to admit 
156 
a reasonable extent of non-minority students. So that the rights under Article 30(1) 
are not substantially impaired and further the citizen's right under Article 29 (2) is 
not infringed . . . it can also be stipulated that passing of the common entrance test 
held by the State agency is necessary to seek admission. As regards non-minority 
students who are eligible to seek admission for the remaining seats, admission 
should normally be on the basis of common entrance test held by the State agency 
followed by counseling wherever it exists. . . A minority insthution may have its 
own procedure and method of admission as well as selection of students in 
professional and higher education colleges should be on the basis of merit. The 
procedure adopted or selection made should not tantamount to mal-administration. 
. . While giving aid to professional institutions, it would be permissible for the 
authority giving aid to prescribe by-rules or regulations, the conditions on the 
basis of which admission will be granted to different aided colleges by virtue of 
merit, coupled with the reservation policy of the State qua non-minority students." 
The court also emphasized that the admission procedure must be transparent and 
fair and the merit gets the priority. 
Earlier in Lilly Kurian case,"^ ^ strong arguments were put forward before the 
Supreme Court in which it was pleaded that reconciliation of minority rights in 
education with other social and educational objectives was inevitably necessary 
and this involved the judicial task of balancing the guaranteed rights under Art.30 
(1) with social, national or educational values. Argument was furthered by saying 
that if the State had any role to play in the system of general education, its power 
should not be confined merely to the laying down of a prescribed standards of 
education for minority educational institutions but should also extend to all 
necessary measures to secure an orderly, efficient and sound administration of 
such institutions.'*'^  
Referring with approval to the test laid down in Sidhrajbhai'^'^ case, namely, 
that regulation must be reasonable as well as must be conducive to making the 
institution an effective vehicle of education for the minority community, Sen J. 
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Speaking on behalf of the Court rejected the above plea and held: "Art. 30 (1) is 
not a charter of maladministration; regulation, so that the right to administer may 
be better exercised for the benefit of the institution is permissible; but the moment 
one goes beyond that and imposes, what is in truth, nor a mere regulation but an 
impairment of the right to administer, the Article comes into play and the 
interference cannot be justified by the pleading the interests of the general public; 
the interests justifying interference can only be the interest of the minority 
concerned"/^ 
Lilly Kurian case clearly indicates that no restriction on a minority institution 
can be acceptable unless the restriction is in the interest of the minority institution 
itself and shows that the courts have not detracted from the path laid in 
Sidhrajbhai case. Gandhi Faiz-e-am College'^^ case is perhaps the only example 
wherein, judging from the test laid down in Sidhrajbhai case, an 'unreasonable 
restriction' was upheld by the court. But there too, Krishna Iyer J. had to fall back 
upon the ratio of the Sidhrajbhai case and had to bring in his usual selective 
diction to drive home that the restriction was nothing but a regulation in the 
interest of the institution itself, and thus 'reasonable'.'*'' 
Many disputes have arisen in the context of holding common entrance test for 
admission to professional colleges. In this regard the in Islamic Academy^^ case 
the Court held that in minority educational institutions the management could 
select students of their quota, either on the basis of the common entrance tests to 
be conducted by an association of all colleges of a particular type in that State e.g. 
medical engineering or technical etc. The common entrance test, held by the 
association, must be for admission to all colleges of that type in the State, The 
opinion of choosing between either of these tests must be for exercised before 
issuing of prospectus and after intimation to the concerned authority and the 
committee set up hereinafter. If any professional colleges choose not to admit 
from the common entrance test conducted by the association then the college must 
necessarily admit from the common entrance test conducted by the state. After 
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holding the common entrance test and declaration of result the merit list will 
immediately be placed on the notice board of all colleges which have chosen to 
admit as per the test. A copy of merit list will also be forthwith sent to the 
concerned authority and the Committee. Selection of students must then be strictly 
on basis of merit as per that merit list. Of course, as indicated earlier, minority will 
be entitled to fill up their quota with their own students on basis of inter-se merit 
amongst those students. The list of student admitted along with the rank number 
obtained by the student, the fees collected and all such particulars and details as 
may be required by the concerned authority or the committee must be submitted to 
them forthwith. The question paper and the answer papers must be preserved for 
such period as the concerned authority or Committee may indicate. If it is found 
that any student has been admitted dehors merit, penalty can be imposed on that 
institute and in appropriate cases recognition affiliation may also be withdrawn"'^ ^ 
In the case of P. A. Inamdar^^ the observation of the court is that six months 
prior to the commencement of academic year, the Government would fix the 
percentage of students to be admitted by minority (religious/linguistic) 
professional college (other than engineering), taking into account the local needs 
of the State, the region as well as the minority. It would be a huge and 
cumbersome exercise in practice, to fix a percentage for each one of the 
institutions separately and it would be a pragmatic approach to have a fixed 
percentage for all the minority institution which is fair and reasonable. A practical 
approach to the problem would require a very definite percentage to be fixed for 
the minority institution, say 50% so that even if candidate of their choice, 
belonging to the minority institutions, are only 25% they would still have the right 
to select non minority students to make up 50%) of course, from CET held by the 
Government.^' 
The Punjab and Haryana High Court has ruled that the students have no right 
under Article 29 (2) to be admitted to an aided and recognized minority 
educational institution on merits alone. Only on the four grounds mentioned in 
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Article 29(2), admission cannot be denied.^ ^ In another case the Bombay High 
Court held that the right of the minorities under Article 30(1) was not subject to 
any reasonable restriction and, therefore held that a restrictions and prescribing 
that a certain percentage of students belonging to the SCs or STs had to be 
admitted even by the non-government polytechnics could not be made applicable 
to the minority institutions." The above decisions of the Courts imply that the 
choice available to a minority institution to admit students of its own choice 
cannot be restricted. 
The extent to which the state can interfere in the matter of admission in a 
minority education institution was discussed by the Supreme Court in Sidhrajbhai 
V. State of Gujarat. In this case the petitioners who were Christian minority and 
running Training College for teachers challenged the order of the Govt, by which 
all private training colleges were required to reserve 80 per cent of the seats for 
government nominees. The Govt, also threatened that noncompliance to its order 
will lead to withdrawal of grant and recognition. Agreeing to the contention of the 
petitioners the Court held that "The order made by the Government of Bombay 
made serious inroads into the right of the society to administer the training 
colleges." The Court also found the order not conceived in the interest of the 
college. 
This question was also discussed by the Kerala High Court in K.O.Varkey 
V.State of Kerala^'' in which the validity of rules 6, 7 and 8 of the Kerala Education 
Rules, 1959 was in question. Under these rules only 20 per cent of the seats were 
left for selection by manager and selection of 80 per cent of the seats was to be 
made by other agencies. The petitioner challenged the enforcement of these rules 
on the ground that these restrictions interfered with the matter of admission of 
students of their choice, and therefore, violated the guarantee under Article 30 (1). 
It is interesting to note the courts observations made in regard to the waving 
of the right under Article 30. It was contended by the respondent in this case that 
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the fundamental right had been waved by its non assertion by the minority in that 
they submitted to the enforcement of the rules in the past without protest. The 
Court said that "The fundamental right under Article 30 is that of a plurality of 
persons as a community of persons necessarily fluctuating and waiver means the 
voluntary relinquishment of a known right. It may be difficult to infer waiver from 
the conduct of the members of a fluctuating body. Can the present members of a 
minority community barter away the right under Article 30 so as to bind the fiature 
members of it as a unit? The fundamental right is of the living generation."^^ 
The courts have asserted and reiterated that Art.30 (1) of the Constitution of 
India cannot be read to imply a condition that an institution, in order to have the 
status of a 'minority institution' must keep its doors open to the members of the 
minority alone. Art. 30(1) implies no limitation whatever the minority institutions 
to restrict their 'choice' of admission to the members alone.^ ^ 
Admitting non-member, however, does not shed its minority character. A 
question, however, arises as to whether the right of the minority educational 
institutions to admit the students of their choice also implies a freedom not to 
admit and can they confine admissions in their institutions to their own members 
only? If answer to this is yes than it must bring the minority institution face to face 
with the prohibition incorporated in CI. (2) of Art.29, which seeks to prevent 
educational institutions receiving aid out of State funds from denying admission to 
any citizen on ground of religion, race, caste or language. If the answer is in 
negative, it must beg the question, what then is true scope underlying Art.30 (I)? 
The courts seem to have read too much in Art.29 (2) and have taken little 
pains to ascertain the true object underlying the both Art.29 (2) and 30 (1) for 
bringing about a rational synthesis between the two. The Supreme Court in the 
Kerala Opimon"^ specifically held that Art. 30(1) was subject to Art.29 (2). It may 
though appear surprising, but is interestingly true that the framers never intended 
Art.29 (2) to act as restrain upon the content of the right under Art.30(l). 
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Originally, the present Art.29 (1) was part of an integrated scheme devised to 
protect educational interest of religious and linguistic minorities. The simple 
object of what now constitutes Art. 29 (2) was to protect minorities from being 
discriminated against in regard to admission into state educational institutions. 
Explaining the scope of draft clause 18(2), KM Munshi said that the scope of this 
clause is only restricted to this, that where the State has got an educational 
insthution of its own, no minority shall be discriminated against.^ ^ Similarly Patel 
said that this a simple non-discriminatory clause against the minorities in the 
matter of admission to schools maintained by the State.^' 
It was only when the draft article 23 came up before the Assembly that a 
dramatic change took place in this position. Pandit Thakurdas Bhargawa suddenly 
came forward whh an amendment to redraft article 23 to read "No citizen shall be 
denied admission into any educational institution maintained wholly by the State 
or receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, cast, language 
or any of them".^° Assembly accepted the Bhargawa's amendment substituting the 
word 'minority, by the word 'citizen' without realizing the outcome in the form 
the apparent conflict between what now in Art.29 (2) and Art.30 (1). The real 
intention of the framers in fact was to extend the benefit of non-discrimination 
clause to other groups as well without sacrificing the real object and not to restrict 
the scope of Art.30 (1). 
The wide scope admitted to Art. 30 (1) would perhaps leave for the courts, in 
any future controversy, little option but to forge a harmonious synthesis between 
Art 30 (1) and Art.29 (2), by giving the latter a restricted scope. In some situation 
the operation to Art.29 (2) may nullify the very object for which Art.30 (1) was 
enacted. For example in Arogiasamf^ where the Madras High Court noted that 
one of the results of the Government order regulating procedure for admission in 
aided schools was that the student belonging to the Roman Catholic minority, 
representing less than ten per cent of the total population, were throve into a 
competition with the general students and thus had little chances for admission 
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into the minority institutions. In such situations as this, thus, a minority being 
smaller numerically may not be able to admit its own student if it is obligated, 
under compulsions of Art.29 (2), to admit students strictly according to merit. 
On such situations, the analogy of Devadason^^ and Balajf^ cases may well 
be extended. The Supreme Court in Devdashan held: "A Proviso or an exception 
cannot be interpreted as to nullify or destroy the main provision".^ "* Balaji case 
was decided; a year earlier, on the reasoning that it would be unreasonable to 
assume that in enacting Art. 15 (4) the constitution intended to provide that the 
other fundamental rights were to be completely ignored. A unanimous Supreme 
Court, in that case, construed Art. 15 (4) (which in terms is similar to Art. 16 (4) 
restrictively and even drew a line beyond which its operation cannot go.^ ^ If an 
'exception' is given a restricted meaning for enabling the 'general rule' to have its 
full play as has been done in the case of Arts. 15 and 16, it is possible that the 
courts may, in an appropriate controversy, interpret Art.29 (2) narrowly so as to 
keep intact the wide scope they have admitted to the language of Art.30 (1).^ ^ 
4.3 Appointment of Teachers 
The selection and appointment of staff for running educational institution is 
an essential part of the "right to administer" under Art.30 (1). The position that a 
Principal/ Head Master or other teachers occupy in the setup of an educational 
institution is of great importance. It is almost wholly these functionaries on whom 
depends the tone and temper of the institution. On them depends the establishment 
and continuity of its traditions and reputation, the maintenance discipline, and the 
efficiency of its teaching and training. On their outlook, efficiency and 
cooperation depends the success or failure of the objects of establishment of the 
institution. It is regarded as pre-eminently a function of the administration. As 
K.K. Methew, J. has observed supporting the majority view in Ahemedabad St. 
Xaviers College case . 
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"It is upon the principal and teachers of a college that the tone and temper of 
an educational institution depend. On them would depend its reputation, the 
maintenance of discipline and its efficiency in teaching. The right to choose the 
principal and to have the teaching conducted by teachers appointed by the 
management after an overall assessment of their outlook and philosophy is 
perhaps the most important facet of the right to administer an educational 
institution. So long as the persons chosen have the qualifications prescribed by the 
University, the choice must be left to the management. That is part of the 
fundamental right of the minorities to administer the educational institution 
established by them." 
In this case two sets of provisions of the Gujarat University Act, 1973, had the 
effect of interference with the right of Christian minority institution to have the 
teachers of their own choice for instruction. Section 40 and 41 together provided 
that if the Gujarat University so decided and the State Government issued the 
necessary notification, all instruction, teaching and training in under- graduate 
course would, in the constituent colleges, be imparted by the teachers of the 
University. The result was that once these provisions become operative the 
minority colleges would not be entitled to impart education through their own 
teachers, which indirectly affected their choice to appoint and have teachers of 
their own liking. But more direct interference with this choice came from Secfion 
33-A (1) (b) which the interveners challenged as violative of Art.30 (1). The 
Secfion provided for a selection provided for a selection committee for recruitment 
of the Principle and members of the teaching staff of a college. 
Mathew J. observed that we can perceive no reason why a representative of 
the University nominated by the Vice- Chancellor should be on the Selecfion 
Committee for recruiting the principal or for the insistence of the head of the 
department besides the representative of the University being on the Selecfion 
Committee requiring the members of the teaching staff So long as the person 
chosen have the qualification prescribed by the University, the choice must be left 
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to the management. That is part of the fundamental right of the minorities to 
administer the educational institution established by them.^ ^ 
Therefore, the position taken by the Supreme Court is that while a University 
can prescribe qualifications for the academic staff, the actual selection of teachers 
must remain in the hands of the administration of the institution and dilution of the 
right of the management infringes Art.30 (1). Accordingly, a condition that any 
appointment of a teacher in a college will be subject to the approval of the Vlce-
Chancellor has been held invalid under Art.30 (1).^ ^ 
The attention of the Supreme Court was drawn to a legal provision which 
required the managing committee of an educational institution to appoint teachers 
in the school with the concurrence of the School Service Board. The Supreme 
Court held the provision to be valid.^ " The Court pointed out that as regards the 
consent of the School Service Board to the appointment of teachers, the Act itself 
clarifies that the Board while considering the question of granting approval to the 
appointment of a teacher would ascertain if the appointment was in accordance 
with the rules laying down qualifications, and the manner of making appointments 
continues to vest in the managing committee of the minority school and the Board 
has no further power to interfere with the right of the managing committee of a 
minority school. This provision was simply aimed to ensure that only qualified 
teachers are appointed in the school and not to interfere with the right of the 
management of minority educational institution to appoint teachers. 
In another case a legal provision requiring the selection of the teachers of all 
affiliated colleges including those established by the minorities to be made by the 
University Service Commission was held to interfere with the rights of the 
petitioners.^' Similarly a rule conferred on the University Syndicate the power to 
veto the selection of the principal or other teachers made by a college was held 
non-applicable to minority institutions.''^ In this case subsections (1), (2) and (3) of 
section 53 of the Kerala University Act, 1969, sought to regulate the appointment 
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of principal in private colleges was challenged. It provided that appointment to 
such post would be made by the managing body from among the teachers of the 
college, an outsider being appointed only if there was no suitable person in the 
college. It further provided that the appointment would be made subject to 
approval of the Syndicate. The Supreme Court found such provisions as violative 
of Art.30 (1). The Court used the following words to express its attitude: 
"Administration means management of the affairs of the institution. This 
management must be free of control so that the founders or their nominees can 
mould the institution as they think fit and in accordance with their ideas of how 
the interests of the community in general and the institution in particular will be 
best served. No part of this management can be taken away and vested in another 
body without an encroachment upon the guaranteed righf." 
The board of management of a school established and managed by the Jesuits 
appointed a junior teacher, a Jesuit, as the Head Master of the school in preference 
to the senior-most teacher who was not a Jesuit. The director of Education 
reversed the appointment and upheld the claim of the senior teacher. This decision 
of the Director of Education was challenged in the High Court by the management 
as violative of Article 30(1) of the constitution. The Court quashed the Director's 
order and upheld the appointment made by the management saying that the post of 
the head Master in a school is of pivotal importance and the right to select him is 
the most important facet of the right to administer the school and this right of the 
management could not be restricted except to the extent of prescribing requisite 
qualifications and experience for the post. A rule requiring that the senior-most 
teacher must be promoted to the Head Master's post cannot be binding on 
minority schools. 
The courts have consistently insisted that the management of a minority 
institution is entitled to select a person of its choice for such a post subject to 
qualification and experience as may be prescribed. In A.M. Patroni v. Asstt. 
166 
Education Officer^ Rules 44 and 45 of the Kerala Education Rules were 
challenged as violation of right guaranteed under Art.30 (1). Rule 44 provided that 
ordinarily a headmaster must be appointed by promotion of the senior most 
teachers and Rule 45 was an exception to that in the case of upper primary 
schools. In order that exception could apply, the teacher who was sought to be 
appointed as the headmaster must be a graduate with at least five years teaching 
experience and must have put in service equal to one-third of the service put in by 
the senior most teachers. The Court observed that even if an institution was 
protected under Art.30 (1), the state could make laws regulating the appointment 
of teachers in the interest of the institution. It, however, insisted that the regulation 
must be limited to the qualifications that a teacher must possess and to the 
experience which he should have.... Rules 44 and 45 do not relate to these two 
requirements.^^ 
In the Mother Provincial'^ case, namely, that there could be no objection to 
the appointment of the principal or any other member of the staff being subject to 
the approval by some authority of the University so long as disapproval could be 
only on the ground that the person had not the requisite qualification, and that if 
the disapproval was not only to be on some stated grounds but was to be left 
entirely to the will and pleasure of the appointing authority, that would be to 
deprive the educational institution of its power of appointment and would offend 
Art.30 (I). Proceeding on the assumption that the choice of the minority in matters 
of selection and appointment of teachers should be unfettered, the High Court 
found Section 57 (2) to be a permissible regulation. Section 57(2) required the 
appointments of principals to be made by promotion from among the teachers of 
the college or by direct recruitment. 
In Benedict Mar Gregorios v. State of Kerala J^ a full bench of the Court gave 
a qualified approval to section 2(27) read with Section 57(9), saying: 
167 
...we would pass Section 2(27) read with Section 57(9) of the Act subject to 
the limitation that the University is bound to grant approval once a teacher 
appointed is found to possess the requisite qualifications prescribed for 
appointment and that any arbitrary or unwarranted refusal or approval to an 
appointment would violate the provisions of Article 30(1).™ 
The Supreme Court in Board of Secondary Education & Teachers Training v. 
Jt. Director of Public Instruction has again upheld the right of the management of 
a minority institution to appoint the Headmaster of its choice.^'' The court was of 
the view that "the management's right to choose a qualified person as the 
Headmaster of the school is well insulated by the protective cover of Article 30 (1) 
of the Constitution and it cannot be cheseled out through any legislative act or 
executive rule except for fixing up the qualifications and conditions of service for 
the post; and that any such statutory or executive feat would be violative of the 
fundamental right enshrined in Article 30(1) and would therefore be void." This 
Court further observed that if the management of the school is not given the wide 
freedom to choose the person for holding the key-post of Principal subject, of 
course, to the restriction regarding qualifications to be prescribed by the State, the 
right to administer the School would get much diminished. 
The Madhya Pradesh High Court in Islamia Karimia Society v. Devi 
Vishwavidyalaya^^ held that the impugned statue framed under the Indore 
University Act, 1963, to provide that the Kulpati or his nominee should be the 
Chairmen of the Selection Committee for non-government educational 
institutions, was repugnant to Article 30 as construed in St. Xaviers. The High 
Court, however, upheld the other provisions of the impugned statute providing that 
a nominee of the management of the college, the principal of the college and two 
experts nominated by the Kulpati should be the other members of the Selection 
Committee. Following a number of Supreme Court cases, it pointed out the 
nomination of experts by the Kulpati for the Selection of teachers was conducive 
to the maintenance of high standards of education. 
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An interesting case relating to the appointment of head of a college is the 
M.M. John case^^ in which sub-sections (1) to (3) of Section 53 of the Kerala 
University Act, 1969 in other amended from amended after they were declared 
ultra virus of Article 30 (1) by the Supreme Court in the Mother Provincial case, 
came up for review before the Kerala High Court. The amended sub-section (1) 
provided that principals of private colleges shall possesses such qualifications as 
may be prescribed by regulations. Sub-section (2) read as follows: 
"A vacancy in the post of principal shall be filled up by the educational 
agency or the corporate management, as the case may be, by the appointment of a 
person possessing the prescribed qualifications, from among the teachers of the 
colleges, as the case may be. If no such person is available, the educational agency 
or corporate management as the case may be shall recruit a qualified person after 
due advertisement as may be specified in the statutes." 
While striking down the amended sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of section 53, 
the Court observed that in the guise of prescribing qualifications by regulations, by 
providing that a vacancy in the post of principal shall be filled up by appointment 
of a person possessing the prescribed qualification from among the teachers of the 
college was the obstruction to the right of the management to choose the best 
person for the post of principal. 
In Rev. Br. A Thomas v. Inspector ofSchools^\ the Madras high Court found 
it to be an unreasonable interference to tell the minority insthution that it could not 
employ a more highly qualified teacher in the interest of better standards of 
education. The Court admitted that the Government was competent to prescribe 
the minimum qualifications, but beyond that the exercise of any control over the 
power of appointment of a minority institution would amount to an uncalled for 
restriction not permitted by Art.30 (1). 
In the most recent case T.M.A.Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka^'^ the 
Supreme Court held that "In such professional unaided institutions, the 
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Management will have the right to select teachers as per the qualifications and 
eligibility conditions laid down by the State/ University subject to adoption of a 
rational procedure of selection" 
A review of the above decisions would show that consistency in judicial 
approach is hardly anywhere more solidly founded that on the question of scope of 
autonomy enjoyable by minority institutions in matter that pertain to selection of 
staff The courts seem to be unwilling to concede any other power to the State than 
a power to prescribe minimum qualification for persons to be appointed by such 
institutions. They are unwilling to accept even such a condition which requires 
that a principal should be appointed from among the existing teachers of the 
institution. Nor are they willing to allow even one person from outside to sit on the 
selection committee for appointment of personnel of the institution. Thus, between 
the right of minorities to choose teachers and other staff of their own choice and 
the claim of the State to regulate such appointments so as to maintain academic 
standards the formula that the courts have evolved is that the State can prescribe 
professional qualifications and experience and the minority institutions are left 
with the freedom to choose personnel.^ ^ 
The lone exception, if it can be regarded so, to the general rule of 'non-
interference' which the courts have jealously guarded in the past, was the view 
expressed by S.R. Das C.J. in re Kerala Education Bilf^ on clause 11 of the 
Kerala Education Bill, 1957. That clause empowered the State Public Service 
Commission to select candidates for appointment as teachers in aided institution. 
Strong objections were made to this clause on the ground that minority institution 
could not appoint a teacher at all except out of a penal to be prepared by the Public 
Service commission, which apart from taking up such duties, could not be 
qualified at all to select teachers who would be acceptable to religious minorities. 
Referring to Clause 11 (along with CI. 12, conditions of service of teachers) 
Das C.J. observed: These are, no doubt, serious inroads on the right of 
[70 
administration and appear perilously near violating that right. But considering that, 
those provisions are applicable to all educational institutions and that the 
impugned parts of els. 9, 11 and 12 are designed to give protection and security to 
the ill paid teachers who are engaged in rendering service to the nation and protect 
the backward classes, we are prepared, as at present advised, to treat these clauses 
9, ] 1(2) and 12(4) as permissible regulations which the State may impose on the 
minorities as a condition for granting aid to their educational institutions.^^ The 
Supreme Court, however, in subsequent cases found such provisions to be 
violative Art.30 (1). In fact in an unbroken line of decisions the courts have 
disallowed every attempt to interfere with minority's choice in matters of selection 
and appointment. 
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CHAPTER - V 
REGULATORY MEASURES 
5.1 General Principles 
The fundamental right of the minorities under Art. 30(1) of the Constitution, 
though couched in absolute terms, is subject to regulatory power of the State. The 
decisions on the scope and applicability of Art.30 (1) seem to have long settled 
that as no right can be absolute, Art.30, being no exception, cannot have its 
operation as an unbridled license, and can have its effectiveness only within 
specified limits. However, the extent to which the State can regulate the affairs of 
the minority educational institutions is a controversial issue. The judiciary has 
consistently recognized that reasonable restrictions can be imposed in the interest 
of the minority educational institutions. 
The courts in general have admitted a very broad interpretation for the word 
"choice" occurring in Art.30 (1). This choice includes, as they have held, a 
number of 'rights' such as to get recognition and affiliation, in some situations to 
receive financial aid from the State, to select medium of instruction, to select staff, 
and the to determine the kind and character of the institution etc. Though none of 
these rights is expressly made available to minorities, yet they are recognized by 
the courts as essential for a meaningful exercise of the principle right- the right to 
establish and administer educational institutions. The courts, however, have also 
expressed and reiterated that 'standards' of education are not part of the right to 
establish and administer and as such can be regulated. 
The Courts have recognized and emphasized that regulations can be imposed 
in all such matters that go to ensure excellence of the institutions, and have left 
enough room for regulatory authorities to prevent deterioration in standards.' The 
courts have done so despite the fact that no where under Art. 30 (1) such 
regulation is stipulated. Regulations may be made either by legislation or by 
executive order. Such regulation are permissible only in so far as they do not 
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restrict the right of administration of the minority community but facilitate and 
ensure better and more effective exercise of that right for the benefit of the 
institutions.^ Regulations should not be in such a manner that offends the very 
sprit of Art.30(l). 
In Sidhrajbhai v. State of Gujarat^ the government of Gujarat had issued an 
order requiring the private teacher's training Colleges to reserve eighty percent of 
the seats in training Colleges for the government deputed candidates. The Supreme 
Court struck down the order on the ground that though the order satisfied the test 
of public interest, i.e. increasing the number of trained teachers in state institution, 
it did not satisfy the other test, i.e. the regulation must be of educational character 
in the interest of minority. The court observed: 
"The right is intended to be effective and is not to be whittled down by so 
called regulative measures conceived in the interest not of the minority 
educational institution, but of the public or the nation as a whole. Regulations 
which may lawfully be imposed either by legislative or executive action must 
satisfy a dual test the test of reasonableness, and the test that it is regulative of the 
educational character of the institution and is conducive to making the institution 
an effective vehicle of education for the minority community or other persons who 
resort to it." Shah J., representing the Court laid down a test for determining the 
validity of a regulatory measure. He stated that the right of the state to regulate 
must satisfy a dual test: that the regulation must be reasonable; and regulation is of 
educational character of the institution and is conducive to making the institution 
an effective vehicle of education. 
The Supreme Court also specified the possible 'subjects' of regulations: 
regulations made in true interests of efficiency of institution, discipline, health, 
sanitation, morality, and public order etc. The court stated that such regulations are 
not restrictions on the substance of the right which is guaranteed, they in fact 
secure the proper functioning of the institutions in educational matters. 
In the Mother Provincial case^ the Supreme Court, while referring to the 
Sidhrajbhai case and tending to follow the line the latter had drawn, came out 
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more frankly on the question, how much of the right to administer was 
unassailable as a being constitutionally protected and what part of it could be 
regulated through constitutionally permissible measures. Hidayatullah C.L 
observed that administration means 'management of the affairs' of the institution 
and this management must be free of control so that the founders or their nominees 
can mould the institution as they think fit, and in accordance with their ideas of 
how the interests of the community in general and the institution in particular will 
be best served. He noted that no part of this management can be taken away.^  
To this general rule of non-interference, the learned Chief Justice admitted the 
following exception: "There is, however, an exception to this and it is that the 
standards of education are not a part of management as such. These standards 
concern the body politic and are dictated by considerations of the advancement of 
the country and its people. Therefore, if universities establish the syllabi for 
examinations they must be followed, subject however to special subjects which 
institutions may seek to teach, and to a certain extent the State may also regulate 
the conditions of employment of teachers and the health and hygiene of students. 
Such regulations do not bear directly upon management as such although they may 
indirectly affect it. Yet the right of the State to regulate education, educational 
standards and allied matters cannot be denied. The minority institutions cannot be 
allowed to fall below the standards of excellence expected of educational 
institutions, or under the guise of exclusive right of management, to decline to 
follow the general pattern. While the management must be left to them, they may 
be compelled to keep in step with others."^ 
In St. Xaviers College' case Roy C.J. viewed that the government can regulate 
course of the study, qualifications and appointments of teachers, conditions of 
employment of teachers, health and hygiene of students, facilities for libraries and 
laboratories. He also talked about the need of such measures as would bring about 
uniformity, efficiency and excellence in educational matters. He emphasized that 
such measures would help orderly, efficient and sound administration. Mathew J. 
accepted the position that minority institutions are subject to the general laws of 
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the land but insisted that no regulation can be permissible which is not calculated 
to subserve the interest of the institution itself. 
The Faiz-e-Am College^ decision gave a narrower construction than the all 
earlier decisions of the court on the question of the scope of the regulation. 
Krishna layer J. speaking for the majority noted: "All the learned Judges who are 
party to St. Xaviers... And all the earlier ruling has negative the untouchable 
absoluteness urged by the managements. Equally fallacious is the simplistic 
submission that Art. 30 are disturbed only when the right is destroyed, not when it 
is damaged. St. Xaviers has dispelled doubts in this behalf: abridgement of the 
constitutional right is as obnoxious as annihilation. To cripple is to kiil.^ He opined 
that regulation which restricts is bad; but regulation which facilitates is good. To 
draw the delicate line between what is permissible and which is not learned Judge 
observed: 
"A benignly regulated liberty which neither abridges nor exaggerates 
autonomy but promotes better performance is the right construction of the 
constitutional provision. Such an approach enables the fundamental right 
meaningfully to fulfill its tryst with the minorities' destiny in a plural policy. He 
said that to regulate, be it noted, is not to restrict, but to facilitate effective exercise 
of the very right. The constitutional estate of the minorities should not be 
encroached upon neither allowed to be neglected nor mal-administered."'° 
The Mark Netto^^ and Lily Kurian^^ cases have only added to the validity of 
the test. In Mark Netto case, the Supreme Court did not allow a restriction on a 
minority institution even as the restriction was supposedly made in the interest of 
another minority institution. The consideration that conditioned the decision in this 
case was thus none else than what the test in the Sidhrajbhai case required. In Lilly 
Kurian case, the Supreme Court quoted the Sidhrajbhai test with affirmation, and 
used words which only help keep the test alive as a living force: "Protection of the 
minorities is an article of faith . . . and the interference cannot be justified by 
pleading the interests of the general public; the interest justifying interference can 
only be the interests of the minority concerned".'^ What the above observation 
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insists upon is that 'public interest' cannot be a test for judging the 
constitutionality of a regulation. 
The D.A. V.College''^ decision, by declaring an order unconstitutional which 
sought to impose Punjabi as the medium of instruction on a minority institution 
which was not the language of the minority itself, did nothing but to reject the 
'public interest' test. For, Punjabi being the language of the majority of inhabitants 
in Punjab, imposition of Punjabi as the language of instruction was nothing but a 
regulation, the object of which was to serve 'public interest'. 
Regulatory conditions for recognition, affiliation or aid may be held 
permissible, and yet they may not have been designed to make the minority 
institution as an excellent vehicle of education but for the sole purpose of 
maintaining 'uniformity' in standards- which is nothing else than a regulation in 
the public interest. All this apart, considerations, forjudging whether a regulation 
seeks to sub serve the interest of the institution itself, may vary from case to case 
and from judge to judge. Krishna Iyer and Gupta JJ., who formed the majority, in 
Gandhi Faiz-e-Am College case broke away from the line of decisions so well 
established till 1975, by allowing a regulation which imposed two persons from 
outside of the managing body of the minority institution against its will, and yet 
emphasized that the regulation was in the interest of the minority institution itself 
Only a year earlier, in the St. Xavier 's College case, a majority of seven judges had 
taken the position that the composition of a managing body could not be disturbed 
by inducting outsiders into it.'^  
In Bihar S.M.E. Board v. M.H.A. College^^ the respondents had challenged the 
constitutional validity of Section 7(2) on Bihar State Madarsa Education Board 
Act, 1982 as violative of Art.30 (1) of Constitution as it interfered with their right 
of management of institutions. The Act provided for the constitution of an 
autonomous Board, for development and supervision of Madarasa Education in 
the State of Bihar. The Act confers power on the Board to provide the constitution 
and dissolution of Management Committee of Madarasa. The Court held that 
Section 7 (2) (n) of the Act which provided for dissolution of Managing 
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Committee of a Madarasa was violative of Art.30 (1) of the Constitution. The 
State has, under the guise of its regulatory power, no power to completely take 
over the management of a minority institution. 
S.B. Sinha J in Islamic Academy^'' held that Article30 (1) of the Constitution 
does not confer an absolute right. The exercise of such right is subject to 
permissible state regulations with an eye on preventing mal-administration. Brodly 
stated there are "permissible regulations" and "impermissible regulations."'^ 
Some of the permissible regulations/restrictions governing enjoyment of 
Art.30 (1) of the Constitution are: 
(i) Guidelines for the efficiency and excellence of educational standards.'^ 
(ii) Regulation ensuring the security of the services of the teachers or other 
employees, 
(iii) Introduction of an outside authority or controlling voice in the matter of 
service conditions of employees.^" 
(iv) Framing Rules and Regulations governing the conditions of service of 
teachers and employees and their pay and allowances.^' 
(v) Appointing a high official with authority and guidance to oversee that Rules 
regarding conditions of service are not violated, but, however such an 
authority should not be given blanket, uncanalised and arbitrary powers. '^ ^ 
(vi) Prescribing courses of study or syllabi or the nature of books, 
(vii) Regulations in the interest of efficiency of instruction, discipline, health 
sanitation, morality, public order and the like. 
In P.A. Inamdar v/s State of Maharashtra,^^ the court observed that once an 
educational institution is granted aid or aspires for recognition, the State may grant 
aid or recognition accompanied by certain restrictions or conditions which must be 
followed as essential to the grant of such aid or recognition. Merely because an 
educational institution belongs to minority it cannot ask for aid or recognition 
though running in unhealthy surroundings, without any competent teachers and 
which does not maintain even a fair standard of teaching or which teaches matters 
subversive to the welfare of the scholars. Therefore, the State may prescribe 
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reasonable regulations to ensure the excellence of the educational institutions to be 
granted aid or to be recognized. However, in the name of laying down conditions 
for aid or recognition the State cannot directly or indirectly defeat the very 
protection conferred by Article 30(1) on the minority to establish and administer 
educational institutions. S.B. Sinha, J. in his opinion in Islamic Academy^^ held 
that the considerations for granting recognition to a minority educational 
institution and casting accompanying regulation would be similar as applicable to 
a non-minority institution subject to two overriding considerations: (i) the 
recognition is not denied solely on the ground of the educational institution being 
one belonging to minority, and (ii) the regulation is neither aimed at nor has the 
effect of depriving the institution of its minority status." 
An analysis of decided cases shows that the extent of regulatory power of the 
state has always been subject matter of controversy because the nature of 
regulation differs from one case to another and no general standard test can be laid 
down for determining the extant of states power to regulate educational 
institutions of the minorities. Any generalization cannot be exhaustive because 
there is no similarity of issues that come before the court.^ ^ However, what seems 
to be well established that a regulatory measure must be reasonable and must also 
be regulative of the educational character of the institution as a minority institution 
and must be conducive to making the institution as an effective vehicle of 
education. A regulation in order to be valid must not interfere with autonomy and 
independence in matters of management and it must not deprive the institution of 
its minority character. The interest of the minority and not the public interest or 
national interest should be crucial in determining the constitutionality of a 
regulation. 
5.2 Affiliation and Recognition 
Recognition and affiliation are very powerful instruments in the hands of 
State or University to control minority educational institutions. When a minority 
institution seeks recognition from the State, it expresses it choice to participate in 
the system of general education and expresses its intention to adopt for itself the 
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courses of instruction prescribed for other institutions. Recognition is a facility 
which the State grants to an educational institution for enabling the students in 
such institution to sit for an examination certificates to degrees. The student of an 
unrecognized educational institution cannot obtain the recognized certificates or 
degrees, cannot be eligible for higher education and, in the existing system where 
jobs are generally linked with educational degrees, cannot be eligible for entering 
the public services. And affiliation to a university is sought to enable the students 
of minority educational institutions to sit for examination conducted by a 
university. Minorities have thus an interest in recognition and affiliation of their 
institutions as without this their educational institutions cannot fulfill the real 
objects of their 'choice' and cannot effectively exercise the rights available to 
them under Art.30 (1). 
But if recognition and affiliation create an interest in minorities, these also 
create an interest in the recognizing or affiliating authorities, the interest being that 
the institutions seeking recognition or affiliation satisfy conditions set by them for 
according recognition or affiliation. But as the conditions set by them of, 
alternatively, in the absence of existence of any such conditions, the option 
otherwise open to minority institutions, are not always such as to enable them to 
effectively exercise their rights under Art.30 (1). Conflicts do arise and have often 
been brought up before the courts for their solutions.^^ 
Question concerning giving of grants, according affiliation or recognition, to 
educational institutions run by the minorities have often been raised before the 
courts. Such questions are of great significance to these institutions. An 
educational institution cannot possibly hope to survive today without government 
grants, nor can it confer degrees without affiliation to a university. Although 
minorities establish institutions with a view to educate their language in an 
atmosphere congenial to the conservation of their language or culture, yet that is 
not their only aim. They also desire that their students are well equipped for usefial 
careers in life. The students of unrecognized institution can neither get admission 
in institutions of higher learning nor can they enter service. By its interpretative 
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process over the years, the Supreme Court has given a wide sweep to the 
protection conferred on minority educational institution by ArticieSO (1). 
Observing on the object of affiliation, Hidayatullah, C.J., in State of Kerala 
V. Very Rey Mother Provincial, pointed out that affiliation is regulating 
educational character and content of the minority institution. The affiliated 
institutions agree to follow the uniform courses of study. Affiliation of minority 
institution ensures the growth and excellence of their children and other student in 
the academic field. The regulatory measures for affiliation are to ensure 
uniformity, efficiency, and excellence in the educational courses and do not violet 
any fundament right of the minority institution guaranteed under Article 30. 
In the ''Managing Board of the Milli Talimi Mission, Bihar, Ranchi and 
others v. the State of Bihar andothers^^, S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, A. Varadarajan and 
Sabyasachi Mukharji. J. J., were of the opinion that affiliation cannot be refused to 
a minority educational institution "on purely illusory grounds". Their Lordship 
were of the opinion that, "Thus the position is that the State has refused to grant 
affiliation on purely illusory grounds which do not exist and failed to consider the 
recommendation of the Education Commissioner which was made after full 
inspection for grant of affiliation. In other words the affiliation was refused 
without giving any sufficient reason and such a refusal contravenes the provisions 
of Article 30 of the Constitution. Where this court should step into strike down the 
Government action which is violafive of Article 30 of the Constitution..."^^ There 
also cannot be a "mechanical rejection without proper application of mind"^° of an 
application for recognition/ affiliation made by a minority educational institution. 
The consistent view of the Supreme Court has been that there is no 
fundamental right of a minority institution to affiliation or recognition. But the 
judiciary has also recognized that for a real and meaningful exercise of the right by 
the minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice, 
recognition by the state or affiliation to a university is a must. In the absence of it 
the educational institutions would be robbed of their utility as the students of their 
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institutions could not be trained for University degrees or compete for government 
jobs. 
However, the educational institutions established by the minorities cannot 
compel the State to recognize them if they fail to follow the statutory measures 
regulating educational standards and efficiency, the prescribed courses of study 
and instructions, the principles regarding the qualifications for the entry of 
students into educational institutions etc. Nor can the State discriminate against the 
minority institutions, or can provide by law for on such terms which would result 
in the abridgement or surrender of their fundamental rights.^' 
The question which often arises for consideration is whether right to 
recognition or affiliation is a part of the right guaranteed under Article 30(1). 
Consistency injudicial approach seems to be quite well pronounced in this regard. 
The courts have held that recognition or affiliation is not a fundamental right. 
However, it has been observed that recognition or affiliation cannot be granted or 
refused on conditions which have the effect to deprive minorities of their rights 
under Article 30(1). The analysis of the cases will show that the Courts are 
conscious that in the absence of such right the establishment of a minority 
institution is not only ineffective but also unreal for the purpose of conferment of 
degrees on students. 
In Kerala Education Bill^\ Das C.J. speaking for the observed: "There is no 
doubt, no such thing as fundamental right to recognition by the state but to deny 
recognition the educational institutions except upon terms tantamount to the 
surrender of their constitutional right of administration of educational institutions 
of their choice is in truth and in effective to deprive them of their rights under 
Article 30 (1)." He further noted: "Without recognition, therefore the educational 
institution established or to be established by the minority communities cannot 
fulfill the real objects of their choice and the rights under Article 30(1) cannot be 
effectively exercised.""'"' In another case,^ "* Ray C.J. speaking on behalf of himself 
and Palikar J. used the following words: "The consistent view of this court has 
been that there is no fundamental right of minority institution to affiliation . . . Any 
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law which provides for affiliation on terms which will involve abridgement of the 
right of linguistic and religious minorities to administer and establish educational 
institutions of their choice will offend Art.30 (1)." 
The requisites to get affiliation and grant in aid are related to such matter as 
syllabi, curriculum, courses, minimum qualifications of teachers, their age of 
superannuation, literary, condition concerning sanitary, health and hygiene of 
students etc. The underlying purpose of such condition is to promote educational 
standards and uniformity and help the institutions concerned achieve efficiency 
and excellence and are imposed not only in the interest of general secular 
education but also are conducive to the improvement of minority institutions 
themselves. Regulatory measures are necessary to maintain the educational 
character and content of minority institutions.^^ 
Decision of the Supreme Court in D.A. V. College Bhatinda v. State of 
Punjab,^^ where the question for decision was whether the Pujabi University could 
compulsorily affiliate minority institutions and prescribe for them a language as 
the exclusive medium of instruction and examination which was not their own, 
provided the answer in the negative. The Supreme Court advised the State, in no 
ambiguous terms, to harmonies its power to prescribe the medium of instruction 
with the rights of minority institution by either providing also for instrucfion in the 
media of minorities or if there are other Universities which allow such Colleges to 
be affiliated where the medium of instruction is that which is adopted by the 
minority institutions, to allow them the choice to be affiliated with them. 
Realising perhaps that such Universities might not be available within that 
particular State, the Supreme Court itself suggested the option: "When the country 
has been recognized and formed into linguistic States, it may be the natural 
outcome of the policy to allow colleges established by linguistic and religious 
minorities giving instruction in the medium of language adopted by the 
Universities in other states to affiliate them ..."''^ These observations suggest that 
no compulsory affiliation can be insisted upon which offend the rights guaranteed 
under Art.30 (1) if, as the Court held, compulsory affiliafion is bad, it would, of 
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necessity, leave the minorities free to have their institutions affiliated to a 
University in some other State. This obviously presupposes that minorities have a 
'right' to get recognition or affiliation where it is possible. 
Sidhrajbhai v. State of Bombay"^ provided an opportunity to the Supreme 
Court to determine the question whether threats of withdrawal of recognition 
already given to an institution could be used to compel a minority educational 
institution to admit nominees of Government into It. In this case the petitioners 
were Christian religious minority. The society of which they were members 
maintained several educational institutions, including a training College for 
training teachers to be observed in the primary schools conducted by the society. 
In 1955 the Government of Bombay issued an order saying that in non-
Govemment training colleges, 80% seats would be reserved for teachers 
nominated by the Government. When the said training Colleges expressed its 
inability to comply with the order, the Educational Inspector directed the College 
not to admit private candidates without obtaining specific permission, failing 
which severe disciplinary action, such as withdrawal of recognition, would be 
taken. 
Shah J., speaking for the court, noted that right of the minority college to 
admit students of its choice was severely restricted and the enforcement of 
restriction was sought to be secured by holding out a threat to withdraw 
recognition. He observed that serious inroads were made upon the right vested in 
the society to administer the training college. He stated that the right under Article 
30 cannot be whittled down by so called regulative measures. He held that 
regulations which may lawfully be imposed either by legislative or executive 
action as a condition of recognition must be directed to making the institution 
while retaining its character as a minority institution effective as an educational 
institution.^^ These observations were made when he had already admitted that: 
Regulations made in the true interest of efficiency of instructions, discipline, 
health, sanitation, morality public order and the like may undoubtedly be imposed. 
Such regulations are not restrictions....; they secure the proper functioning of the 
institution, in matters educational. 
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Socio-Literati Advancement Society v. State of Karnataka"' is a typical 
example of refusal to recognize a minority institution. The petitioner-society was 
an association formed by Malayalam speaking people of Karnataka, a linguistic 
minority. This society submitted an application to the Additional Director of 
Education on 25.6 1978 for according recognition to its Teachers Training 
institute. It undertook to adhere to the standards prescribed by the Department of 
Education and to abide by all the rules prescribed for teacher training schools. It 
was asserted that the Additional Director of Education was convinced of the desire 
and needs of the Society and said that it was competent to start the Institute. On 
his verbal assurance that the necessary recognition would be given, the Society 
started the classes from 1.7.1978. On 25.7.1978, the Department issued a 
notification stating that no recognition was accorded to the institute. The Society 
stated that a representation hade been made on 24.7.1978 reiterating its request for 
recognition which it had earlier made. By a letter of 24.7.1978, the Additional 
Director intimated that there were more number of Training institutes in the State 
than required and that the policy of the Government, was not to permit any more 
training institutes. The Society took the plea that even on 31.8.1978 recognition 
was accorded to one Venkatesha Education Society to start a teacher training 
institute. It contented that the refusal of recognition was on irrelevant and non-
existent grounds. On behalf of the State it was contended that the State has the 
power to decide whether there is a need to establish a particular institution and the 
recognition was refused in order to prevent unhealthy competition amongst the 
various teachers training institutes. 
The Karnataka High Court held as unconstitutional Rule 7 of the Uniform 
Grant-in-Aid Code which laid down the procedure for starting and recognition of 
teachers training institutions. Chandra Kantharaj Urs J. observed that since 
recognition was accorded to another training institute in the very same year in 
which the petitioner-Society applied for recognition, this not only amounted to 
unequal treatment but also showed that no such policy as contented by the State in 
fact existed.'*^ The Court declared Rule 7 as a mere formality where such 
institutions are concerned and the rule has to be read down to yield place to 
constitutional guarantee. It held: "As already noticed in the decided cases of the 
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Supreme Court even reasonable restriction cannot be imposed on a minority 
institution except to the extant of maintaining general educational standards, 
health and hygiene of the students, much less deny them the right to start the 
school and the institution itself"''^ 
In St. John's Teachers Training Institute v. State of Tamil Nadu^'^ the 
appellant challenged the validity of the recognition rules made by the Government 
under the T.N. Minority Schools (Recognition and Payments of Grants) Rules, 
1977 as amended by the Order of 1991 on the ground that they were violative of 
Articles 30(1) and 14 of the Constitution. They were running Teachers Training 
Institution in the State of Tamil Nadu. The Government had refused to recognize 
these institutes on the ground that they had failed to satisfy the conditions for grant 
of recognition as provided in the Government order. The Recognition Rules 
provided for the extent of land sizes of classrooms, cost of library with 10,000 
books, number of bathrooms furniture and laboratory equipments, teaching 
appliances, sports, games, music equipments, play grounds, minimum 
qualifications for teaching and non-teaching staffs, hostel, staff quarters etc. The 
High Court reviewed the whole case law on the point and dismissed the writ 
petition holding that these conditions were regulatory in nature and framed with a 
view to promoting excellence of educational standard and ensuring security of the 
service of teachers and other employees of the institutions. The minority 
institutions must be fully equipped with educational excellence to keep in step 
with other institutions. The Supreme Court agreed with the reasoning and 
conclusions of the High Court and dismissed the special leave petition. 
In P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra,'^^ the Supreme Court held that 
Affiliation or recognition by the State or the Board or the university competent to 
do so, cannot be denied solely on the ground that the institution is a minority 
educational institution. However, the urge or need for affiliation or recognition 
brings in the concept of regulation by way of laying down conditions consistent 
with the requirement of ensuring merit, excellence of education and preventing 
maladministration. For example, provisions can be made indicating the quality of 
the teachers by prescribing the minimum qualifications that they must possess and 
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the courses of studies and curricula. The existence of infrastructure sufficient for 
its growth can be stipulated as a prerequisite to the grant of recognition or 
affiliation. However, there cannot be interference in the day-to-day administration. 
The essential ingredients of the management, including admission of students, 
recruiting of staff and the quantum of fee to be charged, cannot be regulated.""^^ 
Thus, the above analysis shows that although right to recognition or 
affiliafion is not expressly recognized by Art.30 (1) the courts are conscious that in 
the absence of such a right the options otherwise open to minority institutions may 
not be such as to enable them to effectively exercise their right under Art.30 (1). 
The assumption has made them convinced that, in certain situation at least, 
without recognition or affiliation there can be no meaningful exercise of the right 
to establish and administer under Art.30, and that recognition or affiliation can be 
given only on conditions that do not render that Article illusory. They have also 
not failed to emphasise that what the State cannot achieve directly, cannot also 
achieve by employing indirect methods, which means that such regulatory 
conditions cannot be imposed as adversely affect the 'minority' character of the 
institution or, are made on consideration which are not conducive to the making of 
the institution as an efficient and excellent vehicle of education. However, what 
specific factors would exactly distinguish an unconstitutional restriction from a 
permissible regulation would depend upon the nature of the situation presented 
before the court.'*'' 
From this proposition it is very clear that the State or Board is competent 
enough to give affiliation or recognition to a minority institution. The board of the 
State has no power to deny the affiliation or recognition on the ground that the 
insfitution is solely and exclusively a minority institution. However, there must be 
some regulation for the betterment of the institution and maintaining the academic 
standard of the institution. It can be said there cannot be any interference by this 
authority in the day to day management of the institution. 
5.3 Disciplinary Control over Staff 
Minority institutions employ a large number of persons to perform 
institutional and other administrative duties. Maintenance of discipline, order, and 
excellence in academic standards depends to a very great extant upon a qualified, 
efficient and disciplined teaching and administrative staff. It thus apparently seems 
that minority institutions, like any other employer, have a right to select staff of 
their own choice and preference and to take action against them either to enforce 
an orderly conduct or to enforce the terms of the contract of service. This right 
involves prescribing qualifications for appointment of staff, prescribing the 
manner of their selection, laying down the conditions of service, enforcing 
discipline among them, compelling performance of dufies and taking acfion 
against those found recalcitrant. 
On the other hand, the exercise of these rights involves very valuable rights 
that must belong to teachers and members of non-teaching staff. Assurance of 
reasonable conditions of service and security of job are important in any system of 
employment and ensure to a very great extant efficiency of service. It is too 
obvious to be noted that if the service conditions are good and a fair procedure is 
followed in the matter of disciplinary action, this must necessary result in security 
of tenure, attract competent and qualified staff and must ultimately improve the 
excellence and efficiency of the educational institutions. To prevent abuse of 
power by the managements of minority institutions it seems therefore, necessary 
that the State must have some kind of regulatory power so as to safeguard the 
interests of those employed in such institutions and to ultimately maintain a 
minimum level in academic standards. 
In re Kerala Education Bilf^ provided the first opportunity to the Supreme 
Court to express its view over the right of minority institutions to take disciplinary 
action against their staff. The Court was called upon to express its opinion on the 
constitutional propriety of the enactment by the Kerala legislature of Clauses 12(4) 
which provided that "no teacher in aided schools be dismissed, removed, reduced 
in rank of suspended by the manager without the previous sanction of the 
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authorized officer". S. R. Das CJ., speaking for the court, felt himself persuaded 
by considerations of expediency to allow clause 12(4) as permissible. However, 
the learned judge also held that power of dismissal, removal reduction in rank or 
suspension is an index of the right of management and that is taken away by CI. 12 
(4).^° 
In Mother Provinciaf^ the validity of section 56(2) and (4) of the Kerala 
University Act, 1969 was challenged which provided that no teacher of private 
college would be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank by the governing body or 
managing council without the previous sanction of the Vice-Chancellor. It further 
provided that no such teacher would be placed under suspension for a continuous 
period exceeding fifteen days without such previous sanction. It was also provided 
that a teacher against whom disciplinary action was taken would have a right of 
appeal to the Syndicate and the Syndicate would have power to order 
reinstatement of the teacher in cases of wrongful removal or dismissal and to order 
such other remedial measure as deemed fit. Thus these clauses conferred ultimate 
powers on the University and the syndicate in disciplinary matters in respect of 
teachers. A constitution bench, speaking through HidayatuUah C.J. held these 
provisions as taking away the power of disciplinary action and as such not 
permitted by Art.30(l)." 
In St. Xavier's College v. State of Giijarat,^^ S. 51-A (I) (a) of the Gujrat 
University Act, 1949 was under question. The said provision provided that no 
member of teaching or non-teaching staff of an affiliated college shall be 
dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an enquiry in which he has 
been informed or the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of 
being heard and until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of making 
representation on any such penalty. Clause (b) of this section provided that no 
such penalty should be inflicted unless it is approved by the Vice-Chancellor or 
any other officer appointed by him. 
The Supreme Court found the provisions requiring the management to afford 
opportunity of hearing and representation as being merely 'regulatory', but took 
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serious note of the provision which conferred upon the Vice-Chancellor a power 
of approval of disciplinary action. Khanna J. shared the view with the majority 
that the power of approval was in the nature of a veto over disciplinary control by 
the educational institutions and was a blanket power; but added a little more: no 
guidelines are laid down and it is not provided that the approval is to be withheld 
only in case the dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or termination in service is 
mala fide or by way of victimization or other similar cause.^ ^ Mathew J., with 
whom Chandrachud J. Agreed, allowed the provision which required the 
management to follow a procedure before an action could be taken against a 
teacher but held as unconditional the provisions which required approval of the 
action by an outside agency. The learned Judge found the genesis of the power of 
disciplinary control on the basis of the relationship between the management and 
its staff.^ ^ Thus the court sought to strike a balance between the claim of the 
minority institution to exercise disciplinary control over its staff and the right of 
the State to regulate such control so as to minimize the chances of its abuse. 
Lilly Kurian v. St. Levina^^ raised a somewhat different kind of problem 
before the Supreme Court. The facts, as stated, were that one Smt. Lilly Kurian 
was appointed as Principal of the St. Joseph's Training College for Women, 
Ernakulam in the year 1957. The Colleges belonged to the Roman Catholic 
Church, was affiliated to the University of Kerala, and was being managed by a 
Managing Board. On October 30, 1969, an incident took place between the 
principal, the appellant in this case, and a lecturer of the College. On a compliment 
by the latter, the Managing Board initiated disciplinary proceedings against the 
appellant and appointed an Enquiry Officer. The appellant took the stand that the 
Managing Board had no competence to initiate any disciplinary action and 
accordingly did not participate in the proceedings. The Enquiry Officer, in his 
report held the appellant guilty of misconduct. The Managing Board dismissed the 
appellant from service and directed her to hand over charge to one St. Levina. The 
appellant filed an appeal before the Vice-Chancellor of Kerala University. 
Against the order of dismissal, the vice-Chancellor by his order stayed the 
operation of the order of dismissal. Thereafter the Managing Board placed the 
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appellant under suspension pending enquiry for an alleged act of insubordination. 
The Vice-Chancellor by an order of October 19, 1970 held that the orders for 
dismissal and suspension were against the principles of natural justice and 
accordingly directed the Management to allow her to act as Principal. 
The High Court came to the conclusion that the Vice-Chancellor had no such 
power and the provision did not attract Art.30 (1)". Making appeal against this 
judgment before the Supreme Court, the appellant put forward strong arguments in 
favor of the plea that a provision of appeal against suspension or dismissal not hit 
Article 30(1). Testing Ordinance 33(4) against this principal, Sen J. held: 
"The conferral of a right of appeal to an outside authority like the Vice-
Chancellor under ordinance 33(4) takes away the disciplinary power of a minority 
educational authority. The Vice-Chancellor has the power to veto its disciplinary 
control. There is a clear interference with the disciplinary power of the minority 
institution. The state may 'regulate' the exercise of the right of administration but 
it has no power to impose any 'restriction' which is destructive of the right 
itself'.^ ^ 
St. Joseph's Training College v. University Appellate Tribunal^^ is another 
important decision of the Kerala High Court. The case is important for two 
reasons: First, it reviewed the whole corpus of decisional law, and had to even 
overrule its earlier full-bench decision in Benedict Mar Gregorios v. State of 
Kerala, second,^'' it lays down the proposition that even if an appellate power is 
vested in a quasi-judicial authority like an appellate tribunal, it might still suffer 
from the vice of interference with management's choice to exercise disciplinary 
control over its staff. 
Sub Section (7) of S. 60 of Kerala University Act of 1969 laid down that any 
teacher aggrieved by an order passed in any disciplinary proceedings could appeal 
to the Appellate Tribunal and the Tribunal could, after giving parties an 
opportunity of being heard, and after such further enquiry as might be necessary, 
pass such order as it deemed fit. Under S. 65 the government was given power to 
constitute for the purpose of the Act an Appellate Tribunal consisting of a judicial 
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officer below the rank of a District judge nominated by the Chancellor in 
consultation with the High Court. S. 61 provided that disputes between the 
management and a teacher of private colleges relating to conditions of service 
pending at the commencement of the Act were to be decided by the Tribunal. The 
question, therefore, before the Kerala High Court was whether Sections 60 (7) and 
61 were constitutionally valid in relation to educational institutions established and 
administered by religious minorities. 
The court found that S. 60 (7) conferred an unguided power upon the 
tribunal. No guidelines were laid down as to the grounds on which and 
circumstances in which the tribunal could interfere with an order passed by the 
management in a disciplinary proceeding. It also did not specify any limitation as 
to the nature of the orders against which appeal would lie. The court feh that the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal thus goes beyond that of scrutinizing whether the 
disciplinary proceeding has been conducted in conformity with the procedure laid 
down in sub-section (6) as well as the principles of natural justice, or it is an action 
taken malafide or vindictively as a measure of victimisation etc. The Appellate 
Tribunal is thus vested with a blanket power to interfere with every order passed 
by the management in disciplinary matters. Thus the disciplinary power over the 
teachers is effectively transferred from the management to the Appellate Tribunal, 
thereby substantially taking away the autonomy of the management in regard to a 
most vital facet of administration of the educational institution.^' 
in forming such a view the Court did not hesitate even to over-rule its earlier 
full bench decision in Benedict Mar Gregorios v. State of Kerala which had 
upheld a provision in S.57 (9) of the Kerala University Act of 1974 which required 
approval of appointments by the University and a provisions in S.57 (10) which 
provided for a right of appeal to the Appellate Tribunal by any person aggrieved 
by any appointment. 
An issue of identical nature arose before the Goa J.C.'s Court in Monte de 
Guirim Educational Society v. Union of India" The question before the Court was 
whether the Proviso the Rule 74(2) of the Goa, Daman and Diu Grant-in-Aid Code 
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was violative of Art.30 (1). Rule 74 (2) provided that the services of a permanent 
employee could be terminated by the Management without assigning any reason 
on giving compensation. It further provided that an employee whose services were 
intended to be terminated must be given 12 months' salary if he had been in 
services of the institution for 10 years or more, and 6 months' salary must be given 
to the employee of less than 10 years' service. The proviso said that no employee 
should be removed under this Rule without the prior approval of the Deputy 
Director of Education. 
The Court found that the conferral on the Deputy Director contained in the 
proviso was not only an encroachment on the minority institution's right to 
enforce discipline in its administrative affairs but was also an uncanalised and 
unguided power as no restrictions were placed on its exercise. It further pointed 
out that the grounds on which the Deputy Director could interfere with the 
administrative action taken under sub-rule (2) of Rule 74 by the minority 
institution were unchartered. The Court accordingly held that the power conferred 
upon the Deputy Director was inapplicable to minority institutions. 
In All Saints High School v. Govt. o/A.P.^'^ Section 3 to 7 of the Andhra 
Pradesh Recognized Private Educational Institutions Control Act, 1975 was the 
subject matter of dispute before a bench of three judges, Chandrachud C.J., 
Murtaza Fazal All J. and Kaliasam J. S. 3(1) of the Act required private 
educational institutions in Andhra Pradesh to obtain prior approval, from the 
competent authority, to any action intended to be taken against a teacher in the 
form of dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or any other kind of termination of 
service. S 3 (2) left it to the discretion of the competent authority to approve the 
proposal for action. By a majority of 2:1 the Supreme Court declared S.3 (1) and 
(2) as constitutionally inapplicable to minority institution. Chandrachud C.J. took 
the position that a power such as the one contained in S. 3 (1) and (2) requiring 
prior approval of the competent authority to an order of dismissal or removal etc. 
may not by itself be violative of Art.30 (1) if the object of such provision was to 
ensure compliance with the principle of natural justice. But he expressed his 
inability to read down S. 3 so as to limit its operation to these or similar 
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considerations. The further impediment with which the power under S. 3 suffered 
was that there were no rules framed by the government indicating the situations in 
which the power was to be exercised and that in participates the operation of the 
Section would limit to a certain class of cases only. 
Fazal AH J. took a more serious view of the Act as a whole and regarded 
some of its provisions as a 'thoughtless' interference with right of management of 
minority institutions. He declared S.3 (1) & (2) as inapplicable to minority 
institutions and assigned the following reasons: First, if the State wanted to 
regulate the conditions of service of teachers it should have taken care to make 
proper rules giving sufficient powers to the management specifying the manner in 
which it was to act, second, the induction of an outside authority over the head of 
the institution and making its decision final and binding on the institution was a 
blatant interference with the administrative autonomy of the institution. Third, 
while giving approval the competent authority was not required to ascertain the 
view of the governing body so as to know their view-point and the reasons why 
action had been taken against a particular teacher. Fourth, the competent authority 
was not given any guidelines for exercise of his discretion and the power in 
respect of approval of the action could be excercised on purely subjective 
satisfaction. The learned judge made it clear that they would not have the same 
objection had the power been a guided power and worded in a negative form: "So 
as to provide that the sanctioning authority was bound to give approval to any 
action taken by the institution against its teachers unless it was, after hearing the 
teacher and the management of the institution, satisfied that the order passed by 
the institution or the acfion taken by it was in violation of the principles of natural 
justice, against the statutory provision of law or tainted with factual or legal malice 
,, 65 
It may be taken as a judicial proposition that the conferment of a power of 
appeal or approval is not, by itself, unconstitutional, and that only such conferment 
is impermissible which allows a power of appeal and approval with an outside 
authority without any limitation or guidelines. But then, viewed from the point of 
view of minority institutions, even if a power is confined to cases of 
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'victimisation' or 'mala fide' or other 'similar cause' or non-compliance of 
procedural requirements, or is defined and limited to specific terms, the very 
conferment of such power seems to be a restriction of right under Art.30 (1). Right 
of approval or appeal, coupled with a power to disallow a disciplinary action, 
means hardly anything else than vesting a right in an external authority to exercise 
final control over the management's right to take disciplinary action. Disciplinary 
control, being the most vital part of the right to administer is necessarily taken 
away once a power to disallow an action is vested somewhere else. The right of a 
minority to administer its institution according to its own choice must necessarily 
include a choice to select staff as well as a choice to decide for itself as to 
suitability of a teacher to be retained in its institution in accordance with its own 
ideas and ideals about the standards of conduct to be followed by the members of 
its staff 
The courts, however, seem to be in a dilemma. On the one hand they are 
bound by the letter and spirit of Art.30 (1). On the other hand, they do not seem to 
leave aside the truth that disciplinary control with the management involves very 
valuable rights that belong to the staff-members. It is because of this they have 
expressed their willingness to give their approval to a well-guided power 
conferred upon an external agency to see that Art. 30(1) does not become a tool of 
oppression in the hands of the management. This stand of the courts may well 
meet both the ends- the constitutional obligation to protect what is secured to 
minorities under Art.30 (1) and the social necessity to protect the staff in minority 
institutions. 
In W. Proost v. State of Bihar,^^ the validity of Section 48-A of the Bihar 
State Universities (University of Bihar, Bhagalpur and Ranchi) Act, 1960, was 
challenged by the authorities of St. Xavier' College which was managed by the 
Christian minority. The impugned section 48-A provided for the establishment of 
a University Service commission for affiliated colleges not belonging to the State 
Government and it was laid there-under that the appointments, dismissals, 
removals, termination of service or reduction in rank of teachers of the affiliated 
colleges were to be made on the recommendation of the University Service 
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Commission. Chief Justice Hidayatullah (on behalf of himself and justices' shah, 
Ramaswani and Grover) delivering the judgment, held for Section 48-A: "This 
provision completely takes away the autonomy of the Governing Body of the 
College and virtually vests the control of the colleges in the University 
Commission."'''' 
In Mrs. Y Theclamma v. Union of Indict^, The short point involved in this 
petition (under Article 32 of the Constitution) was whether linguistic minority 
educational institutions like the Andhra Education Society were governed by sub-
section (4) of section 8 of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973. Section 8(4) 
reads as follows: "where the managing committee of a recognized private school 
intends to suspend any of its employees, such intention shall be communicated to 
the director and no such suspension shall be made except with the prior approval 
of the Director". It was, however, provided that the managing committee may 
suspend an employee with immediate effect and without the prior approval of the 
Director if it is satisfied that such immediate suspension is necessary by reason of 
the gross misconduct, within the meaning of the Code of Conduct prescribed 
under section 9 of the employee. But it was clarified that no such immediate 
suspension shall remain in force for more than a period of fifteen days from the 
date of suspension unless it has been communicated to the Director and approved 
by him before the expiry of the said period. 
While upholding the above provisions the Court observed that although 
disciplinary control over the teachers of a minority educational institution is with 
the management, regulations can be made for ensuring proper conditions of 
service for the teachers and also for ensuring a fair procedure in the matter of 
disciplinary action. In the opinion of the court the provision contained in sub-
section (4) of Section 8 of the Act is designed to afford some measure of 
protection to the teachers of such institutions without interfering with the 
Managements' right to take disciplinary action. It, however, provided that in a case 
where the management charged the employee with gross misconduct, the Director 
is bound to accord his approval to the suspension. The court observed that in such 
cases the endeavour of the court has been to strike a balance between the 
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constitutional obligation to protect what is secured to the minorities under Article 
30(1) with (sic and) the social necessity to protect the members of the staff against 
arbitrariness and victimisation. 
In Osmania University Teacher's Association v. State of Andhra Pradesh^'^, 
also, the Supreme Court had reiterated the same view. In Manohar Harries 
Walters v. Basel Mission High Education Centre^° the supreme court relied 
heavily on Frank Anthony, Theclamma, All Bihar School Association and 
Osmania University cases and held that the right guaranteed to minority 
institutions by Articles0 (1) of the constitution is not invaded merely because a 
Tribunal constituted under an Act to hear appeals against the order of dismissal, 
removal or reduction in rank of an employee in the service of a minority 
institution. 
In T.M.A. Pai Foundations^ the court held that state is also under an 
obligation to protect the interest of teaching and non-teaching staff. The teachers 
who are working in the school should be governed by proper service conditions 
for teachers and staff receiving aid of the state and the teachers or staff for which 
no aid is being provided is the same. Prerequisite to attract good teachers is to 
have good service conditions. 
Regarding the allegations of misconduct and disciplinary action the court 
affirmed that:^ ^ where allegations of misconduct are made, it is imperative that a 
disciplinary enquiry is conducted, and that a decision is taken. In the case of a 
private institution, the relationship between the Management and the employees is 
contractual in nature. A teacher if the contract so provides, can be proceeded 
against and appropriate disciplinary action can be taken, if the misconduct of the 
teacher is proved. The court held that considering the nature of the duties and 
keeping the principle of natural justice in mind for the purposes of establishing 
misconduct and taking action thereon, it is imperative that a fair domestic enquiry 
is conducted. It is only on the basis of the result of the disciplinary enquiry that the 
management will be entitled to take appropriate action. The court did not see any 
reason why the Management of private unaided educational institutions should 
199 
seek the consent or approval of any governmental authority before taking any such 
action. In the ordinary relationship of master and servant, governed by the terms of 
a contract of employment, anyone who is guilty of breach of the terms can be 
proceeded against and appropriately relief can be sought. Normally, the aggrieved 
party would approach a court of law and seek redress. In the case of educational 
institutions, however, the court was of the opinion that requiring a teacher or a 
member of the staff to go to a civil court for the purpose of seeking redress is not 
in the interest of general education. 
The court further noted that the disputes between the management and the 
staff of educational institutions must be decided speedily, and without the 
excessive incurring of costs. It suggested setting up of an Educational Tribunal for 
each district in a State, to enable the aggrieved teacher to file an appeal, unless 
there already exists such an educational tribunal in a State -- the object being that 
the teacher should not suffer through the substantial costs that arise because of the 
location of the tribunal. Till a specialized tribunal is set up, the court observed, the 
right of filing the appeal would lie before the District Judge or Additional District 
Judge as notified by the government. It will not be necessary for the institution to 
get prior permission or ex post facto approval of a governmental authority while 
taking disciplinary action against a teacher or any other employee. The court held 
that the State Government shall determine, in consultation with the High Court, 
the judicial forum in which an aggrieved teacher can file an appeal against the 
decision of the management concerning disciplinary action or termination of 
service. 
An analysis of the above cases clearly establishes that the courts are 
convinced that the right to exercise disciplinary control over staff belong to the 
institutions and cannot be vested in any external authority. In their opinion the 
basis of the right to take disciplinary action emanates not only from the right to 
administer guaranteed under Article 30 but also from the contractual relationship 
of employer and employee that exists between the management and its staff It is 
because of that they have held that disciplinary action cannot be made subject to 
approval by any outside authority. They are also not prepared to hand over an 
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appellate power to any agency external to the institution even though such 
authority happens to be a quasi judicial authority. The courts, however, have 
insisted on holding an enquiry before any action is taken against the staff and have 
the institutions to follow a fair procedure while taking disciplinary action. 
5.4 Fees Regulation 
In Islamic Academy v. State of KarnatakaJ^ the fees structure of unaided 
institution has been well discussed by the Supreme Court. The Court held that 
there can be no fixing fee structure by the Government. Each institute must have 
the freedom to fix its own fee structure taking into consideration the need to 
generate funds to run the institution and to provide facilities necessary for the 
benefit of the students. They must also be able to generate surplus which must be 
used for the betterment and growth of that educational institution. It has been 
categorically laid down that the fees to be charged must necessarily be left to the 
private educational institutions that do not seek and which are not dependent upon 
any funds from the Government. Each institute will be entitled to have its own fee 
structure. The fee structure for each institute must be fixed keeping in mind the 
infrastructure and facilities available, the investments made, salaries paid to the 
teachers and staff, future plans for expansion and/or betterment of the institution 
etc. The surplus/profit that can be generated must be only for the benefit/use of the 
educational institution. 
As, at present, there are statutes/ regulations which govern the fixation of 
fees and as this Court has not yet considered the validity of those 
statutes/regulations, the court direct that in order to give effect to the judgment in 
T.M.A Paf'^ case the respective State Governments/ concerned authority shall set 
up, in each state, a committee headed by a retired High Court Judge who shall be 
nominated by the Chief-Justice of that State. The other member, who shall be 
nominated by the judge, should be a Chartered Accountant of repute. A 
representative of the Medical Council of India (in short "MCI") or the All India 
Council for Technical Education (in short "AICTE"), depending on the type of 
institution, shall also be a member. The Secretary of the State Government in 
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charge of Medical Education or Technical Education, as the case may be, shall be 
a member and Secretary of the Committee. The Committee should be free to 
nominate/ co-opt another independent person of repute, so that the total number of 
member of the Committee shall not exceed five. Each educational Institute must 
place before this Committee, well in advance of the academic year, its proposed 
fee structure. The Committee will be at liberty to approve the fee structure or to 
propose some other fee which can be charged by the institute. The fee fixed by the 
Committee shall be binding for a period of three years, at the end of which period 
the institute would be at liberty to apply for revision. Once fees are fixed by the 
Committee, the institute cannot charge either directly or indirectly any other 
amount over and above the amount fixed as fees. If any other amount is charged, 
under any other head or guise e.g. donations, the same would amount to charging 
of capitation fee. The Governments/ appropriate authorities should consider 
framing appropriate regulations, if not already framed where under if it is found 
that an institution is charging capitation fees or profiteering that institution can be 
appropriately penalized and also face the prospect of losing its recognition/ 
affiliafion. 
The court held that an educational institution can only charge prescribed fees 
for one semester/ year. If an institution feels that any particular student may leave 
in midstream then, at the highest, it may require that student to give a bond/bank 
guarantee that the balance fees for the whole course would be received by the 
institute even if the student left in midstream. If any educational institution has 
collected fees in advance, only the fees of that semester/ year can be used by the 
institution. The balance fees must be kept invested in fixed deposits in a 
nationalized bank. As and when fees fall due for a semester/ year only the fees 
falling due for the semester year can be withdraw by the institution. The rest must 
continue to remain deposited till such time that they fail due. At the end of the 
course the interest earned on these deposits must be paid to the student from whom 
the fees were collected in advance. 
The fee structure, thus, in relation to each and every college must be 
determined separately keeping in view several factors, including facilities 
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available, infrastructure made available, the age of the institution, investment 
made, future plan for expansion and betterment of the educational standard etc/^ 
While fixing the fee structure the Committee shall also take into consideration, 
inter alia, the salary or remuneration paid to the members of the faculty and other 
staff, the investment made by them, the infrastructure provided and plan for future 
development of the institution as also expansion of the educational institution. 
Future planning or improvement of facilities may be provided for. An institution 
may want to invest in an expensive device (for medical colleges) or a powerful 
computer (for technical college). These factors are also required to be taken care 
of The State must evolve a detailed procedure for constitution and smooth 
functioning of the Committee." 
Fees once fixed should not ordinarily be changed for a period of three years, 
unless there exits an extraordinary reason. The proposed fees, before indication in 
the prospectus issued for admission, have to be approved by the concerned 
authority/body set up. No institution should charge any fee beyond the amount 
fixed and the fee charged shall be deposited in a nationalized bank. ^^  
The question whether in exercise of its regulatory powers, the State can 
prohibit the collection (or charging) of fees in minority educational institufions on 
the ground that the Directive Principle of State Policy contained in Article 45 
requires it to endeavour to provide for free and compulsory education for all 
children until they complete the age of 14 year was considered by the Supreme 
Courts in the Kerala Education Bilf^ case. In this case. Justice Das realized that 
the imposition of any restriction against the collection of fees in an educational 
institution as a condifion for its recognition would in effect make it impossible for 
it to carry on and therefore held that such a restricfion would be violafive of 
Article 30(1). However, he was not prepared to go as real in Article 30(1) a 
fundamental right to recognition. 
As regards collection any fees higher than what is charged in the 
Governmental institutions for similar courses by the private aided institutions the 
Supreme Court in the capitation fee case Unni Krishna J.P. v. State ofA.P. said: 
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"The aided educational institutions have to abide by all the rules and 
regulations as may be framed by the Government and/or recognition/affiliation 
authorities in the matters of recruitment of teachers and staff, their conditions of 
service, syllabus, standard of teaching and so on. . . They shall not he entitled to 
charge any fees higher than what is charged in governmental institutions for 
similar courses. These are and shall be understood to be conditions of grant of aid. 
The reason is simple: public funds, when given as grant and not as a loan-carry the 
public character wherever they go, public funds cannot be donated for private 
purposes. The element of public character necessarily means a fair conduct in all 
respects consistent with the constitutional mandate of Arts 14 and 15."^' 
In nutshell it can be said that the unaided institution cannot charge fee for 
their profit and charging of fees is also subject to limitation. A committee headed 
by Chief Justice can fix the proposed fees structure in accordance with the 
infrastructure, age of the institution, investment made and the future plan etc. of 
the institution.^^ 
5.5 State Aid to Minority Educational Institutions 
The Constitution sought to secure two rights to minority educational 
institutions with respect to financial aid from the State: (1) A right, under the 
express provisions of Art.337, which entitled Anglo-Indian educational institutions 
to continue to receive, as a matter of Constitutional right, the same special 
financial grants to which they were entitled before 1948; (2), A right under the 
express provision of Art. 30(2) which prohibits the State, while granting aid to 
minority educational institutions, from discriminating against any educational 
institution on the ground that it is under the management of a minority whether 
based on religion or language. 
Art.337 reserved to Anglo-Indian educational institutions a right to get 
special financial grants from the State for a period of ten years after the 
commencement of the Constitution. What Art.337 did was to protect such 
financial grants which the Anglo-Indian institutions were getting before 
Independence. Such grants were initially protected for a period of three years. 
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There after, during each succeeding year, such grants could be reduced by ten per 
cent as compared to the preceding three years. The result was that ten years after 
the commencement of the Constitution, such grants, to the extent to which they 
were a special privilege to the Anglo-Indian community, were to cease. Thus, the 
concession under Art.337 is no more available to Anglo-Indian institutions now. 
The institutions entitled to receive special grants under Art.337 were under an 
obligation to make available 40 per cent of the annual admissions to other 
communities. 
One special feature of such grants was that it was not open to the State to put 
any other pre-conditions for receiving such grants. This was recognized by the 
Supreme Court in State of Bombay v. Bombay Education Society.^'' There the State 
of Bombay issued an order directing that no primary or secondary school shall 
admit to a class where English was used as the medium of instruction any pupil 
other than a pupil belonging to a section of citizens the language of which was 
English, namely, Anglo-Indians and citizens of non-Asiatic descent. The Barnes 
High School, which was a recognized Anglo-Indian school and had been 
imparting education through the medium of English since its inception in 1925, 
took the plea that one of the consequences of the order was that the school was 
prevented from admitting students whose mother tongue was not English. The 
Supreme Court noted that the Constitution had imposed upon Anglo-Indian 
institutions, as a condition of receiving special grants, the duty that at least 40 per 
cent of the annual admission therein must be made available to members of other 
communities, ft observed that if the order was applied to the Barnes school it 
amounted to preventing the school from performing its constitutional obligations, 
and thus exposed it to the risk of losing the special grant. The Court held that the 
order amounted to a further condition that was Art 337 itself had imposed upon 
Anglo-Indian institutions, which was not permissible under the Constitution. 
Thus the Supreme Court did not allow the imposition of any other conditions on 
the right of Anglo-Indian educational institutions that which Art.337 itself 
imposed upon them while protecting the financial grants to which they were 
entitled before 1948. 
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Art.30 (2) imposes an obligation upon the State not to discriminate against a 
minority institution in matter of financial aid which the State may choose to make 
available to educational institutions. What CI. (2) provides is not a positive right to 
claim aid fi-om the State; it only provides security against differential treatment in 
matters of distributions of financial grants. The provision does not imply that an 
educational institution belonging to a minority is entitled to ask for aid from the 
State. It is true that in modern times it is impossible to run an educafional 
institution imparting general secular education without some kind of financial 
assistance from the State, and it is also true, as S.R. Das C.J. recognized in the 
Kerala Opinion, that Art.30(2) postulates educational institutions receiving aid out 
of State funds. But the clause does no more than impose an obligation upon the 
State to maintain equality of treatment in matter of financial assistance to 
educational institutions. What the clause means to say is that the conditions under 
which grants-in-aid should be available to minority institutions must be the same 
as for all other educational institutions. 
In Sidhrajbhai v. State ofBombay^^ where Shah J., dealing with the scope of 
clause (1) of Art.30, said: Clause (2) is only a phase of the non-discrimination 
clause of the Constitution and does not derogate from the provisions made in CI. 
(1). The clause is moulded in terms negative; the State is thereby enjoined not to 
discriminate in granting aid to educational institutions on the ground that the 
management of the institution is in the hands of a minority, religious or linguistic, 
but the form is not susceptible of the inference that the State is competent 
otherwise to discriminate so as to impose restrictions upon the substance of the 
right to establish and administer educational institutions by minorities, religious or 
linguistic.^^ 
The operation of Art.30 (2) comes into picture only when a minority 
institution seeks aid from the State and the same is denied on the mere ground that 
the institution is under the management of a minority. The Constitution prohibits 
religious instruction only in institutions wholly maintained out of State funds. But 
it does not purport to prohibit any community from providing religious 
instructions on institutions maintained by that community out of its own funds. 
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Art. 30(2), therefore, has obviously no applicability in a situation where a minority 
institution, meets its expenses out of the funds of the minority and does not seek 
any aid from the State. Minority institutions seeking aid from the State may fall 
under two categories: (1) Institutions imparting general secular education, and (2) 
Denominational institutions imparting secular education according to the standards 
set by the State and also imparting religious education according to the tenets of 
the particular faith. The prohibhion against discrimination under Art.30 (2) must 
necessarily apply with regard to both the type of institutions. 
The application of the non-discrimination clause incorporated under Art.30 
(2) is confined only to one situation where the grant is denied to a minority 
institution or is sanctioned on an unequal basis. It does not have its application in a 
situation like the one that arose in Jose Collian v. Director of Public Instruction.^^ 
The petitioner in this case was a Roman Catholic and was running a school in a 
particular locality. He challenged an order of the Kerala Government, according 
sanction to another person to run a similar school in the same locality, as being in 
violation of Art.30(2). The main grievance of the petitioner was that as a 
consequence of the sanction granted to the other person and the opening of a 
similar school in the locality, he was unable to get for his school enough pupils to 
earn from the Government. The Kerala High Court rejected the plea and held: " . . . 
We are completely at a loss to see how the establishment of another school in the 
same locality interference with the petitioner's right to run his school and if the 
result thereof is that the petitioner cannot get enough pupils to earn a grant surely 
it cannot be said that the State is discriminating against him on the ground of his 
community. 
In the Kerala references'^ one of the questions that the Supreme Court 
considered was whether in order to obtain aid from State funds a minority 
educational institution could be submitted to certain conditions laid down in CIs. 
3,5,6,7,8,9,10,12,14,15 and 20 of the Kerala Education Bill. C1.5 required aided 
institutions to submit annual statements. By C1.6 the assets of the aided institutions 
were frozen and could not be dealt with except with prior permission of the 
Government. Under CI.7 the manager were to be appointed by the authorized 
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officer. Under C1.8, all fees etc. were required to be made over to the Government. 
By CI.9 the Government was responsible for payment of salaries to teachers and 
non-teaching staff. Under CI. 10, the Government was authorized to prescribe 
qualification of teachers. Under Cl.l 1, the aided institutions were under obligation 
to appoint teachers out of a panel settled by the Public Service Commission. Under 
CI. 12, the aided institutions could not take disciplinary action against staff except 
with previous sanction of the authorized officer. CI. 14 and 15 authorised the 
Government to take over management in certain cases. C1.20 sought to prevent 
aided schools from charging any fees for tuition in the primary classes. 
it was argued on behalf of minority institutions that these clauses imposed 
such conditions that they were compelled to surrender their fundamental right to 
establish and administer educational institutions as a price of aid doled out by the 
state. Counsels representing minority institutions contended that not only that 
28(3), 29(2) and 30(2) contemplated the grant of aid to educational institutions 
established by minorities but also relied on Article 41 and 46 which as Directive 
Principles make it the duty of the State to aid educational institutions and to 
promote educational institutions of minorities and other weaker sections of 
society. The Constitution contemplated not only institutions which are wholly 
maintained by the State but also institutions receiving aid out of State funds. The 
argument was if granting of aid is a government function, it must be discharged in 
a reasonable way and without infringing fundamental rights of minorities. 
In State of Kerala v. Mother Provwcial,'^^ sub-section (1), (2) and (9) of 
Section 53 of the Kerala University Act, 1969 were held as violative of the right 
under Art.30 (1). These were in fact similar in terms and effect as CI. 11 of the 
Kerala Education Bill 1957. Similarly, sub-section (2) and (4) of Section 56 of the 
Kerala University Act which were similar in terms and effect to sub-clause (1), 
(2), (3) and (4) of Clause 12 of the Kerala Education Bill came to be held invalid 
in the Mother Provincial case. In D.A.V. College v. State of Punjab'^^ Statue 17 
which incorporated a provision similar to sub-clauses (1), (2) and (3) of Clause 12, 
was declared as invalid. 
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In All Saints High School v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh^'^ T.S 
Kailasam, J., reaffirmed the views that the Constitution did not confer any right on 
the institution to get any aid. His Lordship held that, "It is open to the State to 
prescribe relevant conditions and insist on their being fulfilled before any 
institution becomes entitled to aid. No institution which fails to conform to the 
requirements thus validly prescribed would be entitled to any aid."^^ 
The Supreme Court in Unni Krishnan, J.P. v. State ofA.P/'^, a Constitution 
Bench had to consider the right of private educational institutions to collect 
capitation fee from the students. It was held in that case that right to higher 
education and in particular professional courses are not a fundamental right 
flowing from Art.21 of the Constitution. While considering that question the Court 
made the following relevant observations: "Per B.P. Jeeven Reddy, J.: A citizen of 
this country may have a right to establish an educational institution but no citizen, 
person or institution has a right much less a fundamental right to affiliation or 
recognition or to grant-in-aid from the State. The recognition and/or affiliation 
shall be given by the State subject only to the conditions set out in, and only 
accordance with the scheme contained in part-iii of this judgment."^^ 
Thus apart from a right to receive financial aid available to Anglo-Indian 
educational institutions for a limited period, and a right available to all minority 
institutions not to be discriminated against in matters of financial grants, minority 
institutions are not given any right, fundamental or otherwise, to receive any grant 
from the state. Further there can hardly be any disagreement on the point that the 
State while granting aid can prescribe conditions. But this hardly means that the 
State is free to impose any conditions at its sweet will. The validity of the 
conditions would be decided from case to case on the touchstone of the 
go 
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. 
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CONCLUSION 
The spirit and judicial perception in which the Courts have construed the 
cultural and educational rights of the minorities have been summarized by Shetty, 
J. in St. Stephens: 
"India is very much a Nation in the making. There are linkages and 
connections in the multilayered mix up. There are concerns and considerations 
underlying the provisions relating the minority rights. There are shared 
understandings and expectations of the founding fathers. The constitutional 
construction without such concern and consideration and without such shared and 
understanding and expectations is bound to be inadequate. "We must never forgef 
said Chief Justice Marshall "that it is a Constitution we are expounding", an 
instrument "framed for ages to come and . . . designed to approach Immortality as 
nearly as human institutions can approach."' 
The founding fathers tried to satisfy the hope, aspiration and desire 
of the minority by safeguarding them cultural and educational rights. At the Fifth 
Session of the Constituent Assembly of India, the Chairman (The Honorable Dr. 
Rajendra Prasad) assured the minorities that:^  
"To all the minorities in India we give the assurance that they will receive 
fair and just treatment and there will be no discrimination in any form against 
them. The religion, their culture and their language are safe and they will enjoy all 
the right and privileges of citizenship, and will be expected in their turn to render 
to loyalty to the country in which they live and its constitution. To all we give the 
assurance that it will be our endeavor to end poverty and squalor and its 
companions, hunger and disease to abolish distinction and exploitation and to 
ensure decent condition of living." 
The framers of our Constitution were well aware of the development taking 
place in and around the country and though it necessary to provide protection to 
the rights of the minority was submitted by the Chairman Advisory Committee on 
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Minorities to the President of tiie Constituent Assembly of India on August 8, 
1947 and was placed for consideration before the Constituent Assembly on August 
27, 1947. Emphasizing the importance of giving protection to minorities, the 
report in conclusion says:^ 
"We wish to make it clear, however, that our general approach to the whole 
problem of minorities is that the State should be so run that they should stop 
feeling oppressed by the mere fact that they are minorities and that, on the 
contrary, they should feel that they have as honourable a part to play in the 
national life as any other section of the community. In particular, we think it is a 
fundamental duty of the State to take special steps to bring up those minorities 
which are backward to the level of the general community." 
It is interesting to note that until the decision of partition had not became 
imminent, the member of the Constituent Assembly had placed before them the 
tasks of securing agreement on a constitutional arrangement which could on the 
one hand, reassure the minorities that their interest and their distinctive 
characteristics would be secured in the future political set-up and, on the other 
hand, ensuring for themselves that extremist demands of minorities were not to be 
conceded beyond a certain point. But the statement of June 3, 1947, providing for 
the partition of the country into two separate sovereign nations had the effect of 
changing the whole complexions of minority problem. The decision of partition 
and the great upheaval that was brought with it had the inevitable effect of 
materially alternating the situation both psychologically as well as strategically. 
Congress was no more in need of being extremely conciliatory, and was no more 
under extreme necessity to bring about 'consensus'. The problem of safeguards for 
minorities that had come to the forefront as a communal problem thus boiled down 
to lose its colour. The occurrence of events outside and the consequent change of 
attitudes inside the Assembly were the factors that greatly helped the Assembly in 
weeding out progressively the communal element from the minority problem. 
By not accepting the demands for separate electorates and reservation of 
seats on religions considerations, the Constituent Assembly thus sought do away 
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with any protective principle which could further damage the cause of national 
unity. But it also sought to reassure the minorities that their special interests which 
they cherished as fundamental to their life were safe under the constitution. This 
assurance, more particularly, concerned with cultural and educational interests of 
minorities which the Assembly sought to protect as justifiable rights. 
Ultimately, the Constituent Assembly conceded certain rights relating to 
education, language and culture and they came to be incorporated as Articles 29 
and 30. Thus these two articles sought to recognize and protect a right of religious 
and linguistic minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of 
their choice. By granting autonomy in culture and educational spheres, it was 
hoped that minorities would preserve their way of life and contribute in their own 
way to the prosperity and development of the country and towards its political 
unity 
The establishment and administration of educational institutions and cultural 
centers are undoubtly effective means of preservation of culture and linguistic 
characteristic of minorities. Therefore, special care seems to have been taken by 
the framers to put substance in the right to establish and administer educational 
institutions including institutions for imparting general education through the 
language of administering minority. It is not limited to the institutions established 
after the commencement of the Constitution, but extends also to the administration 
and running of the old established institution."* 
The term 'minority' defies exact definition and the question of defining 
"minority' has always been a hotly contested issue in international and domestic 
fora. Usually Minorities are recognized as groups of people who are united 
through race, religion, language or culture of which their members are conscious 
and which forms the basis of a common identity and distinguishes them from 
others on this basis. Such groups are generally called minorities when they are less 
numerous than the other groups or when they occupy a subordinate economic, 
political or special position in the state, or both. The criteria used to define, 
identify and distinguish minorities may vary from case to case, but generally they 
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have to do with language, religion, territory, history, social and political 
organization, shared myths and feeling of identity and belonging. 
Commonly a minority is understood in numerical terms. It refers to a group 
of individuals smaller in member as against the numerically dominant group in a 
population. But theorists go further than confining their definition of 'minority' to 
merely numerical-ratio criterion. As mentioned earlier the concept of minorities 
cannot be understood solely on the ground of enumeration alone. Three other 
features must also be taken into consideration. First, there must be certain 
identifiable ascribed special features which bind the group together and gives its 
members a sense of separate identity and it is also identified as such by the 
majority. Second, the group must feel that these special idenfity-constitufing 
features could shape the political and social order of the society in which it exist. 
Thus the groups must be politically relevant and must believe and desire that it can 
play a role in the determination of general policies and programmes. Third, there 
must be a perception of disadvantage on the basis of special constitutive features 
of the group. 
In the Indian context, beginning from the Constituent Assembly debates, the 
term 'minority' was to have wider connotation. In the assembly's deliberations, the 
minorities question was regarded as encompassing the claims of three kinds of 
communities: religious minorities, backward castes and tribal. The claims for 
special treatment by these groups were on the basis of some disadvantages 
suffered by them with respect to the rest of the population rather than their 
numerical status. 
The Indian Constitution uses the term minority/minorities only in four 
Articles, namely. Articles 29(1), 30, 350A, and 350B. However, what is amazing 
is that the Constitution nowhere defines the term 'minority', nor does it identify 
the minority groups or prescribe a definite test for identifying the same. There may 
have been two reasons for this - the first, that the framers thought it proper to leave 
the issue open to be guided by the judiciary, from case to case, and the second, 
that the framers did not think it fit to enter into details as the matter had been 
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discussed at such length before the Assembly that it was deemed as settled, who 
and what were minorities.^They were not confronted with any theoretical problem 
of bringing the concept of minority within the confines of a definitional 
formulation. They were rendering a practical solution to a problem which was 
essentially political and had remained in the forefront of India's political scene for 
several decades before independence. While Art. 23 of the Draft Constitution, 
corresponding to the present Article 30, was being debated,^ doubts were indeed 
expressed in the Constituent Assembly over the advisability of leaving vague 
justifiable rights to undefined minorities. The Assembly chose to avoid any further 
elaboration and left it to the wisdom of the courts to supply this omission. 
The judicial opinion seems to have correctly appreciated that the benefit of 
Art. 30(1) is confined to only two types of minorities - religious and linguisfic. It 
is this appreciation which led the Delhi High Court to affirm that "the only or the 
principal basis of a minority must be their adherence to one of the many religions. 
. . and that the other features of the minority are subordinate to the main feature, 
namely its separateness because of the religion".^ By analogy a similar 
interpretation can be put to the words "based on language" also. That being so it 
can be said that for the purpose of Art. 30, a minority means a non-dominant 
collectivity disfinguishable from the majority of the population by the objective 
factors of religion or language or a combination of both. 
The expression 'minority' is a relative term and its meaning should depend 
upon the territorial limits of its operation and the objectives of the particular 
legislation. The deliberations at the Constituent Assembly reveal that the problem 
of defining the term arose there, and the Assembly was unable to formulate any 
definifion of 'minority'. It is, however, clear that the protecfion of Article 30 
applies only to those religious and linguistic minorifies which had claimed 
political rights separated from the majority community prior to the Constitution 
such as the Sikhs, Muslims, Jains, Anglo-Indians and Christians.^ 
The right of the minorities under Article 30 (I) to 'establish and administer 
educational institutions of their choice' guaranteed three main rights: 
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1. The right to estabh'sh educational institutions; 
2. The right to administer educational institutions; and 
3. The right to determine the nature of their educational institutions at their own 
choice. 
Article (30) gives protection only to those educational institutions which are 
established by the minorities. No other institutions can claim this right. To 
administer an educational institution, it is necessary that such institution should be 
established by these minority groups who claim protection. Whether an 
educational institution is established by them or not is subject matter of proof and 
of judicial reviews. As observed by the Supreme Court in S.P. Mittal v. Union of 
India '"- "The benefit of Article 30(1) can be claimed by the community only on 
proving that it is a religious or linguistic minority and that the institution was 
established by it." 
The Courts have tried to solve this problem on the basis of facts and 
circumstances of each case. In every dispute where the protection of Art.30 is 
sought to be made available, the court must be satisfied that the institution in 
respect of which the claim to protection is advanced was in fact established by the 
minority. The nature of proof or the quantum of evidence is, however, a matter for 
the court's discretion and satisfaction. Thus while an affidavit is sometimes 
accepted to be the proof of the fact of establishment, in some cases the court have 
gone into the long history of the establishment and development of the institution 
concerned for the purpose of ascertaining whether the same was in fact established 
by the minority concerned." 
In weighing the sufficiency or inadequacy of the proof of establishment, the 
following factors, singly or in combination with each other have, in the main, 
determined the attitude of the courts. The factors are; name of the institution, 
persons involved in the establishment, sources of funds, subjection to legal 
provisions, expression of intention. What particular factor has received what 
emphasis in the court's estimation appears to have depended upon the 
circumstance of each case, upon the nature of the facts in dispute and of course, 
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upon the court's own discretion. But it is notable at the outset that in requiring 
proof of establishment a lavish use of discretion has resulted in opinions which not 
only fail to achieve other. The failure to evolve jurisprudence on such an important 
aspect of minority right as the kind and quantum of proof needed in support of a 
claim to establishment explains the reason why the courts have failed, at any rate 
in some cases, to enforce the commitment of the constitution. 
The absence of any fixed formulae and the consequent use of wide discretion 
have led the courts to arrive at conclusion which are not always rational. Nowhere 
is this more eminently visible than in the Azeez Bsaha decision which, as has been 
brought out, was wrongly decided. It must also be said that the Azeez Basha 
decision is the lone example to cite where that catholicity which permeates 
through the whole lot of judicial decisions is quite conspicuously missing. The 
decision in that case exemplifies how a court of law can create history by denying 
a fact bom of known history. It shows how a court can deny constitutional 
protection to an educational institution which existed on this soil for no less a 
period than 95 years. 
The next vital part of minority rights in education is the right to administer 
educational institutions. In one word right to administer means managing, 
maintaining, molding, organizing, planning after the affairs of the institution. In a 
very general sense right to administer of a minority educational institution 
indicates the power to appoint teaching and non- teaching staff, admissions of the 
students and deciding the medium of instruction etc. It can also be stated that the 
right to administration includes right to have a fine choice to mould the institution 
to better serve interest of the minority community. 
The right to administer, however, cannot include the right to mal-administer. 
The minority cannot surly ask for aid or recognition for an educational institution 
run by them in unhealthy surroundings without any competent teachers possessing 
any semblance of qualification and which does not maintain even a fair standard 
of teaching. Thus the state may legitimately insist that reasonable restrictions be 
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prescribed to ensure the excellence of the institution before giving aid or 
recognition. 
The right conferred by Article 30(1) is not an absolute right and is not free 
from regulation and that just as regulatory measures are necessary for maintaining 
the educational character and content of minority institutions. These are necessary 
also for ensuring orderly, efficient and sound administration of the school in the 
matter of maintaining discipline, health, morality etc. Chief justice Ray, speaking 
for himself and Justice Palekar in St. Xavier's college v. State of Gujarat said: 
"Permissible regulatory measures are those which do not restrict the right of 
administration but facilitate it and ensure better and more affective exercise of the 
right for the benefit of the institutions and without displacing the management. 
There is no limitation on the subject to be taught in such institution, and they 
are not debarred from giving general education as well in such institution. It is not 
necessary for the protection of Art.30 (1) that the majority of pupils belonging to 
the institution must belong to the religion of minority in question. Thus nature and 
purpose of the institution is entirely left to the discretion of the community. This 
view was upheld by the Supreme Court in State of Bombay v. Bombay Education 
Society.'^ Das C.J. observed: "There is no Limitation placed on the subjects to be 
taught in such educational institutions. As such minorities will ordinarily desire 
that their children should be brought up properly and efficiently and be eligible for 
higher university education and go out in the world fully equipped with such 
intellectual attainments as well make them fit for entering the public services, 
educational institutions of their choice will necessary include institutions 
imparting general secular education also. In other words, the Article leaves it to 
their choice to establish such educational institution as well serve both purpose, 
mainly the purpose of conserving their religion, language or culture, and also the 
purpose of giving a through good general education to their children." 
All educational experts are uniformly of the opinion that pupils should begin 
their schooling through the medium of their mother tongue. There is great reason 
and justice behind this. If the tender minds of the children are subject to an alien 
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medium the learning process becomes unnatural. It inflicts a cruel strain on the 
children which makes the entire transaction mechanical. Besides, the educational 
process becomes artificial and tortuous. The basic knowledge can easily be 
garnered through the mother tongue. Keeping this philosophy in mind, a 
conference of the state ministers of education passed a resolution recommending 
for introduction of mother tongue as the medium of instruction at the primary-
school stage and that where there were no fewer than forty students of a linguistic 
minority in a school, or ten students in a class, the state should provide facility for 
imparting instruction to these student by appointing a teacher in that school for 
that purpose 
One important concomitant of minorities' right to administer educational 
institution is to decide the medium of instruction for their institutions. Article 
30(1) which provided minorities the right to establish and administer educational 
institutions of their 'choice'. Their 'choice', therefore, must necessarily include a 
choice to determine the language of instruction in such institutions. Further Article 
29 (1) admits that the minorities have right to conserve their distinct language or 
script but it does not specify the means of conserving such right. Establishment of 
educational institution is, undoubtedly, one of the most effective means of 
conservation of language and script. The Gujarat High Court in Sri Krishna v. 
Gujarat University^^ expressed the view that the right to determine the medium of 
instruction was a necessary part of the rights secured to minorities under Arts.29 
(1) and 30 (1). The court held that neither the State Legislature nor the Gujarat 
University had the competence under the Constitution to prohibh St. Xaviers 
College from deciding to instruct its pupils in a language of its own choice. 
Minorities have not faced much difficulty in exercising their right to 
determine the medium of instruction for their institutions except where a state has 
sought to prescribe a language as the exclusive medium of instruction. With the 
reorganisation of the States on linguistic basis, the States have shown a tendency 
to prescribe the regional language as the sole medium for teaching, with the 
obvious object to promote regional language. In the Gujarat University case what 
the university had done was to make an attempt to leave the students taking 
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admission to certain classes with no option but to receive instruction and write 
examination in thie Gujarati language. In the D.A.V. College case also the 
university had sought to impose Punjabi as the exclusive medium for students 
taking admission to pre-University class. 
Thus the choice of minority institution to determine medium of instruction is 
implicit in Art. 29(1) and 30(1) and had the status of a fundamental right, the 
State's power to regulate medium of instruction must not come into conflict with 
this right. The choice of minority institution to decide for itself the medium of 
instruction cannot be restricted on extraneous considerations, however laudable. It 
is also recognized that no language can be prescribed as the sole medium of 
instruction if that is not the language of the minority concerned. A university 
cannot compulsorily affiliate a minority institution and impose upon it a medium 
which is not its own. At the same time no minority can claim that the affiliating 
university should conduct teaching and examination in a language which the 
minority has a right to adopt. 
In D.A. V. College v. State of Punjab Reddy J. rightly observed that The state 
must harmonies its power to prescribe the medium of instruction with the rights of 
the religious or linguistic minority or any section of citizens to have the medium of 
instruction an script of their own choice by either providing also for instruction in 
the media of these minorities or if there are other University which allow such 
colleges to be affiliated where the medium of instruction is that which is adopted 
by the minority institutions, to allow them the choice to be affiliated to them. 
The admission policy is another important matter which is considered very 
much within the realm of the administration of a minority educational institution. 
The issue of admissions to the minority educational institutions has raised two 
main questions: firstly whether admissions in such institutions be considered as 
part of the right to administer conferred under article 30(1), and secondly whether 
state can regulate admissions in such institutions and if yes then to what extent? 
In St. Stephen's College v. University ofDelhi^'^ the Supreme Court held that 
admission of students is an important facet of administration. It can be regulated 
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but only to the extent that the regulation is conducive to the welfare of the 
minority institution or for the betterment of those who resort to it. In this case the 
Supreme Court clearly laid down the law regarding the admission to minority 
educational institutions. In the light of all the relevant principles and factors and in 
view of the importance which the constitution attaches to protective measures of 
minorities under Article 30(1), the court decided that there have to be two 
categories for annual admissions in a minority educational institution: (a) 
Category-1, (50% seats) for candidate belonging to the minority community which 
has established and administers the institution; (b) Category- II, (remaining 50%) 
for all candidates to be filled purely on the basis of merit. According to the 
Supreme Court, in the 50% Category - II admissions in a minority educational 
institution there can be no reservation or weightage for any class of admission-
seekers, here the admission are to be based purely on merit. The decision ruled out 
any reservation for SC/ST candidates in Category- II. 
The courts have also asserted and reiterated that Art.30 (1) of the 
Constitution of India cannot be read to imply a condition that an institution, in 
order to have the status of a 'minority institution' must keep its doors open to the 
members of the minority alone. Art. 30(1) implies no limitation whatever the 
minority institutions to restrict their 'choice' of admission to the members alone.'^ 
Admitting non-member does not shed its minority character. 
The selection and appointment of staff for running educational institution is 
also an essential part of the "right to administer" under Art.30 (1). The position 
that a Principal/ Head Master or other teachers occupy in the setup of an 
educational institution is of great importance. It is almost wholly these 
functionaries on whom depends the tone and temper of the institution. On them 
depends the establishment and continuity of its traditions and reputation, the 
maintenance discipline, and the efficiency of its teaching and training. On their 
outlook, efficiency and cooperation depends the success or failure of the objects of 
establishment of the institution. It is regarded as pre-eminently a function of the 
administration. 
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The right to choose the principal and to have the teaching conducted by 
teachers appointed by the management after an overall assessment of their outlook 
and philosophy is perhaps the most important facet of the right to administer an 
educational institution. So long as the persons chosen have the qualifications 
prescribed by the University, the choice must be left to the management. That is 
part of the fundamental right of the minorities to administer the educational 
institution established by them. 
The position taken by the Supreme Court in this regard is that while a 
University can prescribe qualifications for the academic staff, the actual selection 
of teachers must remain in the hands of the administration of the institution and 
dilution of the right of the management infringes Art.30 (1). In A.M. Patroni v. 
Asstt. Education Officer'^ the Court observed that even if an institution was 
protected under Art.30 (1), the state could make laws regulafing the appointment 
of teachers in the interest of the institution. It, however, insisted that the regulation 
must be limited to the qualifications that a teacher must possess and to the 
experience which he should have. 
The Supreme Court in Board of Secondary Education & Teachers Training 
V. Jt. Director of Public Instruction again reiterated that the management's right to 
choose a qualified person as the Headmaster of the school is well insulated by the 
protective cover of Article 30 (1) of the Constitution and it cannot be chiseled out 
through any legislative act or executive rule except for fixing up the qualifications 
and conditions of service for the post; and that any such statutory or executive feat 
would be violative of the fundamental right enshrined in Article 30(1) and would 
therefore be void. The Court further observed that if the management of the school 
is not given the wide freedom to choose the person for holding the key-post of 
Principal subject, of course, to the restriction regarding qualifications to be 
prescribed by the State, the right to administer the School would get much 
diminished. 
Thus a review of the above decisions would show that consistency injudicial 
approach is hardly anywhere more solidly founded that on the question of scope of 
225 
autonomy enjoyable by minority institutions in matter that pertain to selection of 
staff. The courts seem to be unwilling to concede any other power to the State than 
a power to prescribe minimum qualification for persons to be appointed by such 
institutions. They are unwilling to accept even such a condition which requires 
that a principal should be appointed from among the existing teachers of the 
institution. Nor are they willing to allow even one person from outside to sit on the 
selection committee for appointment of personnel of the institution. Thus, between 
the right of minorities to choose teachers and other staff of their own choice and 
the claim of the State to regulate such appointments so as to maintain academic 
standards the formula that the courts have evolved is that the State can prescribe 
professional qualifications and experience and the minority institutions are left 
with the freedom to choose personnel. 
Maintenance of discipline, order, and excellence in academic standards 
depends to a very great extant upon a qualified, efficient and disciplined teaching 
and administrative staff. It thus apparently seems that minority institutions, like 
any other employer, have a right to select staff of their own choice and preference 
and to take action against them either to enforce an orderly conduct or to enforce 
the terms of the contract of service. This right involves prescribing qualifications 
for appointment of staff, prescribing the manner of their selection, laying down the 
conditions of service, enforcing discipline among them, compelling performance 
of duties and taking action against those found recalcitrant. The State, however, 
must have some kind of regulatory power so as to safeguard the interests of those 
employed in such institutions and to ultimately maintain a minimum level in 
academic standards. This is also necessary to prevent abuse of power by the 
managements of minority institutions. The state is also under an obligation to 
protect the interest of teaching and non-teaching staff The teachers who are 
working in the school should be governed by proper service conditions for 
teachers and staff receiving aid of the state and the teachers or staff for which no 
aid is being provided is the same. Prerequisite to attract good teachers is to have 
good service conditions. 
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The courts, however, seem to be in a dilemma. On the one hand they are 
bound by the letter and spirit of Art.30 (1). On the other hand, they do not seem to 
leave aside the truth that disciplinary control with the management involves very 
valuable rights that belong to the staff-members. It is because of this they have 
expressed their willingness to give their approval to a well-guided power 
conferred upon an external agency to see that Art. 30(1) does not become a tool of 
oppression in the hands of the management. This stand of the courts may well 
meet both the ends- the constitutional obligation to protect what is secured to 
minorities under Art.30 (1) and the social necessity to protect the staff in minority 
institutions. 
An analysis of the case law clearly establishes that the courts are convinced 
that the right to exercise disciplinary control over staff belong to the institutions 
and cannot be vested in any external authority. In their opinion the basis of the 
right to take disciplinary action emanates not only from the right to administer 
guaranteed under Article 30 but also from the contractual relationship of employer 
and employee that exists between the management and its staff. It is because of 
that they have held that disciplinary action cannot be made subject to approval by 
any outside authority. They are also not prepared to hand over an appellate power 
to any agency external to the institution even though such authority happens to be 
a quasi judicial authority. The courts, however, have insisted on holding an 
enquiry before any action is taken against the staff and have the institutions to 
follow a fair procedure while taking disciplinary action. 
The minority educational institutions do not enjoy any fundamental right 
under Article 30(1) to receive grant in aid from the State. Art.30 (2) only imposes 
an obligation upon the State not to discriminate against a minority institution in 
matter of financial aid which the State may choose to make available to 
educational institutions. What CI. (2) provides is not a positive right to claim aid 
from the State; it only provides security against differential treatment in matters of 
distributions of financial grants. The provision does not imply that an educational 
institution belonging to a minority is entitled to ask for aid from the State. The 
application of the non-discrimination clause incorporated under Art.30 (2) is 
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confined only to one situation wiiere tlie grant is denied to a minority institution or 
is sanctioned on an unequal basis. Further there can hardly be any disagreement on 
the point that the State while granting aid can prescribe conditions. But this hardly 
means that the State is free to impose any conditions at its sweet will. The validity 
of the conditions would be decided from case to case on the touchstone of the 
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. 
Recognition and affiliation are very powerful instruments in the hands of 
State or University to control minority educational institutions. Recognition is a 
facility which the State grants to an educational institution for enabling the 
students in such institution to sit for an examination certificates to degrees. The 
student of an unrecognized educational institution cannot obtain the recognized 
certificates or degrees, cannot be eligible for higher education and, in the existing 
system where jobs are generally linked with educational degrees, cannot be 
eligible for entering the public services. And affiliation to a university is sought to 
enable the students of minority educational institutions to sit for examination 
conducted by a university. Minorities have thus an interest in recognition and 
affiliation of their institutions as without this their educational institutions cannot 
fulfill the real objects of their 'choice' and cannot effectively exercise the rights 
available to them under Art.30 (1). 
The consistent view of the Supreme Court has been that there is no 
fundamental right of a minority institution to affiliation or recognition. But the 
judiciary has also recognized that for a real and meaningful exercise of the right by 
the minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice, 
recognition by the state or affiliation to a university is a must. In the absence of it 
the educational institutions would be robbed of their utility as the students of their 
institutions could not be trained for University degrees or compete for government 
jobs. The courts have observed that recognition or affiliation cannot be granted or 
refused on conditions which have the effect to deprive minorities of their rights 
under Article 30(1). The analysis of the cases shows that the Courts are conscious 
that in the absence of such right the establishment of a minority institution is not 
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only ineffective but also unreal for the purpose of conferment of degrees on 
students. 
However, the educational institutions established by the minorities cannot 
compel the State to recognize them if they fail to follow the statutory measures 
regulating educational standards and efficiency, the prescribed courses of study 
and instructions, the principles regarding the qualifications for the entry of 
students into educational institutions etc. Nor can the State discriminate against the 
minority institutions, or can provide by law for on such terms which would result 
in the abridgement or surrender of their fundamental rights. 
In the end it is important to emphasize that the right of the minorities under 
Art. 30(1) of the Constitution, though couched in absolute terms, is subject to 
regulatory power of the State. The decisions on the scope and applicability of 
Art.30 (1) seem to have long settled that as no right can be absolute, Art.30, being 
no exception, cannot have its operation as an unbridled license, and can have its 
effectiveness only within specified limits. However, the extent to which the State 
can regulate the affairs of the minority educational institutions is a controversial 
issue. The judiciary has consistently recognized that reasonable restrictions can be 
imposed in the interest of the minority educational institutions. 
The Courts have recognized and emphasized that regulations can be imposed 
in all such matters that go to ensure excellence of the institutions. The courts have 
done so despite the fact that no where under Art. 30 (1) such regulation is 
stipulated. Regulations may be made either by legislation or by executive order. 
Such regulation are permissible only in so far as they do not restrict the right of 
administration of the minority community but facilitate and ensure better and more 
effective exercise of that right for the benefit of the institutions.''' Regulafions 
should not be in such a manner that offends the very sprit of Art.30 (1). 
Regulations which may lawfully be imposed either by legislative or executive 
action must satisfy a dual test : that the regulation must be reasonable; and 
regulation is of educational character of the institution and is conducive to making 
the institution an effective vehicle of education. 
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In Faiz-e-Am College^^ case Krishna layer J. held that it is not only 
erroneous to beHeve in the untouchable absoluteness of Art. 30, equally fallacious 
is the simplistic submission that Art. 30 are disturbed only when the right is 
destroyed, not when it is damaged. Abridgement of the constitutional right is as 
obnoxious as annihilation. To cripple is to kill. He opined that regulation which 
restricts is bad; but regulation which facilitates is good. To draw the delicate line 
between what is permissible and which is not learned Judge observed: "A benignly 
regulated liberty which neither abridges nor exaggerates autonomy but promotes 
better performance is the right construction of the constitutional provision. Such 
an approach enables the fundamental right meaningfully to fulfill its tryst with the 
minorities' destiny in a plural policy. He said that to regulate, be it noted, is not to 
restrict, but to facilitate effective exercise of the very right. The constitutional 
estate of the minorities should not be encroached upon neither allowed to be 
neglected nor mal-administered".'' 
An analysis of decided cases shows that the extent of regulatory power of the 
state has always been subject matter of controversy because the nature of 
regulation differs from one case to another and no general standard test can be laid 
down for determining the extant of states power to regulate educational 
institutions of the minorities. Any generalization cannot be exhaustive because 
there is no similarity of issues that come before the court. However, what seems to 
be well established that a regulatory measure must be reasonable and must also be 
regulative of the educational character of the institution as a minority institution 
and must be conducive to making the institution as an effective vehicle of 
education. A regulation in order to be valid must not interfere with autonomy and 
independence in matters of management and it must not deprive the institution of 
its minority character. The interest of the minority and not the public interest or 
national interest should be crucial in determining the constitutionality of a 
regulation. 
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